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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and Aim of This Book
The level of economic development, economic policies and systems have been trans-
formed since 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was established. Economic
historians usually divide the Chinese economy into the planned economy period
(1949–1977), and the market-oriented economy reform period (post-1978) (also be
called as “transition period”). In the period of planned economy, with the “socialism
campion”, the ownership of whole firms was changed into the government owned
including the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and collectively owned enterprises
(COEs). In other words, only public sector maintained in the planned economy
period in China. Based on the socialism ideology, Chinese government emphasized
gender equality as an important socialist ideology, and the government enforced it
thoroughly by implementing equal employment policies and policies to promote
women’s labor participation, as demonstrated by the slogan “women can hold up
half of the sky”. Therefore, the gender gap in employment, wages, and occupation
was much smaller in that era (Meng 2000; Gustafsson and Li 2000; Li and Song
2013; Ma 2018a, b).
During the market-oriented economy reform period since the 1978, the influence
of market mechanism has become greater which enhance the Chinese economic
growth (Lin et al. 1994). As the progressive of economy transition and economic
growth, the female employment and gender gap change greatly in China, the main
reasons can be considered as follows.
First, with the progressive of ownership reform, the problem of administration
against women in labor market has become severe (Gustafsson and Li 2000; Liu
et al. 2000; Maurer-Fazio and Hughes 2002; Ma 2018a, b). China has long been
known for its persistent advocacy for gradual economic reform. During the market-
oriented economy reform period since 1978, reform has led to substantial growth of
the private sector (i.e. privately owned enterprises: POEs; foreign owned enterprises:
FOEs), while Chinese government has tried to preserve and give favorable treatment
to the public sector (in particular, SOEs in key industry sectors) (Lin et al. 1994; Ma
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2018b, 2019; Ma and Iwasaki 2021; Iwasaki and Ma 2020). As a result, the division
between the public sector and the private sector has becomeone of themost prominent
features in Chinese labor market (Zhang and Xue 2008; Ye et al. 2011; Ma 2018a,
b, 2019). Firms in the private sector can determine wage levels and employment
conditions of individual workers at their own discretion. As it is pointed out by the
discrimination hypothesis (Becker 1957), the discriminations against femaleworkers
from employer, customer or colleague may occur in the private sector. In additions,
with the progressive of SOEs reform, the SOEs own more decision authorities of
employees’ employment and wage, the discrimination against female workers may
occur easily than that in the planned economy period.
Second, from labor supply perspective, as the economic growth, the household
income increased greatly in China (Li et al. 2017; Sicular et al. 2020). Based on
individual utility maximum model, the increased household income may decrease
the female labor force participation, a part of women in high-income household may
choice to exit labor market to become housewives voluntarily (Fu et al. 2016; Ma
2018b; Ma and Zhang 2018).
Third, from the labor demand side, excepting the discrimination factors in work-
place, it is found that as the development of industry sectors (i.e. service industry) and
AI (artificial intelligence) technological progressive, the demand of female workers
has changed greatly for both developed and developing countries (Goldin 1990;
Wamboye et al. 2015; Gupta et al. 2015). With the progressive of modernization and
urbanization in China, it can be assumed that the industry structural upgradation also
effects female employment and gender gap in China.
Forth, the policy and institutional reforms also affect the female employment
and wage gap in China. For example, the New Rural Pension scheme (NRPS) was
implemented in 2009 in rural China, it is expected that receiving public pension
benefits may enhance the well-being of individuals at older age, while it might also
affect the labor supply of pensioner or intra-household prime-age adults (Cheng
2014; Zhang 2015; Liu et al. 2016; Liu 2017; Ma 2020). In additions, the Higher
Education Expansion Policy (HEEP) was published in 1999, it might affect the
college enrollment of students, employment andwage of college graduates (He 2009;
Wu and Zhao 2010; Xing and Li 2011; Yao et al. 2014). When there maintains the
gender role segregation in household and workplace, the influences of these policy
or institutional changes on employment and wage may differ by gender.
Fifth, the gender role consciousness may change with the economy system tran-
sition and economic development, which may also affect the female employment
and gender gap in China. Because there remains gender role segregation, the hours
allocation of family care (i.e. parent care, child care), housework and market work
differ by gender (Becker 1985). In China the influences of Confucian culture on the
consciousness (i.e. filial piety, male domination of women) and lifestyle (i.e. parent
care, living arrangement) are still maintain, particularly, which may cause to the
different pictures of female employment and housework by areas.
These reasons mentioned above have made the female employment and gender
gap changed greatly. This book aims to investigate the situations and determinants
of female employment and gender gap in labor market under the market-oriented
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economy reform period in China. It provides the reader with academic evidences for
understanding themechanism of female labor force participation, the determinants of
gender gap in both household andworkplace, and the impact of policy transformation
on women’ wage and employment in China from economics perspective.
1.2 Main Contents of This Book
This book consists of three parts—Part I Women’s Family Responsibilities and
Employment in China (Chaps. 2 and 3), Part II The Gender Gap in China’s Labor
Market and Society (Chaps. 4, 5 and 6) and Part III Impact of Policy on Women’s
Labor Market Outcomes in China (Chap. 7). The main contents of each chapter are
as follows.
Chapter 2 analyzes the impact of market wage, reservation wage, and unearned
income on the probability ofwork participation ofmarriedwomen by using the longi-
tudinal survey data (China Health and Nutrition Survey: CHNS) from 1989 to 2015
and a random effects probit model to address the heterogeneity problem. The main
findings can be summarized as follows: first, in general, the market wage positively
affects the probability of work participation of married women; the reservation wage
negatively affects the probability of work participation of married women; but the
effect of unearned income is not statistically significant, which contrasts with most
studies of developed countries. Second, the effects differ by age group: the market
wage has a negative effect for middle-aged married women aged 40–49, while it has
a positive effect for younger married women aged 20–39. The negative effect of child
care is greater for mothers aged 30–39; the effect of a husband’s income is not signif-
icant in any age group. Third, the effects differ by urban/rural area: the market wage
positively affects the work participation of married women in urban areas, while the
influence of the market wage on married women is not significant in rural areas. The
negative effect of the reservation wage is greater for married women in urban areas
than for those in rural areas; the effects of a husband’s income are not significant
for either urban or rural areas. Fourth, for the effects by employment status, the
market wage positively affects the probability of becoming a regular worker; when
the market wage rises, the probability of becoming an irregular worker is lower than
that of becoming a nonworker. The negative effect of the reservation wage is greater
for regular work. A husband’s income positively affects the probability of a woman
becoming a regular worker, while it negatively affects her probability of becoming
an irregular worker. These results suggest that a child care support policy can be
expected to address the family-work conflict for Chinese married women.
Chapter 3 investigates the impact of parent care giving on middle-aged women’
employment in China. Based on the household utility maximum mechanism, most
women assume family responsibilities, while most men work in the labor market.
Therefore, it can be thought that parent care may affect women’s labor supply. Some
previous studies for developed countries found that parent care can decreasewomen’s
labor supply. Family care work—including parent care—has been considered a kind
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of unpaid work in the household. China has become an aging-population society; the
Chinese government has faced the problemof decreasingworking-age laborers. Does
parent care influence women’s participation in work? Even though some previous
studies have analyzed the influence of child care on women’s labor supply and
discussed the unpaid work in China, empirical studies on the impact of parent care
giving on middle-aged women’s employment are scarce. Using the longitudinal data
of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS) from 2011
to 2015, Chap. 3 investigates the influence of parent care giving on probability of
work participation ofwomen aged 45–69 inChina. The random-effectsmodel and the
instrumental variables (IV) method are used to address the unobserved heterogeneity
and endogeneity problems. The main findings are as follows. First, the number of
parents living, number of siblings, and individual characteristics such as education,
age, health status, family structure (number of children, household income), and
labor market segmentation factors (urban or rural areas) may influence the proba-
bility of middle-aged and older women providing the caring for parents. Second,
although the results in previous studies that used younger and middle-aged women
(i.e., women aged 18–52) indicate that parent care negatively affects women’s labor
supply, this chapter focuses on middle-aged and older women aged 45–69 and finds
that the probability of work participation is higher for the care-giving group. This can
be explained by the fact that the positive effect (obtaining income effect) is higher
than the negative effect (time-constraint effect). Third, the influences of caring for
parents on women’s work participation differ by group. Concretely, the influence for
women aged 50–59, the well-educated, and low-income women is greater than that
for their counterparts. These results indicate that, in China, most women who care
for parents are likely to participate in work simultaneously; it can be considered that
women who care for parents have to work to obtain money for expenditures associ-
ated with parent care. This suggests that the work-family conflict caused by parent
care may remain among middle-aged and older women. An elderly care insurance
policy should be considered to reduce the burden of caring for parents.
Chapter 4 investigates the influence of labor market segmentation by enterprise
ownership sectors on the genderwage gap in the 2000s.Although theChinese govern-
ment has introduced a number of new policies and regulations since the 1980s to
address the gender gap in labor markets, the gender wage gap has been growing
during the transition period. The expansion of the gender wage gap in urban China
can be explained in many ways. Although some empirical studies have investi-
gated the determinants of the gender wage gap in urban China during the transi-
tion period, empirical studies of the detailed decomposition by different ownership
sectors on the gender wage gap are scarce. Using data of the Chinese Household
Income Project (CHIP) surveys conducted in 2003 and 2014 (CHIPs 2002 andCHIPs
2013), Chap. 4 explores the determinants of the gender wage gap by five kinds of
ownership sectors—the government organization, state-owned enterprises (SOEs),
collectively owned enterprises (COEs), privately owned enterprises (POEs), and the
self-employment sector—from 2002 to 2013 in urban China. A decomposition anal-
ysis of the gender wage gap based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model is
employed. Several major conclusions emerge. First, the gender wage gap exists in
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the urban labor market. When all factors—including the human capital factor—and
ownership dummy variables are constant, the gender wage gap remains in both 2002
and 2013. Second, both the gender difference in human capital and discrimination
against female workers contribute to the gender wage gap; the influence of the unex-
plained component (e.g., discrimination against female workers) increased in each
ownership sector from 2002 to 2013. The range of the increase in the influence of
the unexplained component is greater for firms in the public sector than for those in
the private sector. Third, the influence of factors on the gender wage gap differs by
ownership sector. Concretely, (1) work experience years in the explained component
and years of work experience in the unexplained component are the main factors
for government organizations; (2) the industry sector in the explained component
and ethnic and health status in the unexplained component are the main factors for
SOEs; (3) the occupation in the explained component and the industry in the unex-
plained component are the main factors for COEs; (4) the industry in the explained
component and the work experience years in the unexplained component are the
main factors for FOEs; (5) the industry sector in the explained component and the
occupation as well as education in the unexplained component are the main factors
for the self-employment sector. Because the main factors contributing to the gender
wage gap differ by ownership sector, policies to address the genderwage gap problem
should be different for each ownership sector.
Chapter 5 investigates the determinants of becoming a member of Communist
Party of China (CPC) and the impact of CPCmembership on the wages, and compare
the differences of mechanisms by gender. In China, despite the drastic transition
from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy, because the government
has employed a gradual reform, the de facto Communist Party of China dictatorship
is strongly maintained in the political sphere. This fact creates a unique aspect of the
Chinese economy. There is no doubt that the wage premium of CPC membership is
an important research topic in the study of the Chinese labor market. Nevertheless,
neither theoretical nor empirical studies can reach a certain conclusion on this issue.
Thus, empirical studies should be employed. Chapter 5 uses an empirical study
for the issue. New findings emerge. First, when the other factors are constant, the
probability of becoming a CPCmember is 7.3–7.7% points lower for female workers
than for male workers. This indicates that a gender gap of participation in the CPC
organization remains. Second, the wage premium of CPC membership is higher for
female workers (around 34.7% points) than for male workers (4.8–30.8% points),
and the influence of selection bias on wage levels is greater for female workers than
for males. Third, for both female andmale workers, when the sample selection bias is
controlled, the contribution rate of the unexplained component increases from−19.0
to 232.5% (female) or 11.4 to 139.2% (male); the range of increase of the unexplained
component is greater for female workers than for male workers. This indicates that
the factors that influence self-selection or being selected to become a CPC member
greatly affect the wage gap, and the influence is greater for female workers than for
males. Fourth, the decomposition results show that excepting the selection bias, the
endowment differentials such as the difference in years of schooling, distributions
of occupations, and industry sectors are the main factors affecting the wage gap for
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both female and male workers, and the contributions of endowment differentials are
greater for female workers than for males.
Chapter 6 explores the gender gap of social participation activity in China.
Research findings of the issue for the developed countries suggest that, inmany devel-
oped countries, volunteer activity is an important part of social life that improves
individuals’ well-being and increases social capital and community development.
Yet empirical studies of participation in volunteer activity for China using national
longitudinal survey data are limited. Using the longitudinal data of the China Health
and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS) from 2011 to 2015, Chap. 6 investi-
gates the determinants of participation in volunteer activity of individuals aged 45–69
in China; it also compares differences in the determinants by gender. The random
effects model and instrumental variables (IV) method are used to address unob-
served heterogeneity and endogeneity problems. The main findings are as follows.
First, when other factors are held constant, the gender gap in the probability of
participating in volunteer activity is smaller. Second, to compare differences in the
determinants for participating in volunteer activity by gender, the results indicate
that six factors (market work, education, income, family care, age, health status)
are broadly supported for women and men, but the influence of determinant factors
is different by gender. For example, the negative influence of work on participa-
tion in volunteer activity is greater for women than for men. The results indicate that
participation in the labor market negatively affects participation in volunteer activity.
There is a trade-off relationship between working hours and leisure time (volunteer
activities), particularly for women. This may be because that the family responsibil-
ities (e.g., child care, parent care) are greater for women than for men. Therefore,
the adjustment of working hours and leisure hours is difficult for women; in other
words, it is shown that work-family conflicts may be greater for women than for men.
The results indicate that the enforcement of work-life balance policies—including a
policy to promote men’s participation in housework and the mandatory family care
leave system—may increase women’s participation in social activity.
Chapter 7 analyzes the impact of Higher Education Expansion Policy (HEEP) on
wage of female and male college graduates and compares the effects of the policy by
gender. In 1999, the HEEP was implemented by the government. Along with imple-
mentation of the policy, the number of college graduates increased from 1.08 million
in 1998 to 6.381million in 2013.According to the generalmarket equilibriummecha-
nism, when the labor demand is constant, the increased college graduate labor supply
in the short term may decrease the graduate wage level (negative effect), whereas,
when the labor demand for college graduates increases greatly with economic growth
or technological progress, the college graduate wage level may increase even after
the implementation of the HEEP (positive effect). Thus, the influence of the policy is
not clear, and it deserves empirical investigation. Based on the quasi-natural experi-
ment methods (DID method and DDD method), using six waves (1997, 2000, 2004,
2006, 2009, and 2011) longitudinal survey data of the China Health and Nutrition
Survey (CHNS), Chap. 7 investigates the influence of the HEEP on the wage levels of
young college graduates. We also compare the different policy influences by gender.
Five major conclusions emerge. First, in general, the HEEP does not affect the wage
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levels of young college graduates. Second, the difference of policy impact on wages
by various wage percentiles is small. Third, the HEEP decreased the wage level
of new college graduates in the short term (in 2004), whereas the negative effect
disappears in the long term (in 2006, 2009, and 2011). Fourth, to consider the group
heterogeneities of policy impacts, the results suggest that gender differences in the
impacts of the policy on the wage levels of new college graduates are small.
1.3 Significance of the Book
The main features can be summarized as follows. First, this book provides the
academic evidences about these issues based on the economics theories and econo-
metric analysis methods using many kinds of long-term Chinese national survey
data including cross-section survey data—ChineseHousehold IncomeProject survey
(CHIPs), Chinese national longitudinal surveys data—Chinese Health and Nutrition
Survey (CHNS), and China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS).
The latest survey data are used which can provide new evidences for these issues.
Second, this book investigates the consequences and causes of gender gap in both
household and labor market perspectives, particularly the new issues such as the
association of parent care and female employment, the gender gap of Communist
Party of China, and the gender gap of volunteer activity are estimated which are not
analyzed in the previous studies.
Third, this book also aims to provide academic evidence for policy-maker, there-
fore the book conducts the empirical study about the influences of policies such as the
NewRural PensionScheme (NRPS) andHigherEducationExpansionPolicy (HEEP)
on female employment andwage. This book can generate interests for various groups
such as scholars with econometric analysis backgrounds, policy makers, and readers
who are interested in Chinese economy.
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and Employment in China
Chapter 2
Market Wage, Child Care
and the Employment of Married Women
Abstract This study analyzes the market wage, reservation wage, and unearned
income on the probability of work participation of married women by using the
longitudinal data of China Health and Nutrition Survey from 1989 to 2015 and
a random effects probit model to address the heterogeneity problem. It is found
the market wage positively affects the probability of work participation of married
women; the reservation wage negatively affects the probability of work participation
of married women; but the effect of unearned income is not statistically significant,
which contrasts with most studies of developed countries. These effects differ by age
and hukou (urban and rural) groups.
Keywords Wage · Child care · Employment · Married women · China
2.1 Introduction
Female labor force participation changes with economic development, which may
influence not only individual or household consumption behavior but also the popu-
lation structure and future economic growth (Goldin 1990). In developed countries,
the empirical study of female employment, especially the employment of married
women, is one of the most important research issues (Smith 1980; Killingsworth
and Heckman 1986; Goldin 1990; Blundell and MaCurdy 1999). It has been pointed
out that economic factors such as the market wage, the reservation wage (e.g., child
care), and unearned income greatly influence the employment of married women
(Hofferth 1984; Waite et al. 1985; O’Connell and Bloom 1987; Wenk and Garrett
1992; Del Boca et al. 2004; Buckles 2008; Miller 2011), but few empirical studies
focus on China.3 This study mitigates this neglect.
Regarding female labor force participation in China, in the period of the planned
economy (1949–1977), the Chinese government enforced a set of policies to promote
gender equality at work and in society; as a result, the employment of women was
promoted, and the gender gap in the labor market was not noticeable (Gustaffson
and Li 2000; Pan 2002; Ma 2011). However, since the 1978, as China reformed
its economic system from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy, the
employment status of women has changed greatly. For example, in state-owned
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enterprises (SOEs), the proportion of laid-off workers was higher for females than
for males when SOE reform was promoted by the Chinese government,1 and the
gender wage gap increased during the market-oriented economy reform period (Ma
2009a, 2018a, b; Iwasaki andMa2020). In addition, it was found that the female labor
force participation rate decreased in the current period. China’s population is aging.
In additions, in China, population aging is rapidly progressing in recent years. Based
on the data of National Bureau of Statistics (2019), the percentage of population aged
65 and over to total population (the aging population ratio) increased from 4.2% in
1982 to 7.0% in 2000, and 10.5% in 2015; It is predicted that the Chinese aging
population ratio will reach 14% in 2026, which means that the population aging will
progress quickly for China than the developed countries such as Japan in the future.
Therefore, increasing the female labor force participation rate (FLFPR) has become
an important issue for the Chinese government. Moreover, the family and population
policies, which are related to female employment, have changed in the 2000s. As
it is well known, the Chinese government enforced a one-child policy2 since 1979,
and the total fertility rate (TFR) decreased greatly after the policy’s implementation.
To address the imbalance of the demographic structure, the Chinese government
abolished the one-child policy and implemented a set of population policies such
as the selective two-child policy in the 2000s and the universal two-child policy in
2016.3 It can be assumed that these population policy changes may influence women,
particularlymarriedwomen’s employment. Thus, empirical studyof the determinants
of the employment of married women in China has become an important issue.
However, although some research has focused on the issue, studies on the impact
of the market wage, the reservation wage (e.g., child care), and unearned income
(e.g., husband’s income)—which has been investigated for developed countries—are
scarce for China. This study can remedy this neglect.
Using long-term longitudinal survey data (CHNS: China Health and Nutrition
Survey from 1989 to 2015), this study investigates economic factors—including the
market wage, the reservation wage, and unearned income—on the probability of
participation in work of Chinese married women. A random effects (RE) probit
regression model is used to address the heterogeneity problem, which was not
considered in most previous studies.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Sect. 2.2 reviews the related
theories and summarizes the results of previous empirical studies on the effects of
the market wage, the reservation wage, and unearned income on the employment of
married women. Section 2.3 presents the empirical method, including the models,
data, and variable setting. Section 2.4 reports the descriptive statistical results.
Section 2.5 presents and discusses results of the econometric analysis. The final
section summarizes the conclusions and policy implications.
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2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Economic Theories on the Labor Supply
From the labor supply perspective, according to the general equilibriummodel (indi-
vidual utility maximummodel), an individual’s choice to participate in work is deter-
mined by economic factors—themarket wage, the reservationwage (e.g., child care),
and unearned income (e.g., husband’s income) as follows.
First, when the market wage exceeds the reservation wage, an individual is likely
to work.
Second, when unearned income rises, the labor supply may decrease if leisure
time is a superior good.
Third, when the market wage rises, the labor supply may increase due to the
substitution effect, while the labor supply may decrease due to the income effect
if leisure is a superior good. Because the influence of changes in the market wage
on the labor supply depends on two effects—the substitution effect and the income
effect—the net effect of the market wage on the labor supply is not clear.
In addition, it should be considered that some noneconomic factors such as gender
role consciousness and unobserved individual heterogeneity may also affect the
choice to work.
To sum up, from the economics theory of labor supply perspective and individual
heterogeneity, which determine each individual’s preference for work or leisure, the
influences of the market wage, the reservation wage, and unearned income are not
clear. An empirical study should be conducted to estimate the effects of these factors.
2.2.2 Empirical Studies on the Impact of the Market Wage,
Child Care, and Unearned Income on the Employment
of Married Women
In this section, wemainly summarize the results of the effects of themarket wage, the
reservation wage (e.g., child care), and unearned income (e.g., husband’s income)
on the labor supply of married women.4
First, for the effects of the market wage, the results of empirical studies are mixed.
For example, Layard et al. (1980), Franz and Kawasaki (1981), and Zabalza (1983)
found that the market wage positively influences the employment of married women,
while Nakamura and Nakamura (1981) reported that the market wage negatively
affects the employment of married women aged 35–39. Dooley (1982) confirmed
the negative effect for black married women aged 35–39 and 40–44, and Blundell
and Walker (1982) reported that when controlling for the husband’s work hours,
the market wage negatively affects the employment of wives with two children. For
China, Ma (2009a) found that the market wage positively affected the employment
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of married women in 2002, while the effect of the market wage was not significant
in 1995.
Second, regarding the impact of the reservation wage (particularly child care) on
the employment of married women, for developed countries, Hofferth (1984), Waite
et al. (1985), O’Connell and Bloom (1987), Wenk and Garrett (1992), Del Boca
et al. (2004), Buckles (2008), and Miller (2011) reported that the number of children
negatively affects the employment of mothers. The results for China are mixed. For
example, Jia et al. (2013) and Yu and Xie (2014) found that the women’ employment
changed after childbearing. Zhang (2011) and Yang and Bai (2017) reported that the
number of children negatively affects the women’ participation in work. However,
Ma (2009a) found that the influence of the youngest child’s age is not statistically
significant.
In addition, the labor supply also affects the choice of employment status
(choosing to become a regular worker or an irregular worker). For the associa-
tion of child care and irregular work, in studies of developed countries, Bardasi
and Gornick (2000) used international data from five developed countries (Canada,
Germany, Italy, the UK, and the USA) and found that the mothers are more likely
than childless women to become part-time workers. Drobnic et al. (1996) found that,
in Germany, the probability of becoming part-time workers is higher for mothers.
Shikata and Ma (2006) and Ma (2008, 2009b) found that, in Japan, women with a
younger child or with more children are more likely to become irregular workers.
However, empirical studies about child care and irregular work are scarce for China.5
Third, for the effects of unearned income, the results of empirical studies are
mixed. Heckman (1976, 1980), Cogan (1980a, b), Schulz (1980), Hanoch (1980),
Zabalza (1983), and Franz and Kawasaki (1981) found that when the husband’s
income rises, the labor supply of married women increases; the elasticities of the
husband’s income to the wife’s labor supply are positive values from 0.03 to 15.35.
However, Nakamura, Nakamura, and Cullen (1980) and Nakamura and Nakamura
(1981) reported that the wife’s labor supply decreases as her husband’s income
rises; the elasticities of the husband’s income to the wife’s labor supply are nega-
tive values from −0.12 to −1.06. For China, Ma (2009a) used Chinese Household
Income Project survey (CHIPs 1995 and CHIPs 2002) data and found that although
unearned income (household income excluding the respondent’s income) negatively
affected the employment of urban married women in both 1995 and 2002, the effect
of unearned income is not significant.
As compared with previous studies, the main contributions of this study can be
summarized as follows. First, although empirical studies for both developed countries
and China found that the market wage, child care, and unearned income influence the
employment of married women, the results are mixed. This can be explained by the
survey data and methodology. Concretely, in most of these previous studies, cross-
sectional survey data were used. Because of gender role consciousness or unobserv-
able personality differences in individuals, the heterogeneity problemmay remain in
these results. This study uses longitudinal survey data and a random effects model
to address the heterogeneity problem. Second, China has experienced an economic
transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy; therefore, the
2.2 Literature Review 17
mechanism of the labor supply of married women may differ from those in devel-
oped countries. However, empirical studies about the influences of the market wage,
child care, and the husband’s income for China are scarce. Although Ma (2009a, b)
analyzed the issue, the analyzed periods are 1995 and 2002, and new analysis using
the latest survey data is needed. By using CHNS from 1989 to 2015, this study can
provide new evidence for the issue.
2.3 Methodology and Data
2.3.1 Model
First, themarket wage ofmarriedwomen is an imputedwage based on thewage func-
tion. To address the sample selection bias, the Heckman two-step model (Heckman
1979) is used, which is expressed by Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2):
Pr
(
Y ∗i > 0
) = Pr(α + βH Hi + μi > 0) (1.1)
lnWagei = b + γ1X ′i + γ2λi+ ∈i (1.2)
In Eqs. (1.1) and (1.2), i indicates the individual, Pr
(
Y ∗i > 0
)
is the probability of
participation in work, and lnWage is a logarithmic value of the hourly wage. H, X
expresses the variables, β, γ is the coefficient of each variable, a, b is a constant item,
and μ, ∈ is an error item. The adjusted item (λ) is calculated based on the density
function and thedistribution functionof the probit regressionmodel (λ = φ(.)/(.)).




Y ∗i > 0
) = Pr(c + β1W̄i + β2RWi + β3Hini + β4Xi + εi > 0
)
. (2.1)
In Eq. (2.1), i indicates the individual, c is constant, W̄ is the imputedmarket wage
of married women, RW is the reservation wage (here, the number of children and the
age of the youngest child), Hin is unearned income (here, the husband’s income), X
is another variable, β are the coefficients of variables, and ε is the error term.
If ε includes an individual-specific, time-invariant factor (ui), heterogeneity prob-
lems may occur when it is not considered. To address this problem, a random effects
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In Eq. (2.2), i indicates the individual; t represents the year; ui is an individual-
specific, time-invariant factor; and vit is the real error term.
To estimate the probability of employment status, including three types—(A) non-
work, (B) irregular work, and (C) regular work—a multinomial probit regression
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2.3.2 Data and Variable Setting
Data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from 1989 to 2015 are
used in this study. CHNS is a nationwide longitudinal survey data conducted by the
Carolina Population Center of the University of North Carolina and the National
Institute for Nutrition and Health (NINH, formerly the National Institute of Nutri-
tion and Food Safety) at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention
(CCDC). The survey took place over a 7-day period using a multistage, random
cluster process to draw samples from 15 provinces and municipal cities (Liaoning,
Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Shandong,Henan,Hubei, Hunan,Guangxi, Guizhou, Beijing,
Shanghai, Chongqing, Shaanxi, Yunnan, Zhejiang) that vary substantially in geog-
raphy, economic development, and government resources. Three provinces were
added in CHNS 2011, and another three provinces joined in 2015. In 1989 of initial
survey year, theCHNS surveyed 3,795 households and 15,907 individuals. This study
uses data from 10 waves, including the most recently updated data from 2015. The
CHNS provides extensive information about fertility and pregnancy history as well
as basic social demographic and employment information that facilitate the empirical
analysis in this study.
This study investigates the determinants of the employment of married women.
Themarriage of very young females is regulated by law, and themandatory retirement
age of female workers in the public sector (e.g., government organizations, SOEs)
ranges from 45 to 55. Therefore, this study is limited to samples of married women
aged 20–44 years, which includes the period of child bearing and child care.
The main dependent variable is a binary probability variable equal to 1 when a
woman is working and equal to 0 when she is not working.
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The main independent variables are the market wage, the reservation wage, and
unearned income. (1) The market wage is an imputed value calculated based on the
wage function by using the Heckman two-step model. The dependent variable of
the wage function is the logarithmic value of the hourly wage, which is adjusted by
the 1989 CPI (consumer price index). The variables in the first step estimation (the
function of probability of work participation) include the wife’s years of schooling,
age and age squared, minority ethnicity, husband’s income and squared, number of
children, the age of the youngest child, urban/rural hukou, region, and survey year
dummy variables; the variables in the second-step estimation (the wage function)
include thewife’s years of schooling, years of work experience and squared, minority
ethnicity, urban/rural hukou, region, and survey year dummy variables. The results of
the wage function are shown in Appendix Table 2.6. The coefficient of the adjusted
item (λ) is a negative value and statistically significant at a 1% level, indicating
that a sample selection bias problem remains in the results based on the OLS. The
coefficients of the wage function are used to calculate the imputed market wage. (2)
Three dummy variables of the number of children—one, two, three, and more—and
five kinds of dummy variables of the age of the youngest child—0–1, 2–3, 4–5, 6–14,
or 15 years and older—are used as indices of the reservation wage. It is assumed
that the labor supply of married women may decrease for the group with younger
children and with more children. (3) The logarithmic value of the husband’s income
is used as the index of the unearned income of married women, which is adjusted by
the 1989 CPI.
The other covariates are used to control other influences on the women’ employ-
ment. (1)The culture andwillingness toworkmaydiffer for the various ethnic groups;
therefore, the minority ethnicity dummy (Han ethnicity = 0; minority ethnicity = 1)
is used. (2) In China, there is considerable disparity of culture, lifestyle and social
policies between rural andurban areas as related to family size, gender role conscious-
ness, as well as formal and informal child care support and the public provision of
child care (Zhang 2011). Therefore, the urban dummy variable (urban areas = 1;
rural areas = 0) is constructed to control these disparities. (3) The level of economic
development and the macroeconomic environment differ by region and survey year.
Four region dummy variables (Eastern Region, Central Region,Western Region, and
Northeast Region) and three period dummy variables (periods from 1989 to 1997,
2000 to 2006, and 2009 to 2015) are used.
Table 2.1 presents the descriptive statistics of variables by working and non-
working married women. We employed the t-test to investigate the differences
between these two groups. In general, the total employment rate (percentage of
working individuals to the total samples in each group) is 83.1%; the proportions of
nonworkers, irregular workers, and regular workers are, respectively, 16.9%, 49.6%
and 33.4% for married women aged 20–44. It is observed that the individual char-
acteristics of these two groups differ significantly. For example, working married
women have fewer years of schooling and are less likely to have children aged 0–
3 than non-working group. Economic factors of these two groups also differ. For
example, the imputed market wage and husband’s income are lower for working
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics of variables
Total (a) Work (b) Non-work (c) D (b)–(c) t-test
LP 0.831 1 0
Employment status
Non-work 0.169 0 1
Irregular 0.496 0.597 0
Regular 0.334 0.403 0
Imputed wage 8.713 8.678 9.153 −0.475*** p < 0.001
Wife’ years of schooling 7.715 7.575 8.384 −0.809*** p < 0.001
Husband’ years of schooling 9.051 9.018 9.193 −0.175*** 0.008
Number of children
One 0.496 0.464 0.521 −0.057*** p < 0.001
Two 0.352 0.356 0.384 −0.028*** p < 0.001
Three and more 0.153 0.180 0.095 0.085*** p < 0.001
Age of youngest child
Age 0–1 0.115 0.112 0.166 −0.054*** p < 0.001
Age 2–3 0.121 0.122 0.125 −0.003*** 0.603
Age 4–5 0.118 0.122 0.092 0.030*** p < 0.001
Age 6–14 0.454 0.465 0.385 0.080*** p < 0.001
Age 15 and over 0.192 0.178 0.233 −0.055*** p < 0.001
Unearned income 9.797 9.805 9.835 −0.030*** p < 0.001
Minority ethnicity 0.130 0.122 0.120 0.002*** 0.676
Urban 0.287 0.297 0.152 0.145*** p < 0.001
Region
East 0.232 0.251 0.187 0.064*** p < 0.001
Central 0.355 0.339 0.398 −0.059*** p < 0.001
West 0.254 0.251 0.207 0.044*** p < 0.001
Northeast 0.159 0.160 0.208 −0.048*** p < 0.001
Period
y 1989–1997 0.413 0.518 0.161 0.357*** p < 0.001
y 2000–2006 0.297 0.265 0.391 −0.126*** p < 0.001
y 2009–2015 0.290 0.218 0.448 −0.230*** p < 0.001
Observations 11,522 9,575 1,947
Sources Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2015
Note Age is limited from 20 to 44
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Fig. 2.1 Female employment rate by age. Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2015
married women than for non-working group. Therefore, analyses should control for
these factors.
Figure 2.1 shows the female employment rate (percentage of working women to
total samples in each age group) by age group. First, the female employment rate is
maintained at a higher level (around 80%) for Chinese married women aged 25–39.
In Japan and Korea, the female employment rate by age group is an M-shaped curve
that is lowest in the period of marriage and child care (Ma 2011). This indicates that
the negative effect of child care on maternal employment may be smaller in China
than in Japan and Korea.
Second, although the employment rate for married women aged 25–44 is main-
tained at around 80%, it decreases greatly for married women aged 50 and older.
Concretely, the employment rates are 59.4%, 49.4% and 33.4% for married women
aged 50–54, 55–59, and older than 60 years, respectively. The results can be explained
by China’s mandatory retirement system. In the public sector (e.g., government orga-
nizations, SOEs), the mandatory retirement age is 50 years for female workers (blue-
collar workers) and 55 years for female cadres (white-collar workers), which causes
a sharp decline of female employment rate for the group aged 50 and over.
2.3.3 Female Employment Rate by Age and Education
The female employment rate by age and education groups are shown in Fig. 2.2. It is
observed that, in general, the employment rate is higher for the low-education group
than for both the middle-level group and the high-level education group. In addition,
for married women aged 55 and older, the female employment rate is lower for the
highly educated group than for both the low- and middle-level education groups.
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Fig. 2.2 Female employment rate by age and education. Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–
2015. Note High_edu.: college and over; Mid-edu.: senior high school or junior high school;
Low_edu.: primary school and lower
The explanation is as follows. Based on the marriage-matching model, the proba-
bility of marrying a well-educated man is higher for a well-educated woman than for
a woman with low-education level. According to the human capital theory (Becker
1964; Mincer 1974), the total household income may be lower for low-education
women than for highly educated women; therefore, low-education married women
must workmore in the labor market to support their families. In addition, most highly
educated married women age 55 and older retire from the public sector and receive
higher pension benefits, which may cause the female employment rate decreased.
2.3.4 Female Employment Rate by Age and Unearned Income
The female employment rate by age and unearned income group is shown in Fig. 2.3.
The unearned income groups include the low-income group (first tertile), the middle-
income group (second tertile), and the high-income group (third tertile) based on their
husband’s income. It can be observed that, in each age group, the female employment
rate is lowest for the high-income group, while it is highest for the low-income group.
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Fig. 2.3 Female employment rate by age a andunearned income.SourceCalculated based onCHNS
1989–2015. Note Non-earning income = husband income; Low-income: first tertile; Mid-income:
second tertile; High-income: third tertile
2.3.5 Female Employment Rate by Age and Number
of Children
The female employment rate by age and number of children is shown in Fig. 2.4.
We calculated for three groups—women with one child, two children, and three
or more children. First, the female employment rate is highest for the group with
three or more children. Second, the differential of employment rate is small between
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Fig. 2.4 Female employment rate by age and number of children. Source Calculated based on
CHNS 1989–2015
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more children (three or more) are likely to work. The differentials of employment
rate between mothers with one child and those with two indicates that the negative
influence of child care on maternal employment is small. Regarding the influences of
China’s population policies, the analyzed period in this study is from 1989 to 2015,
while the one-child policy was implemented in 1979, and the two-child policy was
implemented in 2016. Thus, the effects of the current period’s two-child policy on
maternal employment should be evaluated in the future by using new survey data
after 2016.
To summarize, it is observed that the female employment rate differs by age,
education level, unearned income level, and number of children. It should be noticed
that these are results when other factors are not controlled. The effects of the market
wage, the reservationwage, and unearned income estimated by econometric analyses
after controlling for other factors that might affect women’s choice to work are
reported as follows.
2.4 Econometric Analysis Results
2.4.1 The Market Wage, Child Care, Unearned Income,
and Work Participation of Married Women in China
Table 2.2 presents the estimation results of the probability of participation in work by
using the probit regression model and random effects (RE) probit regression models.
The likelihood ratio (LR) test indicates that the RE probit model is appropriate. The
new findings based on RE probit model results can be summarized as follows.
First, it is shown that the market wage positively affects the probability of work
participation of married women; the probability of participation in work increases
as the market wage rises. These results are consistent with those of Layard et al.
(1980), Franz and Kawasaki (1981), and Zabalza (1983) for developed countries.
This indicates that when the market wage rises, the substitution effect is greater than
the income effect, which increases the employment probability of married women
in China.
Second, the reservation wage negatively affects the work participation of married
women. Concretely, as compared with a mother with one child, the probability of
participation in work is lower for a mother with two or more children. As compared
with a mother with a child aged 0–1, the probability of participation in work is
higher for a mother with a child aged 4–5 or 6–14. These results are consistent with
those of Hofferth (1984), Waite et al. (1985), O’Connell and Bloom (1987), Wenk
and Garrett (1992), Del Boca et al. (2004), Buckles (2008), and Miller (2011) for
developed countries and Zhang (2011) and Yang and Bai (2017) for China.
As compared with the results of Ma (2009a, b), who reported the influence of the
age of youngest child on the employment of married women is not significant, the
negative effect of child care on maternal employment is suggested to have increased
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Table 2.2 Probability of participation in work of married women in China
Probit Probit_RE
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Imputed wage 0.384*** 0.152 0.506** 0.202
Number of children (One)
Two −0.182*** 0.046 −0.228*** 0.064
Three and more −0.152** 0.064 −0.195** 0.088
Age of youngest child (Age 0–1)
Age 2–3 0.136 0.089 0.162 0.109
Age 4–5 0.223** 0.089 0.244** 0.108
Age 6–14 0.148** 0.072 0.152* 0.089
Age 15 and over −0.066 0.079 −0.122 0.101
Unearned income −0.011 0.018 −0.013 0.023
Minority ethnicity −0.043 0.061 −0.060 0.085
Urban 0.309*** 0.051 0.393*** 0.071
Region (East)
Central −0.255*** 0.058 −0.328*** 0.081
West 0.120* 0.073 0.130 0.099
Northeast −0.399*** 0.062 −0.491*** 0.088
Period (y 1989–1997)
y 2000–2006 −1.051*** 0.191 −1.350*** 0.257
y 2009–2015 −1.455*** 0.310 −1.849*** 0.416






LR test of rho = 0: chibar2 (01) = 100.13
Prob > = chibar2 = 0.000
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2015
Notes ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
in the current period over that in the past. This indicates that the family-work conflict
problem has grown worse with the progress of the market-oriented economy reform.
The results can also be explained by the fact that, as the economic development and
the household income increased, somemarriedwomen choose to become housewives
and exit the labor market voluntarily.
Third, the effect of unearned income is not statistically significant. Although the
results in Fig. 2.4 show that the female employment rate is lowest for the high-income
group and higher for the low-income group, it seems likely that a husband’s income
maynegatively affect theirwife’swork participation.However,when the other factors
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are controlled, the effect of husbands’ incomes on their wives’ employment is not
significant in China. The finding contrasts with those of most studies of developed
countries. This may be caused by the fact that gender equality in workplace and
family has been promoted by the government since the planned economy period;
thus, most married women are willing to work and they are independent of their
husbands’ incomes.
Fourth, other factors also affect the probability of participation in work of married
women. (1) The probability of participation in work is higher for urban women than
for rural women. (2) As compared with women in the central and northeast regions,
women in the eastern region are more likely to work. This may result from the
fact that, when women in urban areas or regions in which the level of economic
development is higher (eastern regions), better chances for jobs may increase the
probability of working. (3) As compared with the past period (the period of 1989–
1997), the probability of participation in work decreased in the current period (the
periods of 2000–2006 and 2009–2015). This is confirmed by the fact that female
labor force participation rate decreased during the market-oriented economy reform
period.
2.4.2 Results by Group
To examine the heterogeneity problem between various groups, a set of subsamples
was used. We mainly summarized the findings about the market wage, child care,
and husband’s income in the following.
(1) Results by Age
The results for three age groups—aged 20–29, 30–39, and 40–49—are shown in
Table 2.3. First, the market wage positively affects the employment of women aged
20–29 and 30–39 (2.162, 0.693, respectively), while the effect is negative for those
aged 40–49. These results are significant at 1 and 5% levels. This suggests that the
effect of themarket wage on the employment ofmarried women differs by age group;
the market wage has a negative effect for middle-aged married women, while it has
a positive effect for younger married women. These results are similar to those of
Dooley (1982), who found that the market wage positively affects the employment
of black married women aged 30–34, while its effect is negative for black married
women aged 35–39 and 40–44.
Second, regarding the effect of the reservation wage, (1) for younger mothers
(the group aged 20–29), the influence of both the number of children and the age
of the youngest child on the employment of married women are not significant. In
contrast, for married women aged 30–39 and 40–49, as compared with a mother
with one child, the probability of participation in work is lower for a mother with
two children. (2) For married women aged 30–39, as compared with a mother with
a child aged 0–1, a mother with a child aged 4–5 or 6–14 years is more likely to
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Table 2.3 Results by age
(1) Age 20–29 (2) Age 30–39 (3) Age 40–49
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Imputed wage 2.162*** 0.783 0.693** 0.304 −0.795*** 0.239
Number of children (One)
Two 0.135 0.210 −0.312*** 0.093 −0.246*** 0.072
More than three 0.029 0.355 −0.234* 0.136 −0.133 0.089
Age of youngest child (Age 0–1)
Age 2–3 0.068 0.201 0.308* 0.170 0.771 0.564
Age 4–5 0.111 0.222 0.577*** 0.166 0.589 0.485
Age 6–14 0.291 0.282 0.417*** 0.139 0.710* 0.431
Age 15 and over 0.163 0.174 0.444 0.430
Unearned income −0.096 0.084 −0.042 0.034 0.005 0.025
Minority ethnicity −0.086 0.283 0.002 0.119 0.013 0.096
Urban 0.695** 0.284 0.425*** 0.102 −0.002 0.073
Region (East)
Central −0.532* 0.308 −0.267** 0.112 −0.333*** 0.082
West −0.028 0.347 0.257* 0.140 0.122 0.103
Northeast −1.140*** 0.359 −0.461*** 0.121 −0.275*** 0.092
Period (y 1989–1997)
y 2000–2006 −3.790*** 1.089 −1.612*** 0.383 0.346 0.298
y 2009–2015 −6.059*** 1.745 −2.187*** 0.623 0.900* 0.482
Constants −12.687** 5.863 −2.938 2.456 8.239*** 2.027
Observations 2,123 5,819 6,797
Groups 1,534 3,331 3,645
Log likelihood −366.48 −1162.84 −2274.46
LR test of rho = 0: chibar 2 (01) = 17.33 chibar 2 (01) = 25.65 chibar 2 (01) = 71.81
Prob ≥ chibar2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2015
Note (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Random effects probit regression model is used
work; while the influences of the age of the youngest child on the labor supply are
not significant for mothers aged 20–29 and those aged 40–49. The negative effect
of child care seems to be greater for mothers aged 30–39 who are in an important
period of career development. This suggests that the family–work conflict problem
may worse for married women aged 30–39 years.
Third, the effect of the husband’s income is not significant in each age group,
which confirms the conclusions shown in Table 2.2 by using total samples.
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(2) Results by Urban and Rural Areas
Table 2.4 summarizes the results by urban areas and rural areas. First, the effect of
the market wage on the labor supply differs by area (urban or rural). The market
wage positively affects the labor supply of married women in urban areas, while the
influence is not significant for married women in rural areas. This may be caused by
the fact that the function of the market mechanism is weaker in rural areas than in
urban areas; therefore, the influence of themarket wage on the labor supply is smaller
for married women in rural areas. It also can be explained by differences in gender
role consciousness among urban and rural areas. The influence of Confucianism
Table 2.4 Results by urban areas and rural areas
(1) Urban (2) Rural
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Imputed wage 2.223*** 0.611 0.004 0.216
Number of children (One)
Two −0.431** 0.177 −0.164** 0.066
More than three −0.348 0.310 −0.202** 0.090
Age of youngest child (Age 0–1)
Age 2–3 0.785** 0.359 0.100 0.115
Age 4–5 0.479 0.303 0.264** 0.117
Age6-14 0.398 0.256 0.184* 0.096
Age 15 and over −0.353 0.276 0.039 0.108
Unearned income 0.009 0.083 −0.013 0.023
Minority ethnicity 0.003 0.280 −0.083 0.088
Region (East)
Central −0.397* 0.214 −0.243*** 0.087
West 0.111 0.254 0.201* 0.109
Northeast 0.429 0.296 −0.565*** 0.092
Period (y 1989–1997)
y 2000–2006 −3.351*** 0.772 −0.800*** 0.273
y 2009–2015 −4.751*** 1.233 −0.996** 0.443
Constants −14.965*** 4.760 2.509 1.738
Observations 3,228 8,294
Groups 1,634 3,286
Log likelihood −469.11 −2015.55
LR test of rho = 0: chibar 2 (01) = 32.38 chibar 2 (01) = 59.92
Prob ≥ chibar 2 0.000 0.000
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2015
Note: (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Random effects probit regression model is used
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is greater in rural areas (Cheng 2011; Fen and Xiao 2014), and gender wage gap
is larger in rural areas (Iwasaki and Ma 2020); therefore, the impact of economic
factors—such as the market wage on the employment of rural women—is smaller.
Second, for the effect of reservation wage, (1) for both urban and rural areas, as
compared with a mother with one child, the probability of participation in work is
lower for a mother with two or more children. (2) Having a child aged 0–1 negatively
affects mothers’ labor supply for both urban and rural areas. This suggests that child
care negatively affects the employment of married women in both urban and rural
areas. When we compare the sizes of the coefficients, the negative effect of child
care is greater in urban areas than rural areas.
Third, for both urban and rural areas, the effects of a husband’s income are
not significant, which confirmed the conclusions shown in Table 2.2 by using total
samples.
2.4.3 Considering Irregular Work and Regular Work
Regarding the choice of employment status, we used analyses for choosing regular
work and irregular work. The results on employment status are summarized in
Table 2.5.
There is no common definition of irregular work in previous studies, and the
classification of regular work or irregular work is usually based on the number of
hours worked, labor contract, or occupation type (i.e. Zhang and Qin 2015; Zhang
et al. 2018). In this study, irregular work is defined by the type of occupation, as
in the CHNS questionnaire. Irregular workers include self-employed workers with
no employees (including farmers), temporary workers, and paid or unpaid family
workers. Regular workers include self-employed workers who employ others, those
who work for others or work in units (enterprises or organizations) as permanent
employees, or workers with a long-term labor contract.
Two models—(i) a multinomial probit regression model and (ii) a random effects
probit regression model—are used. The dependent variables are a category variable
(1= nonwork, 2= irregularwork, 3= regularwork) in themultinomial probit regres-
sion model, and a binary variable (1= irregular or regular worker, 0= nonworker) in
the random effects probit regression model. The results by using these two types of
model are similar. Regarding the heterogeneity problem, we summarize the findings
based on the results of the random effects model as follows.
First, the effect of the market wage differs by whether a person works regu-
larly or irregularly. Concretely, the market wage positively affects the probability
of becoming a regular worker, while when the market wage rises, the probability
of becoming an irregular worker is lower than that of becoming a nonworker. This
suggests that the substitution effect is greater for regularwork,while the incomeeffect
is greater for irregular work. This can be explained by the labor market’s segmen-
tation into a formal and informal sector. Working hours are longer and the social
security is not maintained for workers in the informal sector; therefore, although the
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market wage may be higher than the reservation wage, the probability of becoming
an irregular worker is lower (Ma 2016).
Second, for the effects of child care, (1) the probability of becoming a regular
worker decreases for a mother with more than two children, while the impact of the
number of children on irregular work is not significant. (2) The age of the youngest
child affects the probability of both regular work and irregular work. As compared
with a mother with a younger child (e.g., a child aged 0–1), the probability of
becoming an irregular worker or a regular worker is higher for a mother with an
older child (e.g., a child aged 4–5 or a child aged 15 and over). To compare the
size of the age of child dummy variables, the effect of the youngest child’s age is
greater for regular work. It is observed that the negative effect of child care is greater
for regular work. This can be explained as follows. From the labor supply side, the
labor supply (e.g., working hours) of irregular workers can be more easily adjusted
for (e.g., the self-employed). It is pointed out that irregular work may reduce the
work–family conflict. Therefore, the negative effect of child care on the labor supply
of married women is smaller for irregular workers than for regular workers.
Third, the results show an interesting finding for the effect of the husband’s
income. The husband’s income positively affects the probability of becoming a
regular worker, while it negatively affects the probability of becoming an irregular
worker. These results about regular work can be explained by the marriage-matching
model. The probability is high that a married, well-educated man who earns a high
income will marry a well-educated woman who is likely to become a regular worker.
For irregular workers, when the income constraint is held constant, if the unearned
income increases, the labor supply may be reduced if leisure is a superior good.
2.5 Conclusions
Using the longitudinal survey data of CHNS from 1989 to 2015, this study analyzes
the impact of the market wage, the reservation wage, and unearned income on the
probability married women will work. The random effects model is used to address
the heterogeneity problem. The main findings and policy implications are as follows.
First, in general, (1) themarket wage positively affects the employment ofmarried
women; the probability of participation in work increases as the market wage rises.
These results are consistent with those of previous empirical studies for developed
countries. (2) The reservation wage (here, the number of children and age of the
youngest child) negatively affects the employment of married women. (3) The effect
of unearned income is not statistically significant, which contrasts with the findings
of most studies for developed countries.
Second, the effects differ by age. (1) The market wage has a negative effect for
middle-aged married women aged 40–49, while it has a positive effect for younger
married women, aged 20–39. (2) The negative effect of child care is greater for
mothers aged 30–39. (3) The effect of a husband’s income is not significant in any
age group.
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Third, the effects differ in urban and rural areas. (1) The market wage positively
affects the employment of married women in urban areas, while the influence of the
market wage on married women is not significant for in rural areas. (2) The negative
effect of the reservation wage is greater for married women in urban areas than those
in rural areas. (3) For both urban and rural areas, the effects of a husband’s income
are not significant.
Fourth, for the effects by employment status, (1) the market wage positively
affects the probability of becoming a regular worker; when the market wage rises,
the probability of becoming an irregular worker is lower than the probability of
becoming a nonworker. (2) The negative effect of the reservation wage is greater
for regular work. (3) The husband’s income positively affects the probability of
becoming a regular worker, while it negatively affects the probability of becoming
an irregular worker.
The results indicate that child care negatively affects the employment of married
women, particularly for women aged 30–39 who are in an important period of career
development, and for women in urban areas. As compared with irregular work,
the negative effect of child care is greater for regular work. This suggests that
as the economy system transitions from a planned economy to a market-oriented
economy, the problem of family–work conflict increased, particularly for regular
female workers. This may due to the decrease of child care support from firms and
government (Maurer-Fazio et al. 2011; Connelly et al. 2018). A child care support
policy should be implemented by the Chinese government. The child care support
policy can be expected to increase both the total fertility rate and the female labor
force participation rate, which contributes to long-term economic growth.
The market wage was found to positively affect the employment of married
women, particularly for younger married women aged 20–39, married women in
urban areas, and regular workers. This suggests that the influence of the market
mechanism on the labor supply of married women has increased with the progress
of the market-oriented economy reform. However, it should be noted that the market
wage negatively affects the probability of becoming an irregular worker. The result
is related to the Chinse labor market segmentation by formal and informal sectors
(Zhang and Qin 2015; Ma 2016; Zhang et al. 2018). The number of regular workers
has decreased, but the number of irregularworkers has increased in the current period.
For example, the proportion of female irregular workers to total female workers
increased from 33.9% in 1996 to 68.6% in 2010 (Zhang and Hu 2017). As compared
with the regular worker group, irregular workers usually earn a lower wage and fewer
fringe benefits. Their social security entitlement is poorer, and their probability of
becoming unemployed is higher (Ma 2008, 2009a, b, 2011; Wu 2009). Labor and
social security policies should be implemented to reduce the gap between the formal
and informal sectors.
Finally, it should be noted that this study has limitations. First, although we used
RE models to address the heterogeneity problems in the current study, our future
researchwill address the endogeneity problembetween child care, husband’s income,
and labor supply by using other econometric models such as the instrument variable
methods. Second, the dynamic model of labor supply should be employed based on
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a life-cycle model. Third, for the reservation wage, parent care should be considered;
we analyzed the issue in Chap. 3 of this book. Fourth, the effect of these economic
factors on working hours has become an issue for our future research. Despite these
limitations, we believe that the current study, which takes full advantage of longitu-
dinal survey data, can provide new insight for understanding the association between
the market wage, child care, husband’s income, and the employment of married
women in China under the market-oriented economy reform period. This may add
to the evidence of the determinants of the women’ employment in China.
Notes
1. Since the 1990s, employment adjustment has been promoted in SOEs. Many
significant employees became unemployed. According to the China Labor Statis-
tics Yearbook 2000, about 5 million urban workers were restructured from 1996
to 2000. Ma (2008) and Li (2003) pointed out that the gender gap in the employ-
ment adjustment of SOEswasmaintained, and the disadvantage of SOE reform is
greater for female workers than for male workers. For the analysis of ownership
sector and the gender wage gap, please refer to Chap. 4 of this book.
2. The one-child policy was China’s family planning policy, which consisted of a
set of regulations, including restrictions on the number of children per household
and the minimum marriage age. The one-child policy mostly applied to urban
residents and public sector employees. In rural regions, if the first child was a girl,
a second child was permitted. If both the wife and husband were Chinese citizens
returning from abroad, if both the wife and husband are without siblings, and for
ethnic minorities, a second child was permitted (Hesketh et al. 2005; Wang et al.
2013). This policy was published in 1979 and abolished in October 2015.
3. In order to address the potential consequences of the one-child policy, such as the
aging population and labor shortages, the one-child policy was replaced by the
universal two-child policy in October 2015. Based on the new policy, a married
woman can have two children. The new law came into force on January 1, 2016.
4. For a detailed survey of the effects of the market wage, the reservation wage,
and unearned income on women’s labor supply, please refer to Smith (1980),
Killingsworth and Heckman (1986), Goldin (1990), and Blundell and MaCurdy
(1999).
5. Some previous studies for China explore only the influence of irregular work on
childbearing based on the descriptive statistical results (for example, Ding and
Shi 2016 and Zhang and Hu 2017).
6. The values of female employment rate in Figs. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 are summarized
in Appendix Tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9.
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Appendix
See Tables 2.6, 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9.
Table 2.6 Results of wage function
(1) One–step (2) Two-step
Probability of work Wage function
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Wife’s years of schooling 0.121*** 0.005 0.058*** 0.006
Experience year 0.032 0.029 −0.013 0.012
Exp. sq. −0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000
Minority ethnicity −0.077 0.049 0.029 0.047
Husband income 0.223* 0.137
Husband income_sq. 0.004 0.008
Number of children −0.344*** 0.023
Age of youngest child 0.006 0.004
Urban 1.038*** 0.036 −0.193*** 0.038
Region (East)
Central −0.440*** 0.040 −0.151*** 0.034
West −0.390*** 0.045 −0.206*** 0.039
Northeast −0.606*** 0.045 −0.170*** 0.041
Year (1989–1997)
2000–2006 −0.320*** 0.036 1.149*** 0.033
2009–2015 0.025 0.045 1.877*** 0.033
Constant −3.278*** 0.774 7.726*** 0.173




Prob > chi 2 0.000
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2015
Note (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Heckman two step model is used
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Table 2.7 Female
employment rate by age and
education group
Low-edu (%) Mid-edu (%) High-edu (%)
20–24 90.3 71.7 78.8
25–29 89.8 81.9 82.1
30–34 89.8 81.5 85.0
35–39 88.4 80.5 85.4
40–44 86.3 75.2 80.4
45–49 80.1 68.0 73.2
50–54 68.3 45.0 53.3
55–59 57.4 33.5 23.6
60+ 35.8 23.9 13.0
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2015
Table 2.8 Female
employment rate by age and
husband income group
Low-income (%) Mid-income (%) High-income (%)
20–24 88.8 77.5 60.0
25–29 93.3 84.8 75.7
30–34 91.8 88.0 81.3
35–39 92.1 86.4 80.2
40–44 89.0 84.9 77.3
45–49 85.9 76.6 68.3
50–54 76.6 62.0 51.3
55–59 69.3 50.6 36.0
60+ 56.3 43.4 28.0
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2015
Table 2.9 Female
employment rate by age and
number of children group
One (%) Two (%) Three+ (%)
20–24 75.7 81.3 89.5
25–29 82.0 84.3 93.7
30–34 84.1 83.6 91.2
35–39 83.2 83.1 90.4
40–44 78.1 78.2 89.3
45–49 70.0 70.8 84.4
50–54 51.2 55.7 70.3
55–59 43.5 45.0 56.0
60+ 29.7 30.8 36.7
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2015
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Chapter 3
Parent Care and Middle-Aged Women’s
Employment
Abstract Does parent care influence Chinesewomen’s participation inwork?Using
the longitudinal data of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey
(CHARLS) from 2011 to 2015, this study investigates the influence of parent care
giving on probability of work participation of women aged 45–69 in China. The
random-effects model and the instrumental variables (IV)method are used to address
the unobserved heterogeneity and other endogeneity problems. Although the results
in previous studies that used younger and middle-aged women (i.e., women aged
18–52) indicate that parent care negatively affects women’s labor supply, the results
indicate that the probability of work participation is higher for the care-giving group.
This can be explained by the fact that the positive effect (obtaining income effect)
is higher than the negative effect (time-constraint effect). We also found that the
influences of caring for parents on women’s work participation differ by age and
education group.
Keywords Parent care · Work participation · Middle-aged women · China
3.1 Introduction
As iswell known, themain givers of family care—including parent care—arewomen.
According to family economics (Becker 1985), the prospect for work in the labor
market is higher formen,while the prospect of housework is higher forwomen; there-
fore, based on the individual and household utility maximum model, most women
assume responsibility for the family, while most men work in the labor market.
Therefore, parent care may affect the women’s employment. Some previous studies
for developed countries found that caring for parents may decrease the women’s
employment. Family care work—including parent care—has been noticed in the
world as a kind of unpaid household work. For example, the Beijing Platform for
Action, adopted at the 1995 United Nations 4thWorld Conference onWomen, called
for member nations to take measures to recognize the value of unpaid family care
work, reduce its burden, and encourage amore equitable distribution of unpaid family
care work within the household (United Nations 1996). Goal 5 of the 2030 Sustain-
ableDevelopmentGoals (SDGs) includes a target for recognizing and valuing unpaid
© IER Hitotsubashi University 2021
X. Ma, Female Employment and Gender Gaps in China, Hitotsubashi University IER
Economic Research Series 48, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6904-7_3
41
42 3 Parent Care and Middle-Aged Women’s Employment
family carework (UnitedNations 2015). Therefore, investigating the impact of parent
care on women’s employment has become an important issue for both developed and
developing countries.
Chinese society has become an aging population and is facing the problem of
a decreasing labor force; thus, increasing labor force participation has become an
important issue for the Chinese government. This study investigates the influence of
caring for parents onwomen’s employment inChina.Although someprevious studies
have analyzed the influences of child care on women’ employment1 and discussed
unpaid work in China,2 empirical studies on the impact of caring for parents on
middle-aged women’s employment are scarce. This study can address this neglected
problem and provide new evidence on the issue from China.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the channels
of the influence of parent care giving on the employment and summarizes previous
empirical studies on the issue. Section 3.3 gives the framework of the empirical
analysis, including models and datasets. Section 3.4 introduces the determinants
of parent care giving and the influences of parent care on middle-aged women’s
employment. Section 3.5 summarizes the conclusions.
3.2 Literature Review
According to the economic theories, parent care may have both negative and positive
effects on employment. First, based on the individual utility maximum model, an
individual’s labor supply is determined by the market wage and the work–leisure
preference (e.g., reservationwage). Parent care can be considered a part of reservation
wage that may increase the preference for leisure (non-work). Because a trade-off
relationship between parent care and working hours remains, when a woman has to
exit the labor market or reduce the working hours to care for parents even though
she prefers to work, parent care may negatively affect her employment (negative
effect). However, when a woman can pay for parent care service from the market,
she may also choose to work, whereby she can earn more so as to pay for parent-care
services or to charge care expenditures (positive effect). Because both the negative
and positive effects remain, it is not clear how caring for parents affects the labor
supply of middle-aged women. Empirical studies should be employed to investigate
the relationship between parent care and middle-aged women’s employment.
Second, numerous empirical studies for developed countries indicate that
providing family care—including child care and parent care—reduces women’ labor
supply (Robar 1992; Lehrer 1992; Michalopoulos et al. 1992; Wolf and Soldo 1994;
Çǎgatay et al. 1995; Wolf et al. 1997; Angrist and Evans 1998; Pezzin and Schone
1998; Carmichael and Charles 2003; Lilly et al. 2007; Leigh 2010; Viitanen 2010;
Givord and Marbot 2015; Ho 2015; Skira 2015; Leken et al. 2017; Gathmann and
Sass 2018).
Particularly, the influence of parent care giving on women’s employment since
the 1980s has been researched (Soldo andMyllyluoma 1983; Brody and Schoonover
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1986). Lilly et al. (2007) summarized 35 papers on the issue for developed coun-
tries. Recently, numerous empirical studies have been undertaken; for example, Heit-
mueller (2007), Heitmueller and Inglis (2007) for the UK, Lilly et al. (2010, 2011)
and Jacobs et al. (2014) for Canada, Meng (2011) for Germany, Casado-Marín et al.
(2011) for Spain, Schneider et al. (2013) for Austria, and Nguyen and Connelly
(2014) for Australia.
Most recent previous studies consider the endogeneity problem between parent
care giving and women’s employment. The previous studies can be divided into three
types, based on the analysis method. First, some studies use parent care giving as
an exogenous variable, but the results among these studies are not consistent. For
example, Carmichael and Charles (2003a) found that family care reduces the prob-
ability of work participation. Lilly et al. (2010) found that family care reduces work
participation, but its influence on work hours and wage is not significant. Second,
some previous studies used cross-sectional survey data and instrumental variables
(IV) methods to address the endogeneity problem. For example, Ettner (1995, 1996),
Heitmueller (2007), and Bolin et al. (2008) used parents’ age, parents’ health status,
number of siblings, and living parent dummy variables as the instrumental vari-
ables. Wolf and Soldo (1994) used the instrumental variables (IV) method and the
reduced function method, respectively, to address the endogeneity problem. Third,
some studies used panel data analysis methods, such as the fixed effects (FE) and
random effects (RE) models, to address the endogeneity problem (Casado-Marín
et al. 2011). Using fixed effects and instrumental variables methods (FE + IV),
Van Houtven et al. (2013) found a remaining endogenous group for women. Most
previous studies found that caring for parents may reduce the women’ employment
(Ettner 1995; Heitmueller 2007; Bolin et al. 2008; Van Houtven et al. 2013).
For China, using the data of the 2009 CHNS and IV-probit regression models,
Chen and Fan (2015, 2016) indicated that caring for parents may reduce the women’s
employment. Using data from the CHNS from 1991–2011 and IV methods, Chen
et al. (2016) found that caring for parents may reduce both the probability of partici-
pation in work and working hours of women aged 18–52, but the influence of caring
for parents on the early retirement ofwomen aged 45–49 is not significant. Using data
from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) from 1993–2011 and IV-probit
and IV-tobit regression models, Wu et al. (2017) found that parent care giving may
reduce the labor supply of both women and men. The instrumental variables used in
these studies are the need of parent care and the number of siblings (Chen and Fan
2015, 2016; Chen et al. 2016; Wu et al. 2017).
Although these previous studies investigated the impact of parent care onwomen’s
employment, some remaining issues should be discussed as follows. First, no empir-
ical study has focused on middle-aged Chinese women. As is well known, the prob-
ability of becoming ill is higher for older parents; therefore, the probability of parent
care giving is higher for themiddle-aged group. Regarding the influence of the public
pension system, a woman can choose early retirement for parent care giving, which
may decrease the labor force participation of middle-aged women. Therefore, from
both economics and policy perspectives, focusing on middle-aged women is impor-
tant. Second, because conditions such as time constraints and pension eligibility
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age differ by groups, a heterogeneity problem may remain among different groups.
Therefore, sensitivity checks for different groups should be employed. Although
previous studies considered differences by population registration system (hukou)
and education groups, differences by age and income have not been analyzed.
In contrast with previous studies, the main contributions of this study can be
considered to be as follows. First, using a longitudinal survey data from the China
Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS), which focuses on individ-
uals age 45 and older, this study chooses women aged 45–69, who give most of
the care for older parents as the analyzed objects, to investigate the influence of
parent care giving on women’s work participation. Second, using subsamples of
different groups, this study considers group heterogeneity and compares the influ-
ence of parent care by age (women aged 45–54, 50–54, 55–59, and 60–69), hukou
(rural or urban), education (low-, middle-, and high-level education), and household
income groups (low-, middle-, and high-income levels). Third, this study uses the
IV method to address the endogeneity problem, as well as the random effects (RE)
model to address the heterogeneity problem. These results may provide new insight
regarding the issue.
3.3 Methodology and Data
3.3.1 Model
The probit regression model can be used to investigate the probability of work
participation as Eq. (3.1).
Pr(Yi = 1) = a0 + βoPC PCi + β0X Xi + vi > 0 (3.1)
In Eq. (3.1), Pr(Yi = 1) denotes the probability of work participation. i indicates
individuals, PC is the dummy variable of parent care giving, and X represents the
control variables. The influence of parent care giving on women’s work participation
is denoted by β0GC , and the effect of each control variable is denoted by β0X . In
addition, a is a constant, and vi is the error term.
In Eq. (3.1), two econometric problems should be considered. First, it is argued
that an endogeneity problem may remain between the labor supply and parent care
giving. For example, a woman can provide parent care because she retired early to
care for a parent. To address the endogeneity problem, the IV method is used and is
expressed as Eqs. (3.2)–(3.5).
Pr(PCi = 1) = a1 + β1Z Zi + β1X Xi + ui (3.2)
Resii = Pr PCi − Pr PC
∧
i (3.3)
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Pr(Yi = 1) = a2 + β2PC PC
∧
i + β2X Xi + εi (3.4)
Pr(Yi = 1) = a2 + β2PC PCi + β2Resi Resii + β2X Xi + εi (3.5)
corr(Z , ε) = 0 and corr(Z , u) = 0
In Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4), β2PC could be estimated by a two-step procedure: first,
estimate Eq. (3.1), then predict PC
∧
or residual items Resi (Eq. 3.3) in the first
step; and second, include PC
∧
or residual items Resi as explanatory variables and
estimate Eq. (3.3) or (3.4) in the second step. Whether the estimates are unbiased
hinges critically on the validity of the instrumental variables (Z); that is, Z needs to
be correlated with PC while satisfying the conditions that corr(Z , ε) = 0. The IV
methods include the two-stage least squares (2SLS), two-stage predictor substitution
(2SPS), and two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) models. The 2SRI model was advo-
cated first by Hausman (1978), and then it was used by Blundell and Smith (1989).
Newey (1987), Rivers and Vuong (1988), and Terza et al. (2008) pointed out that the
SRI model can be used in binary variable analyses, and it can be considered to be an
expansion of the 2SLS model for binary variable analyses. Because the dependent
variable is a binary value (0 or 1), 2SPS and 2SRImodels are used in the study, which
are expressed by Eqs. (3.3) and (3.4), respectively.
Second, the heterogeneity problem may remain in Eq. (3.1). Concretely, vi in
Eq. (3.1) includes the unobserved individual-specific time-invariant effect μi and
the true error δi t (vi t = μi + δi t ). When the unobserved individual-specific time-
invariant effect is not considered, the bias may exist in the results. To address the
problem, the random effects (RE) model is used; it can by expressed by Eq. (3.6):
Pr(Yit = 1) = a3 + β3PC PCit + β3X Xit + μi + δi t. (3.6)
Finally, to address the heterogeneity and other endogeneity problems simul-
taneously, the random effects model and the IV-2SRI model (RE + IV) are
used.
We employ the Cragg-Donald Wald test to check the weak instrumental variables
problem and calculate the Sargan statistic values to check the exogenous variables;
we also employ the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to determine whether the endogeneity
problem remains between labor force participation and parent care giving. Then, we
determine the validity of these models based on these test results.
3.3.2 Data
Data for this study come from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Survey
(CHARLS). The CHARLS, which is conducted by Peking University every two
years, covers representative regions of China. Its survey objects are individuals aged
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45 and older. The baseline national wave of CHARLS, conducted in 2012, includes
approximately 10,000 households and 17,708 individuals in 150 counties/districts
and 450 villages/resident committees. The first and second follow-up survey waves
were for 2014 and 2016. Information such as demographic characteristics, family
structure, intra-household transfer, employment status, income, and other related
facts can be obtained from the CHARLS. Because information about parent care
can only be obtained from CHARLS 2011 and CHARLS 2013 data, this study uses
data from these two waves. To consider the influence of the retirement system in
government organizations and enterprises and public pension policies, the sample is
limited to women from 45–69 years of age, including both rural and urban residents.
Regarding the retirement system, we also analyzed various age groups (groups aged
45–49, 50–54, 55–59, and 60 and older) to check robustness.
3.3.3 Variables
Two dependent variables are constructed as follows: first, a binary variable is equal
to 1 when a woman is caring for a parent and 0 when she is not. This variable is used
in the first stage of the instrumental variable method. Second, a dummy variable is
equal to 1 when a woman is working and 0 when she is not working.
Themain independent variable is the dummy variable of parent care giving, which
is equal to 1 when a woman is a parent care giver and 0 when she is not.
Different covariates are used to control other influences on women’s participation
in the labor force. First, according to the human capital theory (Becker 1964; Mincer
1974), an individual’s wage level is determined by human capital, such as education
and years of experience. As Grossman (1972) pointed out, health status is also a kind
of human capital. It can be thought that these factors are the important determinants
of the labor supply. On the other hand, educational attainment may also influence
people’s attitudes toward work and family care. This study uses educational attain-
ment levels (low, middle, and high educational levels),3 age dummy variables,4 and
subjective health status5 as the proxy variables of human capital.
Second, Douglas (1934) and Arisawa (1956) indicated that women’s labor supply
is influenced not only by the market wage but also by unearned income, such as the
income of the husband and other family members. Annual household consumption
is used as the index of household income. The dummy variable of having a spouse
is constructed to control the influence of family members on the labor supply.
Third, based on the labor market segmentation hypothesis (Piore 1970), workers’
behaviors are shaped by the characteristics of the labor market. As is well known, in
China, the labor market is segmented by the population registration system (hukou)
(Ma 2018). Since 1958, theHukou system has been implemented by the government.
In the planned economy period (1949–1977), migration from rural to urban areas
was prohibited. During the market-oriented economy reform period since the 1978,
the Hukou system has been deregulated, but great differences in employment and
wages remain between the rural hukou and urban hukou residents. For example, social
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security systems (e.g., public pension, medical insurance schemes) differ according
to theHukou system. Therefore, an urban resident dummy variable is used to control
the influence of labor market segmentation by the hukou system.
Fourth, two variables are constructed as instrumental variables. (1) The number of
parents living can affect the probability of parent care giving; the more parents who
are living, the higher the probability of parent care giving will be. (2) The number
of siblings may affect the probability of parent care giving. It is assumed that the
probability of parent care giving may be smaller for a woman with more siblings
because parent care giving can be shared among siblings. It can be considered that
the influnences of these two variables onwork participation ofmiddle-aged and older
women are small. The number of parents living and number of siblings are used as
the instrumental variables in this study.
Finally, the culture and the economic development level may change by years; the
year dummy variables (2011, 2013) are included in the control variables. Table 3.1
presents descriptive statistics of the variables ofwomen aged 45–69. First, the propor-
tion of women caring for a parent is 13.7%; one of seven women aged 45–69 in
China care for a parent. Second, as compared with the employment rate between
the care-giving and non-care-giving groups, it is generally 6.6% lower for the care-
giving group than for the non-care-giving group. Third, individual characteristics
differ between the care-giving group and the non-care-giving group. Concretely, it is
shown that the proportions of groups that are well-educated, healthy, have a spouse,
are urban residents, are younger, and have high-income households are greater for the
care-giving group, whereas the number of children is slightly less for the care-giving
group. The individual characteristics of care-giving and non-care-giving groups are
shown to differ; these factors should be controlled when investigating the influence
of parent care giving on women’s employment.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Determinants of Women’s Parent Care Giving
Table 3.2 summarizes the determinants of parent care giving. The probit regression
model based on the cross-sectional data (Model 1) and the random effects (RE) probit
model based on the panel data are used (Model 2). The main findings are as follows.
First, in the initial stage of the IV method, the coefficients of both the number of
parents living and the number of sibling dummy variables are statistically significant
at 1 and 5% levels in both Model 1 and Model 2. Based on the results of Model 2,
when the number of parents living increases by one, the probability of parent care
giving may increase by 61.9% points; as compared with the group with four or more
siblings, the probability of giving parent care may decrease by 19.1% points for
the group with one sibling; however, the differences in probability between groups
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Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of variables
Total Care giving (a) Non-care giving
(b)
D
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. a–b
Labor participation 0.702 0.457 0.759 0.428 0.693 0.461 0.066
Parent care 0.137 0.344
Education
Low-education 0.899 0.301 0.797 0.402 0.915 0.279 −0.118
Middle-education 0.087 0.282 0.167 0.373 0.074 0.262 0.093
High-education 0.014 0.118 0.036 0.187 0.010 0.102 0.026
Age 55.817 6.828 51.921 5.547 56.437 6.808 −4.516
Health status
Poor 0.257 0.437 0.184 0.387 0.268 0.443 −0.084
Fair 0.512 0.500 0.536 0.499 0.508 0.500 0.028
Good 0.136 0.343 0.161 0.368 0.132 0.338 0.029
Very good 0.085 0.279 0.108 0.310 0.082 0.274 0.026
Excellent 0.011 0.102 0.012 0.108 0.010 0.101 0.002
Having spouse 0.913 0.282 0.945 0.228 0.908 0.289 0.037
Number of children 0.913 0.282 2.022 1.022 2.532 1.259 −0.510
Urban 2.462 1.242 0.287 0.453 0.188 0.391 0.099
Household income 0.201 0.401 8.957 0.916 8.749 0.880 0.208
Number of living parent 8.778 0.888 1.047 0.643 0.423 0.656 0.624
Survey year
y2011 0.425 0.494 0.457 0.498 0.420 0.494 0.037
y2013 0.575 0.494 0.543 0.498 0.580 0.494 −0.037
Observation 8,656 1,187 7,449
SourceCalculated based on China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) 2011 and
2013
without sibling, the group with two or three siblings, and the group with four and
more siblings are small.
Second, for the influence of other factors, based on the results of Model 2, (1) the
probabilities of caring for parents are 29.9% and 27.1% points higher for middle and
high education level groups, respectively, than for the low-education level group.
(2) The probability becomes greater with age. Concretely, as compared with
women in the group aged 45–49, the probabilities of giving parent care are 35.4%
and 59.4% points higher for groups where the women were aged 55–59 and 60–69,
respectively. The difference in the probability of parent care giving for women aged
45–49 and 50–54 is small.
(3) As compared with the group with very poor health, the probability of caring
for grandchildren is 12.1%, 12.1%, and 14.3% points higher for the fair, good, and
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Table 3.2 Determinants of women’s parent care giving
(1) Probit (2) RE probit
dy/dx z-value dy/dx z-value
Education (low)
Middle-education 0.051*** 4.09 0.299*** 3.96
High-education 0.051* 1.88 0.271* 1.68
Age (age 45–49)
Age 50–54 −0.005 −0.57 −0.041 −0.72
Age 55–59 −0.047*** −5.59 −0.354*** −5.49
Age 60–69 −0.079*** −8.29 −0.594*** −7.89
Health status (poor)
Fair 0.018** 2.17 0.121** 2.13
Good 0.020* 1.72 0.121* 1.61
Very good 0.022 1.60 0.143* 1.67
Excellent 0.027 0.81 0.150 0.75
Having spouse 0.012 0.92 0.089 0.97
Children number −0.011*** −3.17 −0.071*** −3.10
Income 0.009** 2.34 0.063** 2.33
Urban 0.022** 2.35 0.139** 2.24
Number of living parent 0.094*** 19.95 0.619*** 16.03
Number of siblings (four and more)
No sibling −0.001 −0.04 −0.017 −0.13
One −0.025** −1.97 −0.191** −2.04
Two 0.006 0.55 0.031 0.46
Three 0.006 0.77 0.043 0.78
Survey year (y2011)
y2013 −0.022*** −3.20 −0.146*** −3.33
Number of obs. 8,656 8,656
Number of groups 6,635
Likelihood-ratio test of rho = 0 chibar2(01) = 27.88
Pseudo R2 0.151
Prob ≥ chi2(chibar2) 0.000 0.000
SourceCalculated based on China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) 2011 and
2013
Notes ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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very good health groups, respectively. This indicates that health status positively
affects the probability of caring for a parent.
(4) The number of children negatively influences the probability of giving parent
care. When the number of children increases by one child, the probability of giving
parent care decreases by 7.1% points. Because the time constraint remains, when the
other time is consistent, a trade-off relationship exists between child care and parent
care. Hours of housework may be greater for women with more children, which may
decrease the time available to care for parents.
(5) Household income positively affects the probability of giving parent care. A
woman in a high-income household may not need to work for a living; therefore, she
may have more leisure hours to devote to parent care.
(6) The probability of giving parent care is 13.9% points higher for urban hukou
women than for rural hukou women.
The results can be considered as follows. First, in rural areas, the influence of
Confucianism is greater. Based on the culture in rural areas, the objects of parent
care are mainly a woman’s parents in law. However, in urban areas, a woman can
care for both her parents and parents in law. In addition, the consciousness of intra-
household or community risk sharing is more significant in rural areas than in urban
areas. Therefore, parent care giving can be shared by other family members or the
community in rural areas. Second, as mentioned above, depending on the public
pension scheme covering employees in government organizations and firms—most
of which are urban hukou workers—the mandatory retirement age is 50 for female
workers and 55 for female cadres; most retired urban hukou workers can obtain
pension benefits from the Urban Employee Pension Insurance scheme (UEPI) and
most urban residents who are not coverved by the UEPI can obtain pension benefit
from the Urban Residents Pension Insurance (URPI). In rural areas, based on the
New Rural Pension Scheme (NRPS), women aged 60 and over can receive pension
benefits when an adult family member has participated in the NRPS. However, the
pension benefit is less for rural hukou residents than for urban hukou residents.6 It
can be assumed that rural womenmay have to work for a living. Thus, the probability
of giving parent care is higher for urban women than for rural women.
The results indicate that the number of parents living, number of siblings, and indi-
vidual characteristics such as education, age, health status, family structure (number
of children, household income), and labor market segmentation factors (urban or
rural areas) may influence the probability of caring for a parent.
3.4.2 Parent Care Giving and Women’s Employment
Table 3.3 displays the results using the total samples of women andmen.We summa-
rize the results of the probit regression model (Model 1), IV-2SPS (Model 2), IV-
2SRI (Model 3), random effects (RE) probit regression model (Model 4), and RE
and IV-2SRI model (Model 5). We use the number of parents living and number















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































giving in the first stage estimation, which is shown in Table 3.2. The values of the
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test are 103.57, 185.54, and 280.46 for IV-2SPS (Model 2),
IV-2SRI (Model 3), and RE and IV-2SRI (Model 5) models, respectively, which are
larger than the standard value of 10 and statistically significant at the 1% level. The
results indicate that these are not weak instrumental variables. The results of the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test show that giving parent care is an endogenous variable in
the probability of the labor force participation function. The Sargan statistic values
suggest that the instrumental variables in the first stage are exogenous. These results
indicate that the instrumental variables are valid, and the IV method should be used
in estimations. The main findings are summarized as follows.
First, the probability of employment is 4.6–135.6% points higher for parent care
giver group. In addition, when considering the heterogeneity and other endogeneity
problem, the influence of parent care giving on the employment of women aged
45–69 years becomes greater. When these problems are not addressed, the results of
the influence of parent care may be underestimated.
Second, other factors influence the employment of middle-aged women.
Concretely, based on the results of Model 5 (RE and IV-2SRI model), (1) to compare
with the group with low-level educations, the probability of work participation is
lower for the mid-level educational group, but is higher for the high-level educa-
tional group. It is shown that U-shaped relationship exists between education and
the employment of women aged 45–69.
The reason is thought to be as follows. Women with low-level educations have to
work for a living, due to their lower household income; therefore, the probability of
participation inwork is higher for the low-level education group than for themid-level
education group. Becausemarket wages are higher for the highly educated group, the
probability of work participation may be higher for the high-level education group
than for the low- and mid-level education groups.
Third, the probability of participation inwork is higher forwomenaged45–49 than
for women aged 50 and older. This is related to the mandatory retirement system in
government organizations and firms.Mostwomen retire at 50 and 55 years; therefore,
the probability of work participation may decrease dramatically for the group aged
50 and older.
Fourth, the probability of participation in work is higher for the healthy group than
for the poor health group. As one kind of human capital, health status may affect
the employment of middle-aged and older women. The health results are consistent
with those of previous studies.
Fifth, the probability of participation in work is higher for women with a spouse
(the married women group) than for single women.
Sixth, household income negatively affects women’s work participation. Based on
the individual utility model, unearned income, such as the household income of other
family members, may increase the preference for leisure; therefore, the probability
of work participation is lower for women in high-income households than for those
in low-income households.
Seventh, the probability of participation inwork is lower for urbanwomen than for
rural women. These results can be explained as follows. Because the public pension
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benefit is higher for urban women than for rural women, most urban women can
maintain their living standard by receiving public pension benefits after they retire,
while most rural women must continue working for a living. In addition, most urban
women are employees, and the proportion of workers whose ages are older than the
mandatory retirement age is small in firms, which may be caused by the reasons
of both labor supply and labor demand sides. From the labor demand perspective,
although urbanwomenmaywish to work after retirement, the labor demand for older
workers in firms is low in urban areas. On the contrary, in rural areas, most women
work in the agricultural industry and are self-employed, so they can adjust their own
work. Thus the labor demand for rural women may not change greatly in the middle-
aged group and older group. In additions, from the labor supply perspective, the
public pension benefit is higher for urban residents than rural residents, the higher
pension benefits may rise the reservation wage level for urban women.
3.4.3 Sensitivity and Robustness Checks: Results
for Different Groups
To consider the heterogeneity of different groups, we employ estimations using the
REorRE_IV-2SRIprobit regressionmodels by age, area (urban and rural), education,
and household income groups. The validity model used is based on the likelihood-
ratio test of ρ = 0, the Cragg-Donald Wald F-test, the Sargan statistic test, and the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. The marginal values (dy/dx) of the parent care giving
dummy variable and estimated residual items are summarized in Tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.6,
3.7. The main results are as follows:
First, the results of Table 3.4 show that the influence of parent care giving on
employment is greater for women aged 50–59 than for women aged 45–49, and all
values are positive. This suggests that to compare women aged 45–49 with women
aged 50–59, the positive effects of parent care giving on employment are greater than
the negative effects. This indicates that women aged 50–59 seem likely to participate
in work to obtain higher incomes for living or to pay for parent care.
Second, the difference in the influence of parent care giving on employment is
small between the urban hukou and rural hukou groups, and the influence is positive
for both urban (1.313) and rural women (1.003) (see Table 3.5). It indicates that
either the urban hukou group or the rural hukou group has to work to obtain more
income from the labor market, therefore the problems of family-work conflict might
maintain for both the rural and the urban residents.
Third, the probability of employment is higher for the mid-level and highly
educated groups (1.732) than for the low-level education group (1.083) (see
Table 3.6). These results can be explained by the human capital theory (Becker
1964; Mincer 1974). Well-educated individuals can obtain higher wages from the
labor market when the reservation wage and work or leisure preference are constant;
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Table 3.5 Parent care and employment of women aged 45–69 by urban hukou and rural hukou
(1) Urban (2) Rural
RE and IV(2SRI) RE and IV(2SRI)
dy/dx z-value dy/dx z-value
Parent care 1.313** 2.13 1.003** 2.48
Control variables Yes Yes
Number of obs. 6,335 5,850
Number of groups 4,903 4,564
Prob ≥ chi2 (chibar2) 0.000 0.000
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test 349.668 (P = 0.000) 620.356 (P = 0.000)
Sargan statistic 6.980 (p = 0.137) 1.902 (p = 0.754)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 39.838 (p = 0.000) 15.863 (p = 0.000)
SourceCalculated based on China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) 2011 and 2013
Notes (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Education, age, marital status, health status, income, and survey year variables are estimated. They
are not expressed in this table
(3) Probit regression models are used. 2SRI: two-stage residual inclusion instrumental variables method;
RE: random effects model
be higher for well-educated women (positive effect). On the contrary, well-educated
women may obtain more pension benefits than less-educated women, and increasing
unearned income may decrease the probability of employment for well-educated
women aged 45–69 (negative effect). The estimated results suggest that the positive
effect is greater than the negative effect for well-educated women.
Fourth, the influences of parent care on employment are not statistically significant
for both middle-income and high-income groups, whereas parent care positively
affects the probability for the low-income group (Table 3.7). It might be caused by
that an individual in the low-income group has to work for living for living or to pay
for parent care. In the sense, the problem of family-work conflict might be severe for
the low-income group than the middle- and high-income groups in China.
3.5 Conclusions
Using the longitudinal survey data of the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
Survey (CHARLS) from 2011–2013, this study investigates the influence of parent
care giving on employment of women aged 45–69 in China. The random effects (RE)
model and instrumental variables (IV) methods are used to address the unobserved
heterogeneity and other endogeneity problems, respectively. The main findings are
as follows.
First, the number of parents living, number of siblings, and individual charac-
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Table 3.7 Parent care and employment of women aged 45–69 by household income
(1) Low-income (2) Middle-income (3) High-income
RE RE and IV(2SRI) RE and IV(2SRI)
dy/dx z-value dy/dx z-value dy/dx z-value
Parent care 0.415** 2.11 1.214 1.95 1.214 1.95
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 2,665 2,876 3,034
Number of groups 2,331 2,624 2,624
Likelihood-ratio test of
rho = 0
chibar2(01) = 56.13 chibar2(01) = 32.53 chibar2(01) = 41.86
Prob ≥ chi2(chibar2) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cragg-Donald Wald
F-test
424.373 (P = 0.000) 537.265 (P = 0.000) 593.265 (P = 0.000)
Sargan statistic 1.229 (P = 0.873) 5.068 (P = 0.280) 5.563 (P = 0.234)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 2.366 (p = 0.124) 4.048 (p = 0.044) 24.172 (p = 0.000)
Source Calculated based on China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) 2011 and
2013
Notes (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Age of samples is from 45–59. (2) Education, age, marital status, health status, urban/rural status,
and survey year variables are estimated. They are not expressed in this table
(3) Probit regression models are used. 2SRI: two-stage residual inclusion instrumental variables
method; RE: random effects model
household income), and labormarket segmentation factors (urban or rural areas) may
influence the probability of parent care giving for middle-aged and older women.
Second, although the results of previous studies using younger and middle-aged
women (i.e., women aged 18–52) indicated that parent care giving negatively affects
women’s employment, this study focused on middle-aged and older women aged
45–69 and found that the probability of employment is higher for the group caring
for parents. This can be explained by the fact that the positive effect (income effect)
is higher than the negative effect (time constraint effect).
Third, the influences of caring for parents on women’s employment differ by
group. Concretely, the influence is greater for women aged 50–59, those who are
well-educated, and low-income women than for their counterparts. In the sense, the
problem of family-work conflict by the parent care might be severe for these groups.
The policy implications of these results can be considered to be as follows. First,
although middle-aged and older women can choose to exit the labor market to live
depending on the public pension benefit and past savings, most women who are
caring for parents chose to work. It is assumed that these parent care givers must
work to earn a living because the pension benefits are lower or they are trying to
obtain more income from the labor market for living or to pay for parent care. This
suggests that the work–family conflict caused by the parent care among the middle-
aged and the olderwomenmay remain. To address the problem, elderly care insurance
policies should be considered. The case in Japan, where a care insurance system was
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implemented in 2000, shows that implementing a care insurance system positively
affects the labor supply of Japanese women (Shimizutani et al. 2004). The Chinese
government may learn from the experience of developed countries to establish a care
insurance system in the future. Second, the results show that low-income women are
likely to have to work. This suggests that income inequality may cause differences
in the labor force participation of middle-aged and older women; poor women must
work endlessly, which may cause the gaps of work status in lifespan among groups
of women. To address the problem, income inequality should be considered in the
care insurance system. For example, the contribution of care insurance should be
paid based on wage or income levels, and basic care service should be equal for
low-income and high-income groups.
Notes
1. For empirical studies on the child care on women’s employment in China, please
refer to Shen et al. (2012); and Liu et al. (2016).
2. For the latest paper on the summary and discussion on family care in China,
please refer to Connelly et al. (2018).
3. Low education includes those with no formal education, those who did not
finish primary school, those who were home schooled, and those who completed
elementary school; middle education includes those with junior high school,
senior high school, or vocational school educations; high education includes
those with college, university, or graduate school educations.
4. The age dummy variables include those 45–49, 50–54, 55–59, and 60–69 years
of age.
5. Based on the CHARLS questionnaire, five kinds of dummy variables (excellent,
very good, good, fair, and poor) were constructed.
6. For example, based on the data from CHARLS2015, the average annual public
pension benefit is 27,543 CNY for urban residents and 2,705 CNY for rural
residents.
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Part II
The Gender Gap in China’s Labor Market
and Society
Chapter 4
Ownership Sector and the Gender Wage
Gap
Abstract Using data of the Chinese Household Income Project surveys (CHIP),
this study explores the determinants of the gender wage gap by five kinds of owner-
ship sectors from 2002 to 2013 in urban China. A decomposition analysis of the
gender wage gap based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model is employed.
The results show that the gender difference in human capital and discrimination
against female workers contribute to the gender wage gap; the influence of the unex-
plained component including the discrimination against female workers increased in
each ownership sector from 2002 to 2013. The range of the increase in the influence
of the unexplained component is greater for firms in the public sector than for those
in the private sector; and the influence of factors on the gender wage gap differs by
ownership sector.
Keywords Ownership · Gender wage gap · Human capital · Discrimination ·
China
4.1 Introduction
With the progress of market-oriented economy reform in China, income inequality
has expanded and become a serious social problem. There have beenmany studies on
the issue, such as those of Zhao et al. (1996; Li et al. (2008, 2013, 2017) and Sicular
et al. (2020). Because wages are the largest share of local urban residents’ income,
a study of wage gaps is undoubtedly of great significance to income inequality.
Currently, there are a variety of wage gaps in China. Of these, the gender wage gap
has risen to prominence.
Under the market-oriented economy reform period from 1978 to the present,
the gender wage gap has become an important issue in China. First, the widening
gender wage gap contributes to greater income inequality. Second, the gender wage
gap has expanded1 (Gustafsson and Li 2000; Li et al. 2011; Ma 2009a, 2009b,
2011, 2018a). The gender wage gap was small during the planned economy period
because the government focusedmore on gender equality and carried out a number of
positive policies to promote female employment and gender equality. These policies
contributed to reducing the genderwage gap (Gustafsson andLi 2000; Liu et al. 2000;
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Maurer-Fazio and Hughes 2002; Ma 2018a, 2018c). Conversely, market-oriented
economy reform had a disastrous effect on the gender wage gap. It is assumed that
the influence ofmarketmechanisms onwage determinationmay become greater with
the growth of the private sector (e.g., domestic privately owned enterprises, foreign-
owned enterprises, or the self-employed sector). Most of the wage determination and
employment systems in the public sector (government organizations, state-owned
enterprises) are still controlled by the government, whereas the influence of market
mechanism onwage determination is greater in the private sector. Therefore the labor
market in urbanChina is segmented into the public sector and the private sector (Chen
et al. 2005; Demurger et al. 2007, 2012; Zhang and Xue 2008; Ye et al. 2011; Ma
2014, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). When the wage determination mechanism differs by
ownership types, the gender wage gap may vary in different ownership sectors.
Although some empirical studies have investigated the determinants of gender
wage gaps, empirical studies of detailed decomposition by different ownership
sectors on the gender wage gap are scarce, particularly, regarding how these factors
changed as the market-oriented economy reform progressed in the 2000s. This study
utilizes data from two periods of the Chinese Household Income Project survey
(CHIPs) conducted in 2003 and2014 (CHIPs 2002,CHIPs 2013) to provide empirical
evidence about determinants of the gender wage gap by different ownership sectors
(e.g., government organizations; state-owned enterprises: SOEs; collectively owned
enterprises: COEs; privately owned enterprises: POEs; foreign-owned enterprises:
FOEs; self-employed) and its change from 2002 to 2013 in urban China.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the background of
labor market reform and the changing gender gap in China. Section 4.3 summarizes
the economic theory of discrimination in the labor market and previous empirical
studies. Section 4.4 describes the methods of analysis, including an introduction to
the models and data. Section 4.5 gives the calculated results, and Sect. 4.6 states and
interprets the econometric results. Section 4.7 presents the main conclusions.
4.2 Changes in the Gender Wage Gap in Urban China
During the Economic Transition Period
In the planned economy period, the government enforced a “socialism reconstruc-
tion” campaign. By the 1960s, all POEs and FOEs were reformed into SOEs or
COEs, comprising the “the public sector” (Gongyouzhi Bumen). In the public sector,
theChinese government controlled the number ofworkers andwage levels and imple-
mented the long-term employment system and the seniority wage system. In order to
enforce the communist ideology, the government implemented policies to promote
female employment andgender equality.Because thegovernment controlled employ-
ment and wage determination, although wage level determination and promotion did
not obey market mechanisms, wage distribution was relatively equal, and the gender
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gap in employment and wages was small in urban China (Gustafsson and Li 2000;
Liu et al. 2000; Maurer-Fazio and Hughes 2002; Ma 2011, 2018a, 2018c).
Conversely, market-oriented economy reform had an indirect effect on the expan-
sion of the gender wage gap. For example, based on data from the third Chinese
Female Social Status Survey (CFSSS) conducted by the National Female Federation,
the gender wage gap (the ratio of female to male wages) in urban regions increased
from 77.5% (1990) to 63.7% (2010). How did the market-oriented economy reform
affect the gender wage gap in China? Three key factors are discussed as follows.
First, SOE reform may have affected the gender wage gap. The government has
been implementing SOE reform since the 1980s. This reform allowed most SOEs to
gain a bit of management authority: they could decide the wage level and individual
bonuses based on the firm’s total wage bills. The government determined the firm’s
total wage bills based on the production plan set by agreement in the prior year.
A firm could reserve a portion that was more than the production plan as a firm’s
reserved saving; the reserved firm’s saving could be used to pay workers’ bonuses.
The reform motivated state-owned enterprises to increase productivity; therefore,
SOEs were motivated to pay more to a highly productive worker (highly skilled, or
highly educated worker). Thus, when labor productivity is higher for the male group
than for the female group, the gender wage gap may increase with the SOE reform.
In addition, starting in 1986, the long-term employment system was replaced by
the labor contract system in SOEs, and the employment system reform in SOEs was
enforced from the late 1990s. It was found that the risk of retrenchment was higher
and reemployment rates lower for the female group (Knight and Li 2006; Ma 2008).
The average wage of re-employed workers was lower for the female group than for
the male group in SOEs (Appleton et al. 2002; Knight and Li 2006; Ma 2008). The
probability of becoming unemployed differed significantly for males and females.
This may be a contributory cause of the decreased female labor force participation
rate.2
Moreover, starting in the 1980s, a section of small and mid-sized SOEs and COEs
changed their ownership types to POEs. The SOE reform and the increase in privately
owned enterprises may affect the gender wage gap in urban China.
Second, from the 1980s, the government implemented an Opening-up policy.
China joined theWTO in 2001, this led to a significant increase in FOEs. In addition,
POEs and self-employment has been permitted by the government since the 1990s.
Because a firm in the private sector (e.g., FOEs, domestic POEs, self-employed
sector) faces a competitivemarket, it determineswages based onmarketmechanisms,
which means wages are determined by workers’ marginal labor productivity. The
competitivemarket should decrease discrimination against femaleworkers.However,
because an employer in the private sector can determine workers’ wages by himself
(herself), it is possible for discrimination against female workers to occurmore easily
in the private sector than in the public sector. Although some empirical studies have
shown that the gender wage gap in the public and private sectors differs, the results
are not consistent. For example, Ma (2009b) utilized CHIPs 1995 and CHIPs 2002
survey data for an empirical study that showed that, in all ownership sectors, the
gender wage gap expanded from 1995 to 2002; the gender wage gap was greater in
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the POEs than in SOEs in 2002. In contrast, Guo and Zhang (2010) utilized Labor
Survey data from 2006 for the Northeast region to analyze the gender wage gap in the
public sector and the private sector; they argued that the gender wage gap is greater
in the public sector than in the private sector. Thus, a more-detailed empirical study
about ownership sectors and the gender wage gap is needed.
Third, in order to address the gender wage gap in labor markets, the Chinese
government introduced a number of new policies and regulations during the market-
oriented reform period. For example, the central government implemented a compul-
sory education policy and increased public education subsidies to poorer rural areas.
These policies may reduce the gender gap for education, considered to be “the
discrimination before entry to the labormarket.” Based on data from the thirdCFSSS,
the gender gap of years of schooling decreased from1.9 years in 1990 (male 6.6 years,
female 4.7 years) to 0.3 years in 2010 (male 9.1 years, female 8.8 years). The Labor
Law (Laodong Fa) was published in 1995, and the Labor Contact Policy (Laodong
Hetong Fa) was promulgated in 2008; these labor policies protect the rights of both
males and females and promote equality of employment and wages for both males
and females. Local government also promulgated policy to promote the equality of
employment and wages between these two groups. For example, Shenzhen City (in
Guangdong Province) implemented a policy called the “Gender Equality Promotion
Law in the Economy Special Zone” in June 2012, which is the first government law
for gender equality in China. These positive policies may affect the gender wage gap
in China.
4.3 Literature Review
4.3.1 General Economic Theories to Explain
the Determinants of the Gender Wage Gap
What causes the gender wage gap in the labor market? First, based on the discrimina-
tion hypothesis (Becker 1957), discrimination against female workers may be shown
by employers, customers, and colleagues; this discrimination causes the gender wage
gap. To consider the situation in China, it is assumed that as compared with the public
sector, an employer’s influence on employees’ wage determination is greater in the
private sector; if employer discrimination is severe in the private sector, the gender
wage gap may be higher in the private sector than in the public sector.
Second, the statistical discrimination hypothesis (Arrow1972, 1973; Phelps 1972)
states that because an employer cannot have perfect information about employees,
he makes decisions on employment and wages for a male worker or a female worker
based on the average values of some factors that are not presently observed (work
effort, probability of turnover). When the employer predicts that the probability of
taking housework (e.g., child care, family care, home cleaning, cooking) is higher
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for females than males, he may reduce their employment and set a lower wage level
for females.
Third, based on the human capital theory (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974), in a
perfectly competitive labor market, the individual wage level is determined by a
worker’s labor productivity, which is related to aworker’s human capital; thuswhen a
worker with higher level of human capital (e.g., higher education level, longer tenure
years, or more years of experience3), he/she should earn a higher wage. Because
foreign-owned enterprises and privately owned enterprises operate in a competitive
market, they determine wages based on market mechanisms, which means that a
worker’s wage is determined by his/her productivity. Thus, when the human capital
factors are held constant, the gender wage gap may be lower in the private sector
than in the public sector.
Fourth, the labor market segmentation hypothesis also can explain the existence
of gender wage gaps. For example, Piore (1970) suggested that the labor market is
not a perfect competitive market; it is segmented by the primary market, in which
the wage level is higher, and the secondary market, in which the wage level is lower.
Thus, when males concentrate in the primary market (e.g., the public sector), while
females concentrate in the secondary market (e.g., the private sector), the gender
wage gap appears.
Fifth, based on the crowded hypothesis (Bergmann 1974), the labor market is
segmented by female-dominated occupations andmale-dominated occupations (e.g.,
manager, professional engineer); the proportion of women in female-dominated
occupations (e.g., beautician, clerical staff) is greater, whereas the proportion of
men in male-dominated occupations is greater. For this reason, when the wage level
in male-dominated occupations is higher than that in female-dominated occupa-
tions, gender wage gaps will appear. This is called “the influence of occupational
segregation on the gender wage gap” (Bergmann 1974).
As described above, based on these economic hypotheses and theory (the discrim-
ination hypothesis; statistical discrimination hypothesis; human capital theory;
primary and secondary labor market segmentation hypothesis; crowd hypothesis),
the prediction results for the gender wage gaps in the public sector or the private
sector are not clear. An empirical study is needed to provide evidence for analysis.
4.3.2 Summary of Empirical Studies on the Gender Wage
Gap in China
For the empirical studies on the gender wage gap in urban China, Gustafsson and Li
(2000), Liu et al. (2000), Ma (2007, 2009a), Li and Yang (2010), Li et al. (2011),
and Ma et al. (2013) used the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model (Blinder 1973;
Oaxaca 1973), the Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition model (Oaxaca and Ransom
1994), or theMelly decompositionmodel (Melly 2006) to employ the decomposition
analysis. They pointed out that both the explained component caused by the differ-
ences of human capital and the unexplained component caused by the discrimination
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affect the gender wage gap. In most of the studies, a comparison of the influences
between these two parts shows that the influence of the unexplained component is
greater than that for the explained component. Thus, it is indicated that discrimina-
tion against female workers is the main reason for the gender wage gap in China. The
contribution rate of influence of unexplained component for the local urban hukou
resident groupwas 52.49% in 1988, 63.20% in 1995 (Gustafsson and Li 2000); 44.2–
49.3% in 1995, 51.0–58.0% in 2002 (Ma 2009a); 52.0% in 1995, 69.0% in 2002, and
77.7% in 2007 (Li et al. 2011). The value for rural-urbanmigrants was 74.32–84.38%
in 2008 (Li and Yang 2010); the value for the all urban residents and migrants in
urban China was 49.18% in 1996 (Meng and Zhang 2001). In addition, the values
are 86.08–101.80% in 2006, and 45.31–91.73% in 2009 by wage percentiles (Ma
et al. 2013).
Many empirical studies on the effect of segmentation by sector on gender wage
gaps in urban China—Wang (2005a), Li and Ma (2006), Ma (2007), Yao and Huang
(2008)—analyzed the influence of occupational segregation on the gender wage
gap. Wang (2005b), Ge (2007), and Wang and Cai (2008) analyzed the influences of
segmentation by industry sectors. All of these studies used the Brown et al. model
(Brown et al. 1980). These studies indicate that the unexplained componentt in the
intra-sector differentials is the main reason for the gender wage gap.
Studies of labor market segmentation by various ownership sectors on the gender
wage gap are inconclusive. Even though Liu et al. (2000), Maurer-Fazio and Hughes
(2002), Demurger et al. (2007), and Guo and Zhang (2010) used the Blinder-Oaxaca
model to decompose the factors affecting the gender wage gap in the public sector
and the private sector separately, these studies use survey data from before 2007;
information regarding the issue is scarce in the current situation. Ma (2018a) inves-
tigated the influence of ownership sector on the gender wage gap from 2002 to 2013
using Brown et al. decomposition model, but the gender wage gap in each ownership
sector was not analyzed.
Using CHIPs 2002 and CHIPs 2013 for urban residents, this study investigated
determinants of the gender wage gap in each ownership sector, and we will compare
the results of different sectors (government organization, SOE,COEs, POEs, and self-
employed sector) and by these two periods (2002 and 2013). We can discover new
evidence leading to an investigation of the labor market segmentation by ownership
sectors and the gender wage gap during the 2000s in urban China.
4.4 Methodology and Data
4.4.1 Model
To estimate when other factors, for example, human capital, are consistent, how
segmentation by ownership sectors affects male and female wage levels and the
wage functions are calculated, the OLS model is expressed as Eq. (4.1.1).7
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lnWi = βOOWNi + βX Xi + ui (4.1.1)
To consider the sample selection bias problem (a worker can choose to work
or not) found in the OLS model, the Heckman two-step model (Heckman 1979) is
used. The estimated results of the distribution function and the density function by
the probit regression model (the dependent variable is Pr(Yi = 1), which indicates
the probability of participation in work), and the inverse Mill’s ratio—the adjusted
items (λ = φ(.)/(.)) are calculated. The corrected wage functions expressed by
Eqs. (4.1.2) and (4.1.3) are estimated using these adjusted items.
lnWi = βMMalei + βOOWNi + βX Xi + βλλi + ui (4.1.2)
lnWi j = βOOWNi j + βX Xi j + βλλi j + ui j (4.1.3)
( j : male, f emale)
In Eqs. (4.1.1), (4.1.2), and (4.1.3), i represents the individual, j represents the
male or female worker, lnW is the logarithm of wage, X represents factors (years of
schooling, years of experience, industry, occupation dummy variables) which affect
wage, OWN is the ownership sector dummy variable, and u is a random error item.
The results of Eq. (4.1.2) indicate the overall influences of sector segmentation by
ownership onwages for the total sample; the results of Eq. (4.1.3) show the influences
of ownership types on wages for males and females separately.
Next, to decompose the determinants of the gender wage gap, the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition model3 (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973) is used. The decomposition
model is expressed as Eq. (4.2.1) and Eq. (4.2.2).4
lnWm − lnW f = βm
(
Xm − X f
) + (βm − β f )X f (4.2.1)
lnWm − lnW f = βf
(
X f − Xm
) + (β f − βm)Xm (4.2.2)
In Eq. (4.2.1) and Eq. (4.2.2), Xm and X f are variable means of men and women,
respectively. βm and βf are estimated coefficients in wage functions. Based on the
human capital theory (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974) and discrimination hypothesis
(Becker 1957; Arrow 1972, 1973; Phelps 1972), the decomposition model decom-
poses the wage gap between men and women into two parts: the human capital
endowment (known as the explained component) [βm
(
Xm − X f
)
orβf(X f − Xm)]
and the endowment return (known as the unexplained component) ([(βm − βf )X f
or (βf − βm)Xm]. The explained component expresses the differentials of individual
characteristics such as the differences in human capital endowments. The unex-
plained component includes the differences in return to human capital, wage deter-
mination systems, discrimination, or capabilities not presentlymeasurable. The larger
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the estimated explained component is, the greater is the influence of human capital
differences between men and women on the wage gap, and vice versa.
4.4.2 Data and Variable Setting
The survey data of CHIPs 2002 and CHIPs 2013 are used for the analysis. The data
was compiled by the Economic Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS) and Beijing Normal University in 2003 and 2014. The sampling method is
stratified random sampling based on samples of the National Bureau of Statistics
(NBS). Because there are design similarities in the questionnaire data, we can use
the same information for analyzing the two periods. CHIPs covers the representative
regions in China, including Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Guangdong,
Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Chongqi, Yunnan, and Gansu in 2002; and Beijing, Shanxi,
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Anhui, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Chongqi, Yunnan,
Gansu, Shandong, and Hunan in 2013. For comparing the two periods, we selected
the regions (provinces) covered in two surveys, including Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning,
Jiangsu, Anhui, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Sichuan, Chongqi, Yunnan, and Gansu.
The analytic objects of this study are workers of local urban residents. Because
the sample selection bias for the choice of work or non-work is considered in the
study, working and non-working individual samples are used. In considering the
mandatory retirement system5 implemented in the public sector, the analytic objects
are limited to groups aged 16–59. All of the abnormal value samples6 and themissing
value samples were deleted. The samples used in analysis including working and
non-working individuals is 14,607 for 2012, 13,549 for 2013.
To maintain the analysis samples by each ownership sector and to consider the
features of the sectors’ distributions, based on CHIPs 2002 and CHIPs 2013 ques-
tionnaires, work sectors are divided into seven categories: (i) the group in the public
organizations, including government organization and the relationship of work units
with the government, called “Shiye Danwei” (GOVs); (ii) the group in state-owned
enterprises (SOEs); (iii) the group in collectively owned enterprises (COEs); (iv) the
group in the privately owned enterprises (POEs), including the group in domestic
privately owned enterprises and foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs)7; (v) the group
in the self-employed sector (Self); (vi) the group in other ownerships sector that is
not included in (i)–(v) (Others); and (vii) the non-working group.
In thewage function, the dependent variable is the logarithmvalue of hourlywage.
The wage is defined as “the total earnings from work.” It comprises the basic wage,
bonus, and any subsidy, which is calculated based onmarket prices. The hourly wage
are calculated based on total wages and corresponding work hours. For example, in
2002, work hours yearly were calculated as work hours daily × work day monthly
× work months yearly; hourly wage are calculated by total yearly wages divided by
yearly work hours. The consumer price index (CPI) in 2002 is used as the standard
for adjusting the nominal wage every year.
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Independent variables are those likely to affect the wage level and the probability
of entry to sectors: they are conducted as follows.
First, the six kinds of ownership sector dummy variables are: the government
organizations (GOVs), the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the collectively owned
enterprises (COEs), the privately owned enterprises (POEs), self-employed (Self),
and other ownerships sectors (Other).
Second, age, years of schooling, years of experience, 8 and health status (if the
answer is “very good” or “good,” it is equal to 1; otherwise it is equal to 0) are used
as the indices of human capital. It is thought that these factors may affect wages or
the probability of entry to various ownership sectors.
Third, considering marital status (having spouse is equal to 1, otherwise 0) and
ethnicity (Han ethnicity is equal to 1, minority ethnicity is equal to 0) might affect
the probability of entry to the sector or wage levels, these dummy variables are used.
Fourth, because wage gaps occur by occupation and industry sectors, occupation
dummy variables (manager, professional worker and technician, production worker,
clerical staff, others) and industry sector dummy variables are used. To maintain the
analysis samples by each industry category, the industrial categories9 are reclassified.
Five kinds of industries—construction and manufacturing, retail, wholesale, service,
and other industries—are used to construct the category variables.
Fifth, because the regional disparity for economic development levels and the
labor markets differ by region, East, Central, and West region dummy variables are
used to control these influences.
4.5 Descriptive Statistical Results
4.5.1 Gender Gap of Individual Characteristics
Themean values of variables bymale and female group and the gender gap are shown
in Table 4.1.
First, the genderwage gap (the gender gap of the logarithmic value of hourlywage)
increased from 0.179 (2002) to 0.270 (2013). It is observed that as market-oriented
reforms progressed in China, the gender wage gap has expanded.
Second, the gender gaps of age, years of experience, years of schooling, and health
status are small in both 2002 and 2013. This suggests that the gender gap of human
capital is small.
Third, the distribution proportion of occupation types differs by gender. For
example, the proportions of managers are 10.5% (2002) and 1.8% (2013) higher
for males than for females.
Fourth, the distribution proportion of ownership sectors differs by gender. For
example, the percentages of workers in SOEs are 7.4% (2002) and 6.3% (2013)
higher for males than for females, while the percentages of workers in COEs and
POEs are higher for females than for males. This indicates that the distribution
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Table 4.1 Gender gap of individual attributes
2002 2013
Male Female Gap Male Female Gap
Log. hourly wage 1.628 1.449 0.179 2.430 2.160 0.27
Age 41 39 2 42 40 2
Exp 30 27 3 24 22 2
Years of schooling 12 11 1 12 12 0
Health 70.2% 66.0% 4.2% 82.0% 81.8% 0.2%
Han race 95.9% 95.7% 0.2% 95.3% 95.0% 0.3%
Married 89.2% 86.7% 2.5% 86.8% 86.3% 0.5%
Occupation category
Manager 19.5% 9.0% 10.5% 6.2% 4.4% 1.8%
Prof. and Tech 18.0% 23.9% −5.9% 15.3% 16.1% −0.8%
Prod. Worker 20.6% 23.5% −2.9% 8.1% 8.3% −0.2%
Clerical staff 33.0% 23.8% 9.2% 24.4% 12.8% 11.6%
Other 8.8% 19.8% −11.0% 45.9% 58.3% −12.4%
Ownership sector
GOVs 31.5% 33.1% −1.6% 24.1% 24.1% 0.0%
SOEs 38.6% 31.2% 7.4% 19.4% 13.1% 6.3%
COEs 5.4% 9.2% −3.8% 4.5% 4.8% −0.3%
POEs 14.4% 14.8% −0.4% 26.6% 28.7% −2.1%
Self 8.3% 8.3% 0.0% 18.2% 20.2% −2.0%
Other 1.7% 3.5% −1.8% 7.3% 9.2% −1.9%
Industry sector
Cons. & manu 31.1% 26.3% 4.8% 22.8% 14.9% 7.9%
Retail 9.5% 14.6% −5.1% 12.8% 23.7% −10.9%
Service 8.8% 14.9% −6.1% 16.4% 20.9% −4.5%
Other 50.5% 44.2% 6.3% 48.0% 40.5% 7.5%
Region category
East 38.8% 39.0% −0.2% 41.3% 42.2% −0.9%
Central 35.4% 33.9% 1.5% 36.7% 34.0% 2.7%
West 25.8% 27.2% −1.4% 22.0% 23.8% −1.8%
Observations 5,249 4,147 5,272 4,197
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013
Note (1) Samples limited on age16–59
(2) gender gap =Male–Female
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proportion of males is higher in the public sector, while the distribution proportion
of females is higher in the private sector.
Fifth, the distribution proportion of industrial sectors differs by gender.
Concretely, the percentages of workers in the construction and manufacturing
industry are 4.8% (2002) and 7.9% (2013) higher for males than for females, while
the percenategs of workers in retail industry are 5.1% (2002) and 10.9% (2013)
higher for females than for males.
Sixth, the difference in the distribution proportion of regions by gender is small.
To sum up, it is observed that although the gender gaps of human capital and
regional distributions are small, large gender differences remain in the distribution
proportions of ownership sectors and occupational and industrial sectors. These
factors may influence the gender wage gap, and we should consider them in the
following econometric analyses.
4.5.2 Gender Wage Gap by Ownership Sector
The mean values of wage by gender in each ownership sector are shown in Table
4.2. The ratio of women to men is used as the index of gender wage gap. The higher
ratio means the lower gender wage gap. The main findings are as follows.
First, in all sectors combined, wages are lower for females than for males in both
2002 and 2013. Concretely, the gender gap in monthly wages (the ratio of female
monthly wages to male monthly wages) was 73.1–85.9% in 2002 and 70.6–84.7% in
2013; the hourly wage gender gap (the ratio of female hourly wages to male hourly
wages) was 79.5–104.0% in 2002 and 75.0–86.7% in 2013.
Second, the gender wage gap was larger in the private sector (COEs, POEs, self-
employed sector) than in the public sector (government organization and SOEs) in
both 2002 and 2013. For example, in 2013, the results based on hourly wage showed
that the gender wage gaps in the public sector were 86.4% (public organization)
and 86.4% (SOEs); whereas, the gender wage gaps in the private sector were 78.9%
(COEs) and 75.0% (POEs), and 77.8% for the self-employed sector.
Third, although the gender wage gap increased from 2002 to 2013 in all sectors,
the increase in the genderwage gapwas larger for the private sector than for the public
sector. For example, the hourly wage gender gap increased from 91.0% (2002) to
86.4% (2013) for government organizations, and it increased from 85.2% (2002) to
75.0% (2013) for the POEs and FOEs, separately.
These tabulated calculation results indicate that the gender wage gap differs by
different ownership sectors, and these calculated values changed from 2002 to 2013.
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Table 4.2 Gender wage gaps in each ownership sector
2002 2013
Male Female Gender gaps (%) Male Female Gender gaps (%)
Monthly wage (Yuan)
GOVs 1,314 1,129 85.9 3,838 3,156 82.2
SOEs 1,077 887 82.4 3,900 3,305 84.7
COEs 786 643 81.8 3,273 2,312 70.6
POEs 1,112 884 79.5 3,695 2,681 72.6
Self 874 639 73.1 3,635 2,570 70.7
Others 866 718 82.9 2,529 1,801 71.2
Total 1,051 796 75.7 3,651 2,751 75.3
Hourly wage (Yuan)
Pub 7.8 7.1 91.0 22.0 18.6 86.4
SOEs 6.3 5.4 85.7 21.9 19.0 86.4
COEs 4.3 3.9 90.7 18.5 15.4 78.9
POEs 6.1 5.2 85.2 19.9 15.0 75.0
Self 3.9 3.1 79.5 17.6 13.5 77.8
Others 5.0 5.2 104.0 15.0 13.1 86.7
Total 6.4 5.5 85.9 20.0 15.9 80.0
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013
Note (1) Gender gap of monthly wage = Females /Males; Gender gap of hourly wage = Females
/Males
(2) Pub: government organizations; SOEs: state-owned enterprises; SOEs: collectively
owned enterprises; POEs: privately owned enterprises including domestic privately
owned enterprises and foreign owned enterprises; Self: self-employment sector; Other:
the other sector
4.6 Econometric Analysis Results
4.6.1 How Does the Ownership Sector Affect Wage Levels?
When other factors including ownership sectors are held constant, does the gender
wage gap occur? How does the ownership sector affect wage levels? Does the gender
wage gap differ by ownership sector? To answer these questions, wage functions are
estimated by using the total sample and subsamples distinguished by ownership
types. The results are shown in Table 4.3 (total sample) and Table 4.4 (subsample).
The Heckman two-step model is used to adjust the sample selection bias caused by
the choice of work or non-work.
First, when other factors are constant, the logarithm values of hourly wages for
males are 5.9% (2002) and 18.5% (2013) points higher than for females (see Table
4.3). This indicates that, except for the individual characteristic differentials that are
controlled in the model, other factors (discrimination against females, unobservable
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Table 4.3 Results of wage function
2002 2013
coef t-value coef t-value
Male 0.050*** 3.67 0.186*** 9.76
Ownership (GOVs)
SOEs −0.082*** −4.65 0.086*** 3.41
COEs −0.385*** −13.76 −0.051 −1.33
POEs −0.094*** −4.11 0.011 0.44
Self −0.564*** −19.81 −0.012 −0.43
Others −0.324*** −7.79 −0.143*** −4.47
Years of schooling 0.053*** 16.42 0.077*** 23.23
Years of Experience 0.020*** 3.33 0.017*** 3.77
Years of Experience squared −0.000 −0.9 −0.000* −1.79
Health −0.019 −1.39 0.079*** 4.00
Han race −0.026 −0.84 0.035 1.03
Occupation (Clerical staff)
Manager 0.095*** 4.33 0.188*** 5.19
Prof. and Tech 0.132*** 6.99 0.122*** 3.84
Prod. Worker −0.085*** −4.38 −0.090*** −3.17
Others −0.184*** −7.65 −0.098*** −4.36
Industries (Cons. & Manu.)
Retail/Catering −0.063** −2.52 −0.143*** −5.03
Service −0.026 −1.06 −0.122*** −4.57
Others 0.163*** 9.23 0.027 1.14
Region (East)
Central −0.407 −26.99 −0.201*** −11.75
West −0.324 −20.56 −0.155*** −8.04
Inverse Mill’s ratio −0.146 −3.59 −0.141*** −2.98
Constant 0.817 6.79 1.165*** 11.42
Observations 14,607 13,549
Censored observations 5,211 4,080
Uncensored observations 9,396 9,469
Wald chi2(19) 3928.230 1850.200
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013
Note (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Calculated by Heckman two-step model. The Results by the selection function are not
expressed in this table
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Table 4.4 Estimated gender wage gaps by ownership sector
2002 2013
coef t-value coef t-value
GOVs 0.051*** 2.59 0.145*** 5.59
SOEs 0.110*** 5.05 0.188*** 5.20
COEs 0.044 0.85 0.294*** 4.18
POEs 0.091** 2.55 0.214*** 7.58
Self 0.196*** 3.53 0.304*** 7.64
Others 0.238** 2.19 0.219*** 3.81
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013
Note (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Samples by different ownership sectors are used in these estimations
(3) Calculated by Heckman two-step model. Years of schooling, years of experience, years
of experience squared, health, ethnicity, occupation, industry, region dummy variables
are calculated, the results are not showed in this table
(4) The Results of the selection function are not expressed in this table
individual ability) affect the gender wage gap in both 2002 and 2013. Moreover, the
results show that the gender wage gap expanded from 2002 to 2013.
Second, as compared with workers in government organizations, wage levels are
lower for workers in other sectors (see Table 4.3). In 2002, average wage levels were
8.2% points lower for workers in SOEs, 38.5% points lower for workers in COEs,
9.4% points lower for workers in the POEs, 56.4% points lower for workers in the
self-employed sector, and 32.4% points lower for workers in other sectors. In 2013,
average wage levels were 8.6% points higher for workers in SOEs and 14.3% points
lower for workers in other sectors. However, when other factors are held constant,
the wage gap between public organizations and COEs, POEs, and the self-employed
sector is not statistically significant. This might be due to the increased influence
of other factors (individual characteristics, including human capital) on wages from
2002 to 2013 in the private sector.
Third, the gender wage gap differs among ownership sectors, and the wage gap
changed from 2002 to 2013 in all sectors (see Table 4.4). When the coefficient is
a positive value and it is statistically significant at the 1% or 5% statistical level, it
denotes that there maintains a gender wage gap. The coefficient of the male dummy
variable in wage function is utilized as an index of the gender wage gap. It is observed
that in 2002, the gender wage gap in SOEs (11.0% points), POEs (9.1% points), the
self-employed sector (19.6% points), and other sectors (23.8% points) was higher
than that in government organizations (5.1% points). In 2013, the gender wage gap
in SOEs (18.8% points), COEs (29.4% points), the POEs (21.4% points), the self-
employed sector (30.4% points), and other sectors (21.9% points) was higher than
that in government organizations (14.5% points). These results show that the gender
wage gap was higher in the private sector than that in the public sector in both 2002
and 2013, and the disparity in the gender wage gaps of the public and private sectors
increased from 2002 to 2013.
4.6 Econometric Analysis Results 79
4.6.2 How Does the Ownership Sector Affect the Gender
Wage Gap?
Which factors contribute to gender wage gap? How does the ownership sector affect
the gender wage gap? To answer these questions, we employed a decomposition
analysis based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model using the total samples
including five kinds of ownership sectors. The results are summarized in Table 4.5.
The new findings are as follows.
First, in general, although both the explained component and the unexplained
component contribute to the gender wage gap in 2002 and 2013, the contribution rate
of the unexplained component on the gender wage gap increased from 51.9% (2002)
to 80.2% (2013). This indicates that as market-oriented economy reform progresses,
Table 4.5 Decomposition results of gender wage gap
Values Percentage
Explained Unexplained Explained (%) Unexplained (%)
【2002】
Total 0.086 0.093 48.1 51.9
Ownership 0.015 0.011 8.5 6.0
Education 0.008 −0.128 4.7 −71.8
Experience 0.029 0.002 16.2 1.0
Health 0.000 0.010 0.0 5.6
Ethnic 0.000 0.067 0.0 37.5
Occupation 0.023 0.039 12.9 21.6
Industry 0.012 0.021 6.7 11.8
Region −0.002 −0.004 −0.9 −2.4
Constants 0.000 0.076 0.0 42.6
【2013】
Total 0.053 0.216 19.8 80.2
Ownership 0.006 0.067 2.2 24.8
Education 0.001 0.062 0.3 22.9
Experience 0.019 0.21 7.2 77.8
Health 0.000 −0.016 0.1 −5.9
Ethnic 0.000 0.015 0.1 5.5
Occupation 0.009 0.001 3.2 0.3
Industry 0.020 0.033 7.5 12.1
Region −0.002 0.000 −0.7 −0.2
Constants 0.000 −0.154 0.0 −57.1
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013
Note Decomposition based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model
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the problem of discrimination against women became severe, particularly in the
current period.
Second, in general, for the influence of ownership on the gender wage gap, (1)
both the gender gap of the proportion of ownership sectors and discrimination against
females in the same ownership sector contributed to expanding the gender wage gap
in both 2002 and 2013. (2) The contribution rate of the discrimination against female
workers in the same ownership sector on the gender wage gap increased from 6.0%
(2002) to 24.8% (2013).
Third, the main factors contributing to the gender wage gap differ in these two
periods. Concretely, in 2002, the main factors are years of experience (16.2%) and
occupation (12.9%) in the explained component, and ethnicity (37.5%) and occu-
pation (21.6%) in the unexplained component in 2013, the main factors are the
industry (7.5%) and years of experience (7.2%) in the explained component, and
years of experience (77.8%) and education (22.9%) in the unexplained component.
4.6.3 Does the Impact of Factors on the Gender Wage Gap
Differ by Ownership Sector?
Does the impact of factors on the gender wage gap differ by ownership sector? To
answer this question, we employed decomposition analysis based on the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition model for each ownership sector. These results are summa-
rized in Table 4.6 (government organizations), Table 4.7 (SOEs), Table 4.8 (COEs),
Table 4.9 (POEs), and Table 4.10 (self-employed sector). The main results are as
follows.
First, in general, in looking at the contributions of the explained component and
the unexplained component, it can be seen that the contributions of the unexplained
component increased from 2002 to 2013 in each ownership sector. For example,
the contribution rates of the unexplained component increased from 40.1 to 68.9%
in government organizations, from 64.1 to105.7% in SOEs, from 48.4 to109.3% in
COEs, from 47.0 to 91.5% in POEs, and from 66.4 to 77.0% in self-employed sector.
This indicates that asmarket-oriented economy reformprogressed, the discrimination
against female workers increased, and it has become the main factor contributing to
the gender wage gap in the 2000s.
Second, in comparing the values of the unexplained component between the public
and private sectors in the current period (2013), it can be seen that the contribution
rate is greater for the public sector (105.7% for SOEs, 109.3% for COEs) than for the
private sector (91.5% for POEs, 77.0% for the self-employed sector), and it is lowest
for government organizations (68.9%). This indicates that, in the current period,
the discrimination against female workers is greater in the public sector than in the
private sector.
The public sector results can be explained by the discrimination hypothesis
(Becker 1957). Concretely, it may be due to the fact that, as ownership reform
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Table 4.6 Decomposition results of gender wage gap in government organizations
Values Percentage
Explained Unexplained Explained (%) Unexplained
【2002】
Total 0.081 0.057 59.9 40.1
Education 0.022 −0.194 16.5 −142.6
Experience 0.035 −0.167 25.7 −122.9
Health 0.000 0.009 0.0 6.5
Ethnic 0.000 0.049 0.0 36.1
Occupation 0.026 0.005 18.8 3.3
Industry 0.000 0.096 0.0 70.5
Region −0.002 0.028 −1.1 20.7
Constants 0.000 0.232 0.0 168.4
【2013】
Total 0.063 0.140 31.1 68.9
Education −0.017 0.074 −8.2 36.2
Experience 0.07 0.177 34.6 87.2
Health 0.000 −0.063 0.1 −30.8
Ethnic 0.000 0.039 −0.2 19.3
Occupation 0.008 0.008 4.1 4.0
Industry 0.005 −0.030 2.5 −14.8
Region −0.004 −0.053 −1.8 −26.3
Constants 0.000 −0.012 0.0 −5.9
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013
Note Decomposition based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model
progressed in the SOEs, they obtained more authority to decide the wage levels
of their employees; therefore, although wage and employment gender equality poli-
cies were enforced in the planned economy period, as the influences of these poli-
cies controlled by the government decreased, the problem of discrimination against
female workers became severe. On the contrary, the results for the private sector can
be explained by the human capital theory (Becker 1964; Mincer 1974). For firms
in the private sector, the influence of market mechanisms is greater. To maximize
profits in the competitivemarket, firms in the private sectormay be likely to determine
wage levels based on individual workers’ productivity (human capital). Therefore,
discrimination against female workers is smaller in the private sector than in the
public sector.
Third, the influences of factors on the genderwage gap differ by ownership sectors.
For example, in 2013, (1) for government organizations, the gender gaps of years
of experience in the explained component (34.6%) and the unexplained component
82 4 Ownership Sector and the Gender Wage Gap
Table 4.7 Decomposition results of gender wage gap in state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
Values Percentage
Explained Unexplained Explained (%) Unexplained (%)
【2002】
Total 0.061 0.111 35.9 64.1
Education −0.004 −0.131 −2.1 −75.3
Experience 0.018 −0.006 10.5 −3.3
Health −0.001 0.028 −0.6 16.0
Ethnic 0.000 0.082 0.1 47.2
Occupation 0.032 0.000 18.7 −0.3
Industry 0.010 0.021 5.6 12.0
Region 0.006 0.024 3.7 13.7
Constants 0.000 0.094 0.0 54.1
【2013】
Total −0.010 0.188 −5.7 105.7
Education −0.023 −0.282 −12.8 −158.3
Experience 0.015 0.027 8.6 15.1
Health −0.003 0.169 −1.5 95.1
Ethnic 0.000 0.566 −0.3 317.6
Occupation −0.014 0.065 −8.1 36.2
Industry 0.018 −0.005 10.2 −2.6
Region −0.003 0.072 −1.8 40.2
Constants 0.000 −0.423 0.0 −237.7
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013
Note Decomposition based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model
(87.2%) are the main factors. This is because the seniority wage system is imple-
mented in most government organizations. In government organizations, the average
length of years of experience is longer for males than for females, and the longer
years of work experience are evaluated to be at a higher level for males than for
females; thus, the influence of years of experience is greater. (2) For SOEs, the gender
differences of proportions of industry sectors (10.2%) in the explained component
and ethnicity (317.6%) and health status (95.1%) in the unexplained component are
the main factors. This indicates that the wage gap between a monopoly industry
sector and a competitive industry sector may greatly affect the gender wage gap for
workers in state-owned enterprises. (3) For COEs, the gender gap of the proportions
of occupations (2.0%) in the explained component and the proportion of industry
sectors (49.6%) in the unexplained component are the main factors contributing to
the gender wage gap. (4) For POEs, the gender gap in the proportions of industry
sectors (6.6%) in the explained component and the years of experience (83.4%) in the
unexplained component are the main factors contributing to the wage gap. (5) For the
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Table 4.8 Decomposition results of gender wage gap in collectively owned enterprises (COEs)
Values Percentage
Explained Unexplained Explained (%) Unexplained (%)
【2002】
Total 0.055 0.052 51.6 48.4
Education 0.004 −0.193 4.1 −179.8
Experience 0.014 0.485 12.6 451.4
Health −0.001 0.064 −1.3 59.1
Ethnic 0.004 0.311 3.8 289.3
Occupation 0.035 −0.053 32.7 −49.7
Industry 0.002 0.008 2.3 7.5
Region −0.003 −0.088 −2.6 −82.2
Constants 0.000 −0.480 0.0 −447.3
【2013】
Total −0.025 0.294 −9.3 109.3
Education −0.011 −0.046 −4.0 −17.1
Experience −0.017 −0.178 −6.2 −66.3
Health 0.000 0.047 0.1 17.6
Ethnic 0.000 −0.166 −0.1 −61.9
Occupation 0.005 −0.204 2.0 −75.8
Industry −0.004 0.133 −1.6 49.6
Region 0.001 −0.075 0.5 −28.0
Constants 0.000 0.782 0.0 291.1
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013
Note Decomposition based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model
self-employed sector, the gender gap of the proportions of industry sectors (12.4%)
in the explained component and occupation (167.8%) as well as education (95.3%)
in the unexplained component are the main factors. This indicates that discrimina-
tion against female workers even exists within a group with the same educational
attainment level and the same occupation, and the influence of these discriminations
is greater for the self-employed sector than for other ownership sectors.
4.7 Conclusions
Using data of the Chinese Household Income Project surveys (CHIPs) conducted in
2003 and 2014 (CHIPs 2002 and CHIPs 2013), this study explores the determinants
of gender wage gaps of five kinds of ownership sectors—government organizations,
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collectively owned enterprises (COEs), privately
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Table 4.9 Decomposition results of gender wage gap in privately owned enterprises (POEs)
Values Percentage
Explained Unexplained Explained (%) Unexplained (%)
【2002】
Total 0.093 0.083 53.0 47.0
Education −0.005 0.018 −2.7 10.4
Experience 0.069 0.123 39.2 70.1
Health −0.001 −0.028 −0.3 −15.9
Ethnic 0.000 0.036 −0.1 20.7
Occupation 0.024 0.199 13.4 113.1
Industry 0.004 0.028 2.0 15.9
Region 0.003 −0.009 1.6 −5.0
Constants 0.000 −0.286 0.0 −162.2
【2013】
Total 0.020 0.217 8.5 91.5
Education −0.004 0.014 −1.8 5.9
Experience 0.014 0.198 6.1 83.4
Health −0.003 −0.132 −1.1 −55.5
Ethnic 0.000 0.113 0.2 47.5
Occupation −0.004 −0.089 −1.7 −37.5
Industry 0.016 0.003 6.6 1.3
Region 0.001 0.021 0.2 8.7
Constants 0.000 0.090 0.0 37.7
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013
Note Decomposition based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model
owned enterprises (POEs), and the self-employed sector—from 2002 to 2013 in
urban China. A decomposition analysis of the gender wage gap is employed. Several
major conclusions emerge.
First, the gender wage gap exists. When all factors including the human capital
factor and ownership dummy variables are held constant, the gender wage gap
persisted in both 2002 and 2013, and the gender wage gap expanded from 2002
to 2013.
Second, both the gender differences of human capital and discrimination against
female workers contribute to the gender wage gap; the influence of the unexplained
part (e.g., discrimination against female workers) increased in each ownership sector
from 2002 to 2013. The range of increase of the influence of the unexplained part is
greater for firms in the public sector than for those in the private sector.
Third, the influence (contribution rate) of factors on the gender wage gap differs
by ownership sectors. Concretely, (1) years of work experience in the explained
component and work experience years in the unexplained component are the main
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Table 4.10 Decomposition results of gender wage gap in self-employed sector
Values Percentage
Explained Unexplained Explained (%) Unexplained (%)
【2002】
Total 0.098 0.194 33.6 66.4
Education 0.009 0.031 3.2 10.8
Experience 0.005 −0.365 1.8 −124.9
Health 0.004 0.001 1.3 0.2
Ethnic −0.001 0.070 −0.4 24.0
Occupation 0.011 0.663 3.8 227.0
Industry 0.056 −0.251 19.3 −86.1
Region 0.013 −0.067 4.6 −22.9
Constants 0.000 0.112 0.0 38.4
【2013】
Total 0.086 0.288 23.0 77.0
Education 0.013 0.357 3.4 95.3
Experience 0.006 0.309 1.6 82.5
Health 0.004 0.003 1.1 0.7
Ethnic 0.000 −0.112 0.0 −30.0
Occupation 0.011 0.629 3.0 167.8
Industry 0.046 0.197 12.4 52.7
Region 0.006 −0.014 1.5 −3.8
Constants 0.000 −1.080 0.0 −288.2
Source Calculated based on CHIPs2002 and CHIPs2013.
Note Decomposition based on the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model
factors for government organizations; (2) industry sector in the explained component
and ethnicity and health status in the unexplained component are the main factors for
SOEs; (3) occupation in the explained component and industry in the unexplained
component are the main factors for COEs; (4) industry in the explained component
and the years of experience in the unexplained component are the main factors for
POEs; (5) industry sector in the explained component and the occupation as well as
education in the unexplained component are the main factors for the self-employed
sector.
These findings indicate that as market-oriented economy reforms progress, the
problem of discrimination against female worker is becoming severe, particularly for
SOEs and COEs in the public sector. In order to reduce the gender wage gap, employ-
ment equality laws and an equal pay for equal work policy should be implemented
and enforced by the Chinese government.
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Notes
1. Based on the classification that is utilized in most of the previous studies, in this
study, the period from 1949 to 1977 is called “the planned economy period,” in
which the Chinese government tried to establish a management economy system
based on the Soviet Union’s socialist nation management model, and the period
after 1978 is called “the market-oriented reform period.”.
2. Based on data of the third CFSSS, the female labor participation rate decreased
from 87.1% in 1990 to 60.8% in 2010.
3. Although Reimers (1983), Cotton (1988), Neumark (1988), Oaxaca and Ransom
(1994), and Fortin (2008) argued that there is an “index number” problem in
the basic Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model, the classifications of the unex-
plained component and the unexplained component in these studies are similar to
those of Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973). Two decompositions based on Eqs.
(4.2.1) and (4.2.2) are employed, and these results are almost identical. Thus,
only the results based on Eq. (4.2.1) are shown in this chapter.
4. In order to simplify the expression of equations following, all constant items are
omitted.
5. In the public sector, the legal retirement age is 50 for female workers (blue collar
workers), 55 for female cadres (white collar workers), and 60 for male workers
and male cadres.
6. That variable values are not in the range of “mean value ± three times S.D.” is
defined as an abnormal value here.
7. In CHIPs 2002, the sample of workers in foreign-owned enterprises is rela-
tively smaller and cannot be analyzed in the decomposition analysis; workers in
privately owned enterprises or foreign-owned enterprises are combined into one
group.
8. Years of experience = age-6-years of schooling.
9. The number of industry categories is 16 in CHIPs 2002, and 50 in CHIPs 2013.
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Chapter 5
Gender Gap of Communist Party
of China Membership
Abstract Using data of the Chinese Household Income Project survey (CHIPs), this
study investigates the determinations for becoming a CPCmember, and decomposes
the wage gap between CPC and non-CPC members based on the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition model. It is found that the probability of becoming a CPC member is
7.3–7.7% points lower for female workers than for male workers; the wage premium
of CPC membership is higher for female workers (around 34.7%) than for male
workers (4.8–30.8%); the endowment differentials such as the difference in years
of schooling, distributions of occupations, and industry sectors are the main factors
affecting the wage gap for both female and male workers, and the contributions of
endowment differentials are greater for female workers than for male workers.
Keywords Gender gap · Communist Party of China ·Membership ·Wage
premium
5.1 Introduction
In China, despite the drastic transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented
economy, because the government has employed a gradual reform, the de facto
Communist Party of China (CPC) dictatorship is strongly maintained in the political
sphere.1 This fact creates a very unique aspect of the Chinese economy. Therefore
the wage premium of CPC membership is an important issue in Chinese economy.
Neither theoretical nor empirical works can reach a certain conclusion on this
issue. From a theoretical perspective, five hypotheses can explain the influence of
CPC membership on wages (Ma and Iwasaki 2021). Concretely, it is thought that
the ability of an individual to become a CPC member is a kind of human capital
that includes organizational ability, collective control capability, job motivation, and
non-cognitive social ability (the human capital theory). In addition, CPCmembership
works as a clear signal to distinguish CPCmembers from citizens by a third party (the
signaling hypothesis). Furthermore, as compared with nonmembers, CPC members
This chapter is a developed and revised version of: Ma (2019). The impact of membership of the
Communist Party of China on wages.Economics Bulletin, 39(4), 2839–2856. Copyright © reprinted
by permission of the Journal of Economics Bulletin.
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can utilize CPC organizations and connections with other members to effectively
obtain economic benefits (Bian et al. 2015; McLaughlin 2017; Ma 2019). In other
words, party membership can be regarded as a sort of political and social capital in
China (the political and social capital hypothesis). Based on these three hypotheses, it
is expected that CPCmembership positively affects the wage level of CPCmembers.
In contrast, with the progress of the market-oriented economy reform and the sepa-
ration of the political and economic systems, the unique abilities of CPC members,
represented by their belief inMarxist ideology and organizational loyalty to the party,
may become a harmful factor for firm management based on market mechanisms
(the marketization hypothesis). In addition, when the corruption of the CPC orga-
nization and party members is revealed, it may increase social criticism or popular
psychological antipathy toward them (the negative rumor hypothesis). Because the
above-mentioned hypotheses contradict each other, we cannot theoretically predict
the direction of the impact of CPC membership on wage levels in China based on
the above-mentioned hypotheses. Thus, empirical studies should be employed to
investigate the impact of CPC membership on wages.
The results of empirical analysis are also inconclusive.2 In fact, there is a series of
studies (Gustafsson and Li 2000; Knight and Song 2003; Appleton et al. 2005, 2009;
Bishop et al. 2005; Li et al. 2007, 2012; Xing 2014; McLaughlin 2017; Ma 2018a,
b; MacDonald and Hasmath 2018; Wang and Lien 2018; Nikolov et al. 2019) that
found a positive association between CPC membership and wage levels, whereas
a set of studies, such as those of Li and Zhang (2003) and Wang and Lien (2018),
reported that the effect of CPC membership on wages is not statistically significant.
Moreover, more than a few studies supporting the marketization hypothesis and the
negative rumor hypothesis, such as Xing (2014) and Ma (2018a) found that CPC
membership negatively affects wage levels.
Although some empirical studies have estimated the influence of CPC member-
ship on wages, a set of important issues remains to be discussed as follows. First,
empirical studies on the determinants of becoming aCPCmember are scarce. Second,
most previous studies did not address the sample selection bias problem in the wage
function, which is usually caused by the fact that the probability of becoming a CPC
member is not a random distribution.3 Third, although it is predicted that the wage
gap between CPCmembers and nonmembersmay be caused by human capital differ-
entials (eg., educational attainment)4 between these two groups or the wage determi-
nate system, including discrimination against nonmembers, no empirical study has
focused on the issue. In China, with the progress ofmarket-oriented economy reform,
the problem of income inequality is worsening; therefore, a study on the wage gap
betweenCPCmembers and nonmembers can provide newevidence. Fourth, although
it can be assumed that the determinants of participation in the CPC and the wage gap
between CPC members and nonmembers may differ by gender, there has been no
empirical study of this issue.
The main contributions of this study are as follows. First, we investigate the
determinants of becoming a CPC member, which has not been analyzed in previous
studies. Second, to consider the sample selection bias problem, we utilize the
Heckman two-step model (Heckman 1979) in the wage function. Third, based on
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the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973; Oaxaca and
Choe 2016), this study investigates how the explained component (human capital
differentials) and unexplained component (the wage system or discrimination) affect
thewage gap betweenCPCmembers and nonmembers, considering the sample selec-
tion bias problem simultaneously. Fourth, this is the first study to compare the wage
premium of CPCmembership and its impact on thewage gap between CPCmembers
and nonmembers by gender.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Sect. 5.2 introduces the
methodology including the decomposition model and data. Section 5.3 summarizes
the results of descriptive statistics by CPC members and nonmembers. Section 5.4
introduces and explains the econometric analysis results. Section 5.5 summarizes the
major findings and concludes the study.
5.2 Methodology and Data
5.2.1 Model
First, to investigate the determinants of participation in the CPC, a probit regression
model is utilized as follows:
Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(a + βH Hi + εi > 0) (5.1)
In Eq. (5.1), Pr(Yi = 1) is the dependent variable, which is the probability of
participation in the CPC organizations. i represents the individual, H represents
factors (e.g., individual characteristics, job, parents in the public sector) that affect
the probability of participation in the CPC, β is the estimated coefficient, and ε is a
random error item.
Second, to estimate the wage premium of CPC membership, the wage functions
are estimated. The wage function by the ordinary least squares (OLS) model is
expressed as Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2).5
lnW i = a + βcpcC PCi + βX Xi + ui (5.2)
In Eq. (5.2), lnW is the logarithmic value of the average wage, X represents
factors (e.g., education, years of experience) that may affect the wage level, β is
the estimated coefficient, and u is a random error item. When βcpc is statistically
significant and is a positive value, it indicates that when other factors (e.g., human
capital) are held constant, a wage premium of CPC membership remains—the wage
level is higher for CPC members than for their non-CPC counterparts.
To consider the sample selection bias problem (a worker chooses by him(her)self
or is selected by the CPC to become a CPC member) left in the OLS model, the
Heckman two-step model (Heckman 1979) is used. Using the estimated results of
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the distribution function ((·)) and the density function (φ(·)) by the probit regres-
sion model (the dependent variable is Pr(Yi = 1), which indicates the probability
of becoming a CPC member; see Eq. (5.1), the adjusted item for CPC members
and nonmembers are calculated. Concretely, the adjusted item for the CPC member
group is calculated as λ = φ(·)/(·). The corrected wage function expressed by
Eq. (5.3) is estimated using the adjusted item.
lnW i = a + βcpcC PCi + βX Xi + βλλi+ui (5.3)
Finally, Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model based on variable means is used
to estimate the determinants of wage gap between CPC members and nonmembers.
As referenced in Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973), and Oaxaca and Choe (2016), the
Blinder-Oaxaca model is expressed by Eq. (5.4) and Eq. (5.5), and the Oaxaca and
Choe model is expressed by Eqs. (5.6) and (5.7) as follows6:
lnW cpc − lnW ncpc = βcpc(Xcpc − Xncpc) + (βcpc − βncpc)Xncpc (5.4)
lnW cpc − lnW ncpc = βncpc(Xncpc − Xcpc) + (βncpc − βcpc)Xcpc (5.5)
lnW cpc − lnW ncpc = βcpc(Xcpc − Xncpc) + (βcpc − βncpc)Xncpc
+βcpc(λcpc − λncpc) + (βcpc − βncpc)λncpc (5.6)
lnW cpc − lnW ncpc = βncpc(Xncpc − Xcpc) + (βncpc − βcpc)Xcpc
+βncpc(λncpc − λcpc) + (βncpc − βcpc)λcpc (5.7)
Xcpc and Xncpc are variable means of CPC members and nonmembers. βcpc and
βncpc are estimated coefficients. Based on the human capital theory (Becker 1964;
Mincer 1974) and the discrimination hypothesis (Becker 1957), the decomposi-
tion model decomposes the wage gap between CPC members and nonmembers
into two parts: for example, in the Oaxaca and Choe decomposition model, the
explained component [βcpc(Xcpc−Xncpc)+ βcpc(λcpc−λncpc) or βncpc(Xncpc−Xcpc)





or (βncpc − βcpc)Xcpc + (βncpc − βcpc)λcpc].7
The explained component expresses the differentials of individual characteristics,
such as the differences in human capital endowments. The unexplained component
includes differences in the wage determination systems, discrimination, or capabili-
ties not presently measurable. It can be said that the larger the estimated unexplained
component is, the greater is the influence of discrimination against CPC members
regarding the wage gap.
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5.2.2 Data and Variable Setting
Data from the Chinese Household Income Project survey (CHIPs) are used for the
analysis. CHIPs 2013 was conducted in 2014 by Beijing Normal University and the
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China. CHIPs 2013 covers local urban resi-
dents, migrants, and rural residents. Considering that the proportion of CPCmembers
is lower for migrants and most workers earn wages in urban areas, local urban resi-
dent samples are utilized in this study. CHIPs 2013 includes information about indi-
vidual and household characteristic factors, job status, and wages. Particularly, we
can obtain information about the parents’ workplace (public sector or private sector),
which can be utilized as an identification variable in the Heckman two-step model.
The CHIPs sample is part of the samples in the NBS, which covers 15 representative
provinces or metropolises, including Beijing, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong,
Anhui, Guangdong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Chongqing, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu,
and Xinjiang in the eastern, central, and western regions of China.
The analytic objects are workers of urban residents, excluding the unemployed.
Regarding the mandatory retirement system implemented in the public sector (e.g.,
SOEs and government organizations),8 the analytic objects are limited to the samples
ages 16–59. No answer samples, abnormal value samples,9 or missing value samples
are deleted. The samples used in the analysis is 10,755.
To see the dependent variables setting, first, in the probability function of partic-
ipation in the CPC, the dependent variable is a binary category variable; it is equal
to 1 when a worker is a CPC member. Second, in the wage function and decomposi-
tion model, the dependent variable is the logarithmic value of the hourly wage. The
hourly wage is calculated based on wages and work hours. The wage includes the
basic wage, bonuses, and cash subsidies.
The independent variables are those likely to affect the probability of participation
in the CPC organization and the wage level: they are constructed as follows. First, for
the individual characteristic factors, (1) the educational dummy variables (primary
school or below, junior high school, senior high school/vocational school, college
and above) and years of experience10 are constructed as an index of human capital. It
is expected that the wage level and probability of participation in the CPC are higher
for the highly educated and long years of experience groups.
(2) Some previous studies have pointed out that a gender wage gap remains in the
Chinese labor market.11 The male dummy variable is constructed to investigate the
gender gap.When gender gaps remain inwages and in the probability of participating
in the CPC organization, the coefficients of male dummy variables in these models
are statistically significant.
Second, for the job factors, (1) five kinds of occupation dummy variables
(manager/technician, clerk, manufacturing worker, service worker, and others) are
constructed. (2) Five kinds of industry dummy variables (construction, manufac-
turing, sales, service, and others) are utilized to control the industry sector dispari-
ties.12 (3) It is pointed out that there are wage gaps between the public sector and the
96 5 Gender Gap of Communist Party of China Membership
private sector.13 The public sector and private sector dummy variables are employed
to control the influence of ownership types on wages. Concretely, the public sector
(PUB) includes the government organizations (GOVs) and state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). The private sector is composed of collectively owned enterprises (COEs),
foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs), privately owned enterprises (POEs), and others.
It can be expected that the probability of becoming a CPCmember and the wage level
may be higher for the public sector than the private sector (COEs, POEs, FOEs).
Third, to control the regional disparity, eastern, central, andwestern region dummy
variables are constructed.
Fourth, it can be thought that when a worker’s parents are working or have worked
in the public sector (e.g., the government organizations, SOEs), the worker may
obtain political or social capital and more information about the CPC from the
parents, which may increase the probability of becoming a CPC member. Using
the information in the CHIPs 2013 questionnaire about the parents’ workplaces, a
binary dummy variable of parents in the public sector is constructed, which is equal
to 1 when a worker’s parents (father or mother) are working or worked in the public
sector or to 0 when they have not.
5.3 Descriptive Statistic Results
5.3.1 Differentials of Characteristics of CPC and Non-CPC
Table 5.1 summarizes the descriptive statistics by total sample, CPC members, and
nonmembers. The gap of mean values between CPC members and nonmembers
is calculated. It can be observed that the differentials of mean values of variables
between these two groups remain. It can be observed that the mean values and the
distributions in various sectors differ between these two groups. For example, the
proportions of highly educated workers are 8.4% (college) and 30.3% (university)
higher for CPC members than for nonmembers. It seems that the human capital
level is higher for CPC members, which may affect the wage gap between these two
groups.
5.3.2 Wage Gaps Between CPC and Non-CPC by Gender
and Other Groups
Themean values of hourlywages of CPCmembers and nonmembers are summarized
in Table 5.2. The wage gaps between these two groups are calculated. The main
findings are as follows.
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Table 5.1 Description statistics of variables
Total CPC Non-CPC Gap
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
Party 0.189 0.392
Log.wage 2.191 0.784 2.482 0.744 2.123 0.777 0.359
Female 0.440 0.496 0.322 0.467 0.467 0.499 −0.145
Experience year 28.942 11.193 29.344 10.658 28.848 11.313 0.496
Age
Aged 16–29 0.168 0.373 0.091 0.288 0.185 0.389 −0.094
Aged 30–39 0.278 0.448 0.273 0.445 0.279 0.449 −0.006
Aged 40–49 0.351 0.477 0.360 0.480 0.349 0.477 0.011
Aged 50–60 0.204 0.403 0.276 0.447 0.187 0.390 0.089
Education
Primary 0.058 0.234 0.004 0.067 0.071 0.257 −0.067
Junior high school 0.289 0.453 0.092 0.289 0.335 0.472 −0.243
Senior high school 0.294 0.456 0.231 0.422 0.309 0.462 −0.078
College 0.179 0.383 0.247 0.432 0.163 0.369 0.084
University 0.180 0.384 0.425 0.494 0.122 0.328 0.303
Occupation
Manager and engineer 0.225 0.417 0.337 0.473 0.198 0.399 0.139
Clerk 0.144 0.351 0.320 0.466 0.103 0.304 0.217
Manufacturing worker 0.200 0.400 0.104 0.305 0.223 0.416 −0.119
Service worker 0.301 0.459 0.143 0.350 0.338 0.473 −0.195
Other 0.129 0.336 0.096 0.295 0.137 0.344 −0.041
Ownership type
PUB 0.372 0.483 0.730 0.444 0.288 0.453 0.442
COEs 0.045 0.207 0.045 0.208 0.045 0.207 0.000
FOEs 0.028 0.165 0.011 0.104 0.032 0.176 −0.021
POEs 0.256 0.437 0.099 0.299 0.293 0.455 −0.194
Other 0.299 0.458 0.114 0.318 0.342 0.474 −0.228
Industry sector
Construction 0.053 0.225 0.029 0.169 0.059 0.236 −0.030
Manufacturing 0.147 0.354 0.098 0.297 0.158 0.365 −0.060
Sales 0.197 0.398 0.048 0.213 0.232 0.422 −0.184
Service 0.183 0.387 0.131 0.337 0.195 0.396 −0.064
Other 0.420 0.494 0.694 0.461 0.356 0.479 0.338
Regions
East 0.419 0.493 0.424 0.494 0.418 0.493 0.006
(continued)
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Table 5.1 (continued)
Total CPC Non-CPC Gap
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D
Central 0.360 0.480 0.355 0.479 0.361 0.480 −0.006
West 0.221 0.415 0.221 0.415 0.221 0.415 0.000
Parent in public sector 0.049 0.215 0.101 0.301 0.037 0.188 0.064
Observations 10,611 2,009 8,602
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note mean values of CPC-mean values of non-CPC
First, although the wage level is lower for women than for men for both CPC
members and nonmembers, the wage gap between CPC members and nonmembers
is similar (female 1.347, male 1.345) for women and men.
Second, wages increase with age for CPC members, which indicates that the
influence of the seniority wage system is greater for CPC members, while for non-
CPC members, the relationship between the wage level and age is an inverse U
shape; the lowest is at 30–39 years of age. The wage gap between CPC members
and nonmembers is greater for the older group (workers aged 40 and over) than the
younger group (workers aged 16–39). The wage gap is observed to increase with
age.
Third, the wage level is higher for highly educated workers for both CPC and
non-CPC groups, which can be explained by the human capital theory (Becker 1964;
Mincer 1974). The wage gap between CPCmembers and nonmembers is smaller for
the highly educated group than for the low- and middle-level education groups.
Fourth, the wage level is higher for managers/technicians and clerks than for other
occupational groups (e.g., manufacturing worker, service worker) for both CPC and
non-CPC groups. The wage gap between CPCmembers and nonmembers is greatest
for managers/technicians; it is smallest for manufacturing workers.
Fifth, an interesting phenomenon related to ownership type is found. Excepting
COEs, the wage level is higher for CPC members than nonmembers in the public
sector (PUB), FOEs, POEs, and others. The wage level in the FOEs is highest for
both CPC members and nonmembers. The wage gap between CPC members and
nonmembers is greater for privately owned enterprises (1.411) and the public sector
(1.302).
Sixth, the wage level is higher for CPC members than for nonmembers in each
industry sector. The wage gap between CPC members and nonmembers is greater
for the manufacturing industry and sales industry sectors than for other sectors.
It is also observed that wage levels differ by group, which means that individual
characteristics (gender, age, educational attainment) and job (occupation, ownership
type of enterprises, industry sector) may affect the wage level for both CPCmembers
and nonmembers. The wage gap between these two groups is shown to be greater
for workers who are older, less-educated, in the manager and technician group, in
the manufacturing industry and sales industry sectors, and in the public sector and
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Table 5.2 Wage gaps





Female 19.783 14.689 1.347
Male 24.396 18.135 1.345
Age category
Aged 16–29 18.341 14.323 1.281
Aged 30–39 22.240 18.011 1.235
Aged 40–49 23.134 16.900 1.369
Aged 50–60 23.841 16.548 1.441
Education category
Primary 12.211 11.703 1.043
Junior high school 20.315 13.562 1.498
Senior high school 18.532 15.978 1.160
College 21.263 19.054 1.116
University 27.267 26.501 1.029
Occupation category
Manager and engineer 29.038 22.722 1.278
Clerk 22.408 18.623 1.203
Manufacturing worker 18.840 15.961 1.180
Service worker 16.000 13.295 1.203
Other 19.436 15.346 1.267
Ownership category
PUB 24.460 18.792 1.302
COEs 16.631 17.086 0.973
FOEs 30.564 23.890 1.279
POEs 22.425 15.889 1.411
Other 16.299 14.549 1.120
Industry category
Construction 21.436 20.230 1.060
Manufacturing 22.849 16.166 1.413
Sales 19.207 13.624 1.410
Service 19.633 16.015 1.226
Other 23.925 18.248 1.311
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note The age is limited from 16 to 59 years old. Hourly wage in
each group is used in calculations
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privately owned enterprises. Therefore, these factors should be considered when we
analyze the wage gap between CPC members and nonmembers.
5.4 Econometric Analysis Results
5.4.1 Determinants of Participation in the CPC Organization
Table 5.3 reports the determinants of participation in the CPC organization based on
the probit regression model. Five kinds of analyses (Model 1–5) are employed based
on the utilizations of various independent variables. The margin effects are shown
in Table 5.3.
First, when the other factors are held constant, the probability of becoming a
CPC member is 7.3–8.6% points lower for female workers than for male workers.
This indicates a remaining gender gap in the probability of participating in the CPC
organization.
Second, as compared with the youth group and the low-level education group,
the probability of becoming a CPC member is higher for the middle- and older-aged
group and for the middle-level and highly educated groups.
Third, the probability of participating in the CPC organization differs by owner-
ship sector. For example, based on the results of Model 5, as compared with workers
in the public sector (PUB), the probability of becoming a CPC member is 2.4%,
10.5%, or 10.7% points lower for the workers in the private sector (COEs, FOEs, or
POEs, respectively). In addition, the probability of participating in the CPC organi-
zation differs by occupation. For example, when other conditions remain constant,
the possibility of becoming a CPC member is lowest for manufacturing workers,
while it is highest for clerks.
Fourth, it should be noted that having parents in the public sector may positively
affect the statistical probability of becoming a CPC member. As is well known,
the influence of the CPC is greater in the public sector than in the private sector;
when the parents are in the public sector, their children may easily earn loyalty
from the CPC, obtain more information about the CPC organization, and gain more
political social capital from their parents, which may increase their probability of
becoming a CPCmember. The results suggest that the intergenerational transference
of CPC membership between parents and their children remains, which may cause
the intergenerational transference of social economic status. Based on the results,
we utilize the parent in the public sector as an identification variable to calculate the
sample election bias and adjust items in the following estimations.
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5.4.2 Wage Premium of CPC Membership by Gender
To investigate the wage premium of CPC membership, the wage functions are esti-
mated. Estimation 1 is based on pooling OLS; Estimation 2 utilizes the Heckman
two-step model to address the sample selection bias problem. The results using total
samples including both female and male workers are summarized in Table 5.4.14
Four kinds of analyses are employed by using various independent variables. We
add more independent variables from Model 1 to Model 4. Concretely, Model 1
utilizes only one—the CPC member dummy variable as the independent variable;
the independent variables in Model 2 include CPC membership, female, years of
experience, and educational variables; Model 3 adds new variables—the occupation,
industry sector, and region variables—to the variables of Model 2; Model 4 adds a
new variable—the parents in the public sector dummy variable—to the variables of
Model 3. The main findings are as follows.
First, based on the results in Estimation 1 (OLS), when other conditions are
not controlled, the wage premium of CPC membership is 32.2% points, which is
statistically significant at a 1% level (Model 1). When we control the individual
characteristics (gender, education, years of experience), the wage premium of CPC
membership decreases greatly to 4.3% points, which is statistically significant at a
5% level (Model 2). However, when job factors (occupation, industry sector) are
controlled, the wage premium of CPC membership is not statistically significant
(Model 3). The results indicate thatwork conditions such as the occupationor industry
sector may greatly influence the wage premium of CPC membership.
Second, based on the results inEstimation 2 (Heckman two-step),when the sample
selection bias is adjusted, the wage premium of CPC membership is not statistically
significant in thewholemodels, and the coefficients of selection items are statistically
Table 5.4 Wage premium of CPC membership (total samples)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation 1 CPC 0.322*** 0.043** 0.024 0.023
(17.18) (2.22) (1.20) (1.14)
Estimation 2 CPC 0.020 0.025 0.025 0.024
(0.97) (1.20) (1.23) (1.21)
Adjusted 0.760*** 0.124*** −0.013 −0.035
Item (28.89) (3.00) (−0.25) (−0.48)
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Model 1 uses only one-the CPC member dummy variable as the independent variable; the
independent variables in Model 2 includes the CPC membership, female, years of experience and
education variables; the Model 3 is the one added the new variables—the occupation, industry
sector and regions variables to the variables of Model 2; the Model 4 is the one added the new
variables—the parents in the public sector dummy variable to the variables of Model 3
(3) t-values are expressed in parentheses
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significant at a 1% level in both Model 1 and Model 2. The results suggest that
selection bias problem remains in the OLS results; thus, it is necessary to consider
this bias in the estimations of wage function and wage decomposition.
To compare the wage premium of CPC membership of female and male workers,
we conducted the estimations by gender; these results are summarized in Table 5.5
(female) and Table 5.6 (male). The main new findings are as follows.
First, the wage premium of CPC membership is around 34.7% points for female
workers and 4.8–30.8% points for male workers. However, when the job factor
and selection items are controlled, the impact of CPC membership on wages is not
Table 5.5 Wage premium of CPC membership for female workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation 1 CPC 0.347*** 0.034 0.017 0.017
(10.63) (1.03) (0.50) (0.51)
Estimation 2 CPC −0.001 −0.005 0.002 0.007
(−0.03) (−0.14) (0.06) (0.20)
Adjusted 1.035*** 0.320*** 0.210** 0.247*
Item (22.10) (4.31) (2.12) (1.83)
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Model 1 uses only one-the CPC member dummy variable as the independent variable; the
independent variables in Model 2 includes the CPC membership, female, years of experience and
education variables; the Model 3 is the one added the new variables—the occupation, industry
sector and regions variables to the variables of Model 2; the Model 4 is the one added the new
variables—the parents in the public sector dummy variable to the variables of Model 3
(3) t-values are expressed in parentheses
Table 5.6 Wage Premium of CPC membership for male workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation 1 CPC 0.308*** 0.048** 0.027 0.028
(13.58) (2.02) (1.13) (1.13)
Estimation 2 CPC 0.037 0.038 0.032 0.030
(1.44) (1.49) (1.29) (1.23)
Adjusted 0.631*** 0.067 −0.0628018 −0.080
Item (20.00) (1.33) (−0.90) (−0.81)
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Model 1 uses only one-the CPC member dummy variable as the independent variable; the
independent variables in Model 2 includes the CPC membership, female, years of experience and
education variables; the Model 3 is the one added the new variables—the occupation, industry
sector and regions variables to the variables of Model 2; the Model 4 is the one added the new
variables—the parents in the public sector dummy variable to the variables of Model 3
(3) t-values are expressed in parentheses
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statistically significant for female or male workers. These results are consistent with
those shown in Table 5.4, suggesting that the influences on wages of job factors and
selection are greater for female and male workers. In addition, for female workers,
when the individual’s human capital such as education and years of work experience
is controlled, the significances of the impact of CPCmembership onwages disappear.
The results indicate that, for female workers, human capital may greatly influence
the probability of becoming a CPC member.
Second, in Model 1 to Model 4, the selection items are all statistically significant
for femaleworkers,whereas the adjusted item is only statistically significant inModel
1 for male workers. This suggests that the influence of sample selection bias on wage
levels is greater for female workers than for their male counterparts.
5.4.3 The Decomposition Results of the Wage Gap Between
CPC and Non-CPC
Table 5.7 reports the decomposition results of wage gaps between CPC members
and nonmembers for the total sample including female and male workers. Two kinds
of decomposition analyses are employed. Model 1 is a decomposition analysis that
excludes the selectivity items based on the wage function by the OLSmodel (Blinder
1973; Oaxaca 1973). Model 2 is a decomposition analysis that includes the selection
items based on the wage function by the Heckman two-stepmodel (Oaxaca and Choe
2016).15 The main results are as follows.
First, in general, the results ofModel 1 andModel are different. Concretely, based
on Model 1, the contribute rate of the explained component (98.3%) on the wage
gap is greater than that of the unexplained component (1.7%); however, based on
Model 2, the influence of the unexplained component (92.8%) on the wage gap
is greater than that of the explained part (7.2%). Particularly, the contribute rate of
unexplained component of adjusted items is 170.2%,which is the largest among these
factors. This suggests that the factors that determine the probability of becoming a
CPC member and some unobserved factors that are not controlled in the study, such
as unobserved ability, may influence the probability of becoming a CPC member,
greatly affecting the wage gap. Thus, analyses that consider the sample selection bias
should be employed.
Second, for the detailed decomposition results, (1) the differentials of education
enlarge the wage gap, the contribution rate is 55.3% in Model 1, 43.2% in Model
2. This indicates that the differentials in human capital between CPC members and
nonmembers contribute to the existence of the wage gap. Concretely, because the
average educational level is higher for CPC members than for nonmembers, based
on the human capital theory (Becker 1964;Mincer 1974), the wage level is higher for
CPCmembers,which contributes to thewage gap. In addition, the contribution rate of
wage determination mechanism differs between these two groups. For example, the
value of the unexplained component of education is greater for CPCmembers (12.2%
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Table 5.7 Decomposition results of wage gap between CPC and non-CPC (total samples)
Values %
Explained Unexplained Explained (%) Unexplained (%)
Model 1
Total 0.354 0.006 98.3 1.7
Female 0.030 0.020 8.3 5.6
Years of experience 0.008 −0.150 2.2 −41.7
Education 0.199 0.044 55.3 12.2
Occupation 0.052 −0.007 14.4 −1.9
Industry 0.000 −0.087 0.0 −24.2
Ownership 0.062 −0.094 17.2 −26.1
Region 0.003 −0.120 0.8 −33.3
Constants 0.000 0.400 0.0 111.1
Model 2
Total 0.026 0.333 7.2 92.8
Selection −0.235 0.611 −65.5 170.2
Female 0.025 0.019 7.0 5.3
Years of experience 0.006 −0.164 1.7 −45.7
Education 0.155 0.120 43.2 33.4
Occupation 0.040 −0.004 11.1 −1.1
Industry 0.041 −0.100 11.4 −27.9
Ownership −0.008 −0.094 −2.2 −26.2
Region 0.002 −0.119 0.6 −33.1
Constants 0.000 0.064 0.0 17.8
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note Estimation 1 based on Blinder-Oaxaca model; Estimation 2 based on Oaxaca and Choe model
in Model 1, 33.4% in Model 2), suggesting that the return on education is greater for
CPCmembers than for nonmembers, which expands the wage gap between these two
groups. The results indicate that both the gap of educational attainment and the return
on education may cause the wage gap between CPC members and nonmembers in
China.
(2) The gender proportion may increase the wage gap (8.3% in Model 1, 7.0%
in Model 2). The results can be explained as follows. Because the gender wage
gap remains (Gustafsson and Li 2000; Maurer-Fazio and Hughes 2002; Demurger
et al. 2007; Li et al. 2011; Ma 2018a, c), when the female proportion is higher for
non-CPC members, the average wage may be lower for non-CPC members than
for their counterparts, which may cause the wage gap between CPC members and
nonmembers. In China, as shown by the slogan “women can hold up half of the
sky,” the government implemented gender equality employment policies and greatly
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promoted female employment in the public sector (Ma 2018a). However, the propor-
tion of females in the CPC is smaller than that of males, which may be caused by
discrimination against women or women’s own choices (self-selection).
(3) The differentials of occupational distributions between these two groups may
cause the existence of the wage gap (14.4% in Model 1, 11.1% in Model 2). In
addition, the differentials of industry sector distributions between these two groups
increase the wage gap (11.4% in Model 2).
(4) Regarding enterprise ownership, the differentials of distributions of ownership
types increase the wage gap (17.2% in Model 1), whereas when sample selection
bias is considered, its influence decreased (−2.2% in Model 2). This indicates that
the ownership sector may influence the probability of participating in the CPC; thus,
the ownership effect on the wage gap is absorbed by the selection item.
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 report the decomposition results of wage gaps between CPC
members and nonmembers for female workers and male workers separately. The
new findings are as follows.
Table 5.8 Decomposition results of wage gap between CPC and non-CPC (female workers)
Values %
Explained Unexplained Explained (%) Unexplained (%)
Model 1
Total 0.419 −0.067 119.0 −19.0
Years of experience −0.012 0.053 −3.4 15.1
Education 0.309 0.394 87.8 111.9
Occupation 0.064 −0.047 18.2 −13.4
Industry 0.052 −0.065 14.8 −18.5
Ownership −0.002 −0.004 −0.6 −1.1
Region 0.008 −0.116 2.3 −33.0
Constants 0.000 −0.282 0.0 −80.1
Model 2
Total −0.469 0.823 −132.5 232.5
Selection −0.711 1.318 −200.8 372.3
Years of experience −0.003 −0.030 −0.8 −8.5
Education 0.212 0.455 59.9 128.5
Occupation 0.041 −0.048 11.6 −13.6
Industry 0.005 −0.040 1.4 −11.3
Ownership −0.021 −0.011 −5.9 −3.1
Region 0.008 −0.117 2.3 −33.1
Constants 0.000 −0.705 0.0 −199.2
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note Estimation 1 based on Blinder-Oaxaca model; Estimation 2 based on Oaxaca and Choe model
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Table 5.9 Decomposition results of wage gap between CPC and non-CPC (male workers)
Values %
Explained Unexplained Explained (%) Unexplained (%)
Model 1
Total 0.273 0.035 88.6 11.4
Years of experience 0.017 −0.266 5.5 −86.4
Education 0.158 −0.226 51.3 −73.4
Occupation 0.043 0.015 14.0 4.9
Industry 0.046 −0.089 14.9 −28.9
Ownership 0.008 −0.15 2.6 −48.7
Region 0.001 −0.128 0.3 −41.6
Constants 0.000 0.879 0.0 285.4
Model 2
Total −0.120 0.426 −39.2 139.2
Selection −0.266 0.598 −86.9 195.4
Years of experience 0.011 −0.359 3.6 −117.3
Education 0.097 −0.233 31.7 −76.1
Occupation 0.023 0.002 7.5 0.7
Industry 0.016 −0.067 5.2 −21.9
Ownership −0.002 −0.150 −0.7 −49.0
Region 0.001 −0.130 0.3 −42.5
Constants 0.000 0.765 0.0 250.0
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note Estimation 1 based on Blinder-Oaxaca model; Estimation 2 based on Oaxaca and Choe model
First, in general for both female andmale workers, when the sample selection bias
is controlled, the contribute rate of unexplained component increases from−19.0 to
232.5% (female) and from 11.4 to 139.2% (male); the range of the increase of the
unexplained component is greater for female workers than for male workers. This
indicates that the factors influencing the self-selection or being selected to participate
in theCPCorganization greatly affect thewage gap; the influence is greater for female
workers than for male workers.
Second, for the detailed decomposition results, (1) although education contributes
to the existence of the wage gap for both female workers andmale workers, the effect
of education is greater for female workers than for male workers. For example,
based on Decomposition 2, the calculated values of education are 59.9% (explained
component) and 128.5% (unexplained component) for female workers and 31.7%
(explained component) and −76.1% (unexplained component) for male workers.
The educational attainment gap may be found to enlarge the wage gap between
CPC members and nonmembers for both female workers and male workers, and the
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difference in the return on education for wages may enlarge the wage gap for female
workers while reducing it for male workers.
(2) The differentials in occupational distribution between these two groups may
increase the wage gap between CPC members and nonmembers for both female and
male workers. For example, based on the explained part results of Decomposition
2, the calculated values of occupation are 11.6% for female workers and 7.5% for
male workers. This demonstrates that the influence of differentials in occupational
distributions on the wage gap is greater for female workers than for male workers.
(3) The differentials in distributions among industry sectors between these two
groups may increase the wage gap between CPC members and nonmembers for
both female and male workers, and the influence of the differentials in occupational
distributions on the wage gap is greater for female workers than for male workers.
Concretely, based on the explained part results of Decomposition 2, the calculated
values of industry are 11.4% for female workers and 5.2 percent for male workers.
5.5 Conclusions
Using data from theChineseHousehold Income Project survey (CHIPs) conducted in
2014, this study employs an empirical study based on the wage function considering
the sample selection bias (Heckman 1979), the probit regression model, and the
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973; Oaxaca and
Choe 2016) to (1) estimate the determinants of participation in the CPC, (2) estimate
the impact of CPC membership on wage levels, and (3) investigate the determinants
of the wage gap between CPC members and nonmembers in China. We mainly
compare the differences in these factors between female and male workers.
Fourth, new findings emerge. First, when the other factors are constant, the prob-
ability of becoming a CPC member is 7.3–7.7% points lower for female workers
than for male workers. This indicates that a gender gap of participation in the CPC
remains.
Second, the wage premium of CPC membership is higher for female workers
(around 34.7% points) than for male workers (4.8–30.8% points), and the influence
of selection bias on wage levels is greater for female workers than for male workers.
Third, for both female workers and male workers, when the sample selection bias
is controlled, the contribution rate of the unexplained component increases from −
19.0 to 232.5% (females) and from 11.4 to 139.2% (males); the range of increase
of the unexplained component is greater for female workers than for male workers.
This indicates that factors influencing self-selection or being selected to become a
CPC member greatly affect the wage gap, and the influence is greater for female
workers than for male workers.
Fourth, the decomposition results show that, excepting the sample selection bias,
endowment differentials—such as differences in years of schooling and distributions
of occupations and industry sectors—are the main factors affecting the wage gap for
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both female and male workers, and the contribution of endowment differentials is
greater for female workers than for male workers.
The results indicate that, in the 2000s, CPC membership positively affected wage
levels for both female and male workers, and the wage premium of CPCmembership
was greater for female workers than for male workers. The decomposition results
show that, excepting the selection bias, endowment differentials—including human
capital—are the main factors contributing to the wage gap between CPC members
and nonmembers, and the influence is greater for female workers than for male
workers. This suggests that, as the market-oriented economy reform advances, the
influence of market mechanisms on wage determination becomes greater. Although
the CPC leadership remains dominant in the political sphere, the influence of market
mechanisms on wage determination increased; therefore, endowment differentials
become themain factor contributing to the wage gap. It can be expected that, with the
progress of market-oriented economy reform, the influence of unexplained compo-
nent—including discrimination against non-CPC members—on the wage gap may
decrease, and the influence of differences in the explained component (endowment
differentials)—including human capital—may increase for both female and male
workers. However, it should be noted that, in general, when other factors are constant,
the probability of becoming a CPCmember is lower for female workers than formale
workers, and the influence of sample selection bias on wages is greater for female
workers than for their male counterparts. This suggests that there may be discrim-
ination against female workers participating in the CPC organization. Moreover,
it also may be argued that the wage data used in this analysis only include basic
wages, bonuses, and allowances that are reported. It is well known that some parts of
income, such as income derived from corruption, may not be reported and cannot be
measured, possibly causing the income gap between CPCmembers and nonmembers
to be underestimated.
Notes
1. Since 1949, the CPC has been the dominant party leading the national organi-
zation of China. Article 29 of the Constitution of the Communist Party of China
stipulates that “China is led by the Communist Party of China.” For details on
CPC organization, criteria and the selection process for joining the CPC, and
the role of the CPC in Chinese firms, please refer to Ma and Iwasaki (2021).
2. For the survey andmeta-analysis on communist partymembership and thewage
premium in China, please refer to Ma and Iwasaki (2021).
3. Based on Section 1 Article 1 of the Constitution, prospective members of the
Communist Party of China must meet five prerequisites. They must be: (1) blue
collar workers, farmers, white collar workers, and other revolutionary activists
who are Chinese citizens older than 18 years of age; (2) those who accept the
party’s program and constitution; (3) those who are willing to join and work
actively in one of the party organizations; (4) those who enforce the party’s
resolutions; (5) thosewho regularly payCommunist Party of Chinamembership
dues. Even though these five conditions could bemet by themajority of Chinese
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citizens, the selection process for becoming a CPC member is strict and long
(Hu and Zhou 1998; Li and Zhang 2003).
4. Regarding individual characteristics (e.g., education, gender), in fact, CPC
members in China can be considered an elite class. For example, based on
reports from the China Xinhua News Network Corporation, the proportion of
higher education graduates among all CPC members is 45.9%.
5. In order to simplify the expression of equations, all constant items are omitted.
6. In the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition model (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973), the
adjusted item (λ) is not considered.
7. It is debated whether an index number problem exists in the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition model. Estimated results may vary with the kinds of groups
compared. Given the space constraints, and because the two sets of decompo-
sition results are almost identical, only estimated results using Eq. (5.4) are
presented in this study.
8. The mandatory retirement ages are as follows: 45 for a female worker, 50 for a
male worker, 55 for a female cadre, and 60 for a male cadre.
9. Variable values in the range of the mean value ± three times S.D. are defined
as abnormal values here.
10. Years of experience = age − years of schooling −6.
11. Gustafsson and Li (2000), Demurger et al. (2007), and Ma (2018c) analyzed
the gender wage gaps in China based on decomposition methods and found that
discrimination against women is the main factor contributing to the existence
of the gender wage gap.
12. There are 16 industry categories in the survey for local urban residents in CHIPs
2013. To confirm the analyzed samples, we reclassified the industrial sectors
into five kinds.
13. For empirical studies on the wage gap between the public sector and the private
sector inChina, please refer toZhang andXue (2008),Ye et al. (2011),Demurger
et al. (2012), and Ma (2018c).
14. For detailed results, please see Appendix Tables 5.10 and 5.11.
15. The results of the wage function by the OLS model and the Heckman two-step
model are shown in the Tables 5.12 and 5.13.
Appendix
See Tables 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13.
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Table 5.10 Results of wage functions of CPC and non-CPC (OLS)
(1) CPC (2) Non-CPC (3) Gap
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Female −0.208*** −6.42 −0.252*** −16.03 0.044
Exp 0.025*** 3.39 0.043*** 12.61 −0.018
Exp.-sq −0.000** −2.26 −0.001*** −11.77 0.001
Education (Primary)
Junior high 0.057 0.25 0.036 1.08 0.021
Senior high 0.297 1.33 0.189*** 5.37 0.108
College 0.447** 1.99 0.414*** 10.28 0.033
University 0.654*** 2.89 0.658*** 14.92 −0.004
Occupation (Manufacturing)
Manager/engineer 0.130** 2.22 0.137*** 5.09 −0.007
Clerk 0.010 0.16 0.013 0.42 −0.003
Service worker −0.140** −2.06 −0.126*** −4.80 −0.014
Other −0.102 −1.47 −0.119*** −4.17 0.017
Ownership (PUB)
COEs −0.284*** −3.81 −0.001 −0.02 −0.283
FOEs 0.306** 2.12 0.266*** 5.71 0.04
POEs −0.139** −2.52 −0.017 −0.75 −0.122
Other −0.184*** −3.34 −0.047** −1.99 −0.137
Industry sector (Manufacturing)
Construction −0.0195 −0.20 0.253*** 6.74 −0.273
Sales −0.044 −0.50 0.019 0.61 −0.063
Service −0.079 −1.17 −0.002 −0.06 −0.077
Other −0.041 −0.72 0.080*** 2.99 −0.121
Region (East)
Central −0.399*** −11.78 −0.168*** −9.52 −0.231
West −0.306*** −7.84 −0.143*** −7.00 −0.163
Constants 1.916*** 7.56 1.517*** 23.60 0.399
Observations 2,009 8,602
Adj R-squared 0.224 0.237
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; Gap = CPC-Non-CPC
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Table 5.11 Results of wage functions of CPC and non-CPC (Heckman two-step model)
(1) CPC (2) Non-CPC (3) Gap
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
Female −0.171*** −4.05 −0.212*** −7.85 0.041
Exp 0.020** 2.42 0.040*** 9.98 −0.020
Exp.-sq −0.000* −1.80 −0.001*** −11.20 0.001
Education (Primary)
Junior high 0.044 0.20 −0.045 −0.81 0.089
Senior high 0.248 1.10 0.054 0.66 0.194
College 0.362 1.56 0.236** 2.26 0.126
University 0.510** 2.06 0.430*** 3.29 0.080
Occupation (Manufacturing)
Manager/engineer 0.112* 1.89 0.116*** 3.94 −0.004
Clerk −0.059 −0.78 −0.050 −1.06 −0.009
Service worker −0.162** −2.34 −0.149*** −5.04 −0.013
Other −0.129* −1.81 −0.143*** −4.44 0.014
Ownership (PUB)
COEs −0.267*** −3.52 0.011 0.28 −0.278
FOEs 0.392** 2.51 0.360*** 5.17 0.032
POEs −0.085 −1.26 0.050 1.17 −0.135
Other −0.146** −2.39 −0.004 −0.12 −0.142
Industry sector (Manufacturing)
Construction −0.011 −0.11 0.270*** 7.01 −0.281
Sales −0.012 −0.14 0.070* 1.68 −0.082
Service −0.070 −1.03 0.007 0.24 −0.077
Other −0.045 −0.78 0.077*** 2.88 −0.122
Region (East)
Central −0.400*** −11.78 −0.169*** −9.58 −0.231
West −0.317*** −7.98 −0.155*** −7.25 −0.162
Adjusted item 0.198 1.42 −0.132* −1.84 0.330
Constants 1.992*** 7.69 1.928*** 8.28 0.064
Observations 2,009 8,602
Adj R-squared 0.2248 0.187
Source Calculated based on CHIPs 2013
Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10; Gap = CPC-Non-CPC
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Chapter 6
Gender Gap in Volunteer Activity
Participation
Abstract Using the longitudinal data of the China Health and Retirement Longitu-
dinal Survey (CHARLS) from 2011 to 2015, this study investigates the determinants
of participation in volunteer activity of individuals aged 45–69 in China; it also
compares differences in the determinants by gender. The random effects model and
instrumental variables method are used to address unobserved heterogeneity and
other endogeneity problems. The results indicate that when other factors are held
constant, the gender gap in the probability of participating in volunteer activity is
smaller. Second, to compare differences in themechanisms for participating in volun-
teer activity by gender, we found that six factors (market work, education, income,
family care, age, health status) are broadly supported for women and men, but the
influence of determinant factors is different by gender.
Keywords Gender gap · Volunteer activity · Participation · China
6.1 Introduction
Research suggests that, in many developed countries, volunteer activity1 is an impor-
tant part of social life, and volunteer activity improves individuals’ well-being
(happiness or health status) and increases social capital and community develop-
ment (Growiec and Growiec 2014; Rodriguez-Pose and Berlepsch 2014; Aranpatzi
et al. 2018;Ma et al. 2020;Ma 2020). Some previous studies have analyzed the deter-
minants of participation in volunteer activity in developed countries and analyzed
nonprofit organizations in China (McCabe and Deng 2018; Pei et al. 2018; Liu and
Dong 2018; Dong et al. 2019; Li 2019; Liu andWang 2019). Yet empirical studies of
individuals’ behavior in participating in volunteer activity for China using national
longitudinal survey data are limited, and the studies on the gender gap in volunteer
activity participation are scare. This study can fill the gaps.
Volunteering may be a beneficial activity for older adults. It gives them a connec-
tion to people, a usefulness to others they may value, and a purpose in life that may
improve their self-esteem and mental and physical health. Notably, in China, the
mandatory retirement age for men is 60 for both worker (blue collar worker) and
cadre (white collar worker); For women, it is 50 (for a worker) and 55 (for a cadre).
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Retired people usually have more disposable time than workers, it can be expected
that the probability of participating in volunteer activity may be higher for retired
individuals than for working individuals. The issue becomes even more relevant
because China is experiencing the quick population aging. Using a national longi-
tudinal survey, this study investigates the determinants of participation in volunteer
activity of individuals aged 45–69 years old in China and compares the results by
gender.
The remainder of this chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 summarizes the previous
empirical studies on the issue and discusses the influences of main factors on partic-
ipation in volunteer activity. Section 6.3 gives the framework of the empirical anal-
ysis, including models and datasets. Section 6.4 introduces the empirical results and
compares them by gender. Section 6.5 summarizes the conclusions.
6.2 Literature Review
6.2.1 Theories and Empirical Studies on the Determinants
of Participation in Volunteer Activity
Theoretical frameworks2 on the determinants of participation in volunteer activities
can be summarized from three perspectives: (i) psychological theories that empha-
size personality traits, self-concepts, andmotivations (Handy andCnaan 2007; Einolf
2008; Gronlund 2011); (ii) sociological theories that focus on individual sociode-
mographic characteristics such as race, gender, social class, and social network (or
social capital); and (iii) economics theories based on the altruistic behavior of “not
for oneself but for someone else” (Becker 1974, 1976, 1981, 1991, 1985a, 1985b;
Barro 1974; Andreoni 1989, 1990; Sen 1982; Haski-Leventhal 2009), and those
based on selfish behavior. The consumption model is based on a utility function, in
which volunteer activities are treated as a consumer good that is similar to leisure
in neoclassic economics (Menchik and Weisbrod 1987; Freeman 1997; Yamauchi
2001).
This study is mainly based on the economics theories. Previous studies3 of devel-
oped countries have shown that volunteer participation is influenced by work status,
educational background, household income, family care, age, health status, and other
factors (i.e., gender, community).
However, empirical studies on the issue for China are scarce; three papers deal
with the issue. Concretely, using a cross-sectional community survey conducted in
2008 in Shanghai, Tong et al. (2018) examined the probability of participation into
formal social participation among elderly single-person household and the associa-
tion between the utilization of community-based services and formal social partic-
ipation. They found that the use of community-based services is significantly asso-
ciated with formal social participation among elderly single-person household. The
results also indicate that the age and number of chronic illnesses may negatively
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affect the probability of participation into social activity. Using data from the 2012
Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), Lin (2019) investigated the impact of social
capital (social trust, bridging networks, civic engagement, organizational activism,
informal networks) on individual charitable donations and volunteer activity and
found that social capital may affect individual charitable behaviors in China. Using
a representative dataset from the 2013 Survey on Philanthropic Behaviors of Urban
Citizens in China, Wu et al. (2018) constructed five social capital indices (civic
network, reciprocal norms, institutional trust, acquaintance trust, and stranger trust)
to investigate the influence of social capital on volunteer activity in urban China;
he found that civic network, norms of reciprocity, institutional trust, and stranger
trust are positively associated with both volunteer activity and charitable donation,
while acquaintance trust is negatively correlated with charitable donation but has no
significant association with volunteer activity in China.
6.2.2 Gender Gap of Volunteer Activity Participation
The gender gap observed in volunteer activity participation may be considered
according to two channels of influence.
First, volunteer activity participation can be considered a form of leisure.
According to the neoclassic economics, there is a trade-off relationship between
market work and leisure (e.g., volunteer activity). Gender role segregation, expressed
as “men for work, women for family,” means that women have fewer hours for
market work. Therefore, it is assumed that the probability of participating in volun-
teer activity is higher for women than for men (positive effect). Previous studies have
revealed that women are more likely than men to participate in volunteer activity,
and women spend more time on volunteer activity. Also, people with children are
more likely to take part in volunteer activity and to spend more time on volunteer
activity.
Second, some factors may decrease the probability of participating in volunteer
activity more for women than for men. For example, women may take more respon-
sibility for family care and housework than men do. Consciousness of participation
in social activity may be less for women than for men; therefore the probability of
participating in volunteer activity may be lower for women than for men (negative
effect).
Thus, from the economics theory perspective, no clear conclusions can be drawn
on the issue of the gender gap in volunteer activity participation because both positive
and negative effects remain. When the negative effect is greater than the positive
effect, the probability of participating in volunteer activity may be lower for women
than for men, or vice versa. The gender gap in volunteer activity should be estimated
based on empirical studies.
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6.2.3 Contributions of This Study
The three main contributions of this study can be summarized as follows. First,
regarding the issue of the determinants of volunteer activity participation, compar-
isons with studies of developed countries are scarce for China. The results of this
study may provide useful new evidence for China.
Second, the previous studies use cross-sectional data anddonot address the hetero-
geneity problem, and this may bias the results. This study uses a longitudinal data
and a random effects (RE) model to address the problem.
Third, due to time constraints, there may be an endogeneity problem between
participation in market work and participation in volunteer activity; for example, the
two types of behaviors may be decided simultaneously. This problem has not been
considered in previous studies. This study uses instrumental variables (IV) methods
to address the endogeneity problem.
Fourth, although previous studies (Wu et al. 2018; Tong et al. 2018; Lin 2019)
found that a gender gap remains in the probability of volunteering, they did not
investigate differences in themechanismof volunteer activity participation by gender.
This study is the first to consider differences in the determinants of volunteer activity
participation by gender.
6.3 Methodology and Data
6.3.1 Model
A probit regression model is used to investigate the probability of participating in
volunteer activity in Eq. (6.1).
Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(a0 + βof eFei + β0X Xi + vi > 0) (6.1)
In Eq. (6.1), Pr(Yi = 1) denotes the probability of participating in volunteer
activity. i indicates individuals, Fe is a female dummy variable, and X represents
the control variables. The coefficients of variables are denoted by β0 f e and β0X . In
addition, a is a constant, and v is the error term.When β0 f e is statistically significant,
it indicates that a gender gap remains in the probability of participating in volunteer
activity.
Two econometric problems must be addressed in Eq. (6.1). First, there may be
an endogeneity problem between market work and volunteer activity. Instrumental
variables (IV) methods are used to address the endogeneity problem. IV methods are
expressed as Eqs. (6.2.1) ~ (6.2.5).
Pr(Worki = 1) = Pr(a1 + β1Z Zi + β1 f e Fei + β1X Xi + ui > 0) (6.2.1)







= Pr(a1 + β1Z Zi + β1 f e Fei + β1X Xi > 0) (6.2.2)
Resi i = PrWorki − PrWork
∧
i (6.2.3)
Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(a2 + β2WorkWork
∧
i + β2 f e Fei + β2X Xi + εi > 0) (6.2.4)
Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(a2 + β2WorkWorki + β2Resi Resi i + β2 f e Fei + β2X Xi + εi > 0)
(6.2.5)
corr(Z , ε) = 0 and corr(Z , u) = 0
Based on Eqs. (6.2.1)–(6.2.5), a two-step procedure is used for estimates: (1) In
the first step, we employ the probit regression model (Eq. (6.2.1)), and then calculate
the imputed value of probability of participating in market work Work
∧
(Eq. (6.2.2))
and the residual items Resi (Eq. (6.2.3)). (2) In the second step, we use the imputed
value of Work
∧
or residual items Resi as an explanatory variable and estimate the
probability of participating in volunteer activity (Eqs. (6.2.4), (6.2.5)). Whether
the estimates are unbiased hinges critically on the validity of instrumental variable
(Z); that is, Z needs to be correlated with Work while satisfying the conditions of
corr(Z , ε) = 0, andneeds not to be correlatedwithPr(Yi = 1) (corr(Z , u) = 0).We
use the formal retirement experience dummy variable as the IV. IV methods include
the two-stage least squares (2SLS), the two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS), and
the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) model. Considering that the dependent vari-
able of participation in volunteer activity is a binary variable, 2SPS and the 2SRI
models are used in this study.7 The 2SPS model is expressed by Eq. (6.2.4), and the
2SRI model is expressed by Eq. (6.2.5).
The second econometric problem for Eq. (6.1) is the heterogeneity problem. vi in
Eq. (6.1) includes the unobserved individual-specific time-invariant effect, μi , and
true error, δi t (vi t= μi+δi t ). When the unobserved individual-specific time-invariant
effect is not addressed, a bias may exist in the results. To address this problem, a
random effects model is used. It is expressed by Eq. (6.3).
Pr(Yit = 1) = Pr(a3 + β3 f e Feit + β3X Xit + μi + δi t > 0) (6.3)
Finally, to address the heterogeneity and other endogeneity problems simultane-
ously, a random effects (RE) probit regression model and IV methods is used. It is
expressed by Eq. (6.4).
Pr(Yit = 1) = Pr(a4 + β4WorkWorkit + β4Resi Resi i + β4 f e Feit + β4X Xit + μi + δi t ) > 0
(6.4)
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The Cragg-Donald Wald test is used as the weak instrumental variables test, and
the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test is used to check for endogeneity between participation
in market work and participation in volunteer activity.
To compare the differences in determinants of volunteer activity participation, we
also run these models using female and male samples.
6.3.2 Data
The data for this study comes from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal
Survey (CHARLS). TheCHARLS is conducted byPekingUniversity every twoyears
and covers representative regions of China. Its survey objects are individuals aged 45
and older. The baseline national wave of the CHARLS conducted in 2012 includes
about 10,000 households and 17,708individuals in 150 counties/districts and 450
villages/resident committees. The first and second follow-up survey waves are for
2014 and 2016. Information such as demographic characteristics, family structure,
intra-household transfer, employment status, income, and other related information
can be obtained from theCHARLS. This study uses data from threewaves (CHARLS
2011, 2013, and 2015), including the most recent data from CHARLS 2015. To
consider the influence of the retirement system in government organizations and
enterprises, the sample is limited to individuals aged 45–69 years. The samples used
in the analysis is 28,463 (sample of participation in volunteer activity is 4,491, sample
of non-participation in volunteer activity is 23,972).
6.3.3 Variable Setting
Two dependent variables are constructed as follows: first, a binary variable for work
is equal to 1 when an individual is working and equal to 0 when the individual is
not working. It is used in the first stage of the IV method. In China, the individ-
uals experienced formal retirement are those who worked in the public sector (e.g.,
government organization, state-owned enterprises) before retriement, majority of
them can receive higher public pension benefits after mandatory retirement. It can
be predicted that the probability of participation work are lower for the individuals
experienced formal retirement than the counterpart (who exited labor market without
formal retirement experience, for example, the self-employed). On the other hand, for
the individuals exiting labor market, when the other factors are constant, because the
leisure hours (time constraints) may be similar regardness of formal retirement expe-
rience, the influnence of formal retirement experience on participation in volunteer
activity may small. Therefore, the dummy variable of formal retirement experience
(1 = has experienced the formal retriement, 0 = otherwise) is used as the IV in this
study. The results of the first stage of the IV method are shown in the Appendix
Table 6.4. Second, a binary variable for participation in volunteer activity is equal
to 1 and equal to 0 when the individual is not participating in volunteer activity.
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Based on the CHARLS questionnaire item “Have you done any of these activities
in the last month,” when the respondent chooses “done volunteer or charity work,”
“cared for a sick or disabled adult not coresident with you,” or “provided help to
family, friends, or neighbors not coresident with you,” it qualifies as participation in
volunteer activity.8
The main independent variables are conducted as follows. First, a female dummy
variable is constructed to estimate the gender gap in volunteer activity participation.
Second, a set of variables of six factors are used as follows:
Market work
Based on the individual utility function in neoclassic economics theory, there is a
trade-off relationship betweenmarket work and volunteer activity.4 It is expected that
the probability of participating in volunteer activity is lower for the working group
than for the non-working group because of time constraints. Carlin (2001) found
that time spent on volunteer activity decreases as working hours increase. For Japan,
Atoda et al. (1999), Atoda and Fukushige (2000), Yamauchi (2001), Ono (2006), and
Moriyama (2007) reported that the probability of participating in volunteer activity
is inversely proportionate to the householder’s working hours and working days.
Although the labor force participation rate of women and men is higher for China
than for other countries, the labor force participation rate for middle-aged women
has decreased during the current period. It is assumed that there remains a trade-off
relationship between labor market work and volunteer activity. The dummy variable
of work is equal to 1when an individual is working and equal to 0when the individual
is not working;
Education
Some research has demonstrated that educational background has a strong influence
on participation in volunteer activity, and that personswith a higher level of education
are more likely to volunteer (Vaillancourt 1994; Freeman 1997; Ma and Ono 2013;
Wu et al. 2018; Tong et al. 2018; Lin 2019). This can be explained by the human
capital theory (Becker 1964). It may also be that social contribution consciousness
differs among different educational attainment groups. For example, Carlin (2001)
found that the higher the market wage (higher educational attainment) of married
women, the more they volunteer (probability of participating in volunteer activity,
volunteer activity hours). It also can be expected that educational attainment may
affect volunteer activity. There educational attainment level dummy variables—low,
middle, and high education levels9 were used.
Income factors
Menchik andWeisbrod (1987) employed an empirical study to investigate themecha-
nism of participation in volunteer activity based on the consumptionmodel. Menchik
and Weisbrod (1987), Vaillancourt (1994), Ma and Ono (2013), Tong et al. (2018),
and Lin (2019) found that the higher the unearned income, the longer the time spent
on volunteer activities; conversely, the higher the market wage rate, the shorter the
volunteer activity hours. Based on the consumption model advocated by Menchik
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andWeisbrod (1987) and previous studies, it is assumed that the probability of partic-
ipating in volunteer activity may be higher for the high-unearned income group than
for the low-unearned income group in China.
Three income factor variables were constructed as: (i) the logarithmic value of
the annual household consumption; (ii) the pension receipt dummy variable, which
is equal to 1 when a woman is receiving a pension and equal to 0 when she is not;
and (iii) the transfer to children dummy variable, which is equal to 1 when a women
transfers her pension income to her children and equal to 0 when she does not.
Family care
Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), Morgan et al. (1977), and Vaillancourt (1994) found
that the probability of volunteer activity tends to be lower and the hours of volunteer
activity tend to be less when caring for infants.5 In a study of married women, Carlin
(2001)6 found that the probability of participating in volunteer activity increases
but the hours of volunteer activity decrease as the number of children increases.
In Japan, Atoda et al. (1999), Atoda and Fukushige (2000), Yamauchi (2001), Ono
(2006), Moriyama (2007), and Ma and Ono (2013) reported that the duties of family
care (child care, parent care) and the number of children decrease the probability of
participating in volunteer activity and the hours of volunteer activity.
Regarding family care in China, because the one-child policy had been in effect
since 1979, most middle- and older aged women aged 45 and older in the survey
years from 2011 to 2015 had one or two children, and most children were more than
14 years old. It can be assumed that, with an increase in the number of children,
parents have more hours of work at home, which may decrease the probability of
participating in volunteer activity. In contrast, family caregivers may have stronger
altruistic values and greater motivation to volunteer to help others than those who are
not family caregivers. It is predicted that the number of children may decrease the
probability of participating in volunteer activity, but the availability of family care
may increase the probability of participating in volunteer activity.
Three family factor variables were used as: (i) the number of children; (ii) the
grandchildren caregiving dummy variable, which is equal to 1 when a women is
caring for grandchildren and equal to 0 when she is not; and (iii) the child care
giving variable, which is equal to 1 when a women is caring for children and equal
to 0 when she is not.
Age
Both the probability of participating in volunteer activities and the time spent on such
activities tend to change with age (Menchik and Weisbrod 1987; Vaillancourt 1994;
Wu et al. 2018; Tong et al. 2018; Lin 2019). For example, for developed countries,
Menchik and Weisbrod (1987) pointed out that, while the time spent on volunteer
activity increases with age to a point, it decreases after the age of 43. Vaillancourt
(1994) found that themost likely age for volunteering for bothmenandwomen is from
age15 to 19, and that while men are more likely to participate in volunteer activities
from age 25 to 54, this probability decreases between age 55 and 69. For women,
the probability of participating clearly decreases at age 70 and older. In America and
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Canada, participation in volunteer activities during one’s student years is utilized
as one aspect of socio-cultural background that may influence the employment and
wages of an individual, whichmay reinforce an individual’s participation in volunteer
activities; this is known as the human capital investment theory. In China, Wu et al.
(2018) and Lin (2019) reported that the probability of participating in volunteer
activity decreases with age for those aged 18 and older. Tong et al. (2018) found this
was also true for people aged60 andolder; the probability of participating in volunteer
activity decreases with age. To consider the lifestyle and situation of middle-aged
and older individuals in China, regarding the decrease in health status and social
contribution efforts with age, it is assumed that the probability of participating in
volunteer activity decreases with age. Regarding the retirement eligibility age for
women is 50 years for workers and 55 years for cadres, we constructed three age
dummy variables—age 45–49, 50–59, and 60–69 years old.
Health status
Health status as a part of human capital can influence bothmarket work and volunteer
activity. Grossman (1972) advocated a health investment model to emphasize the
importance of health status for an individual. It is expected that health status may
enhanceparticipation in volunteer activity.Atoda et al. (1999) andMaandOno (2013)
found that a healthy status increases the probability of participating in volunteer
activity in Japan. In China, Tong et al. (2018) and Wu et al. (2018) found that poor
health status decreases the possibility of participating in volunteer activity. Based on
the human capital theory (Becker 1964) and the results of previous empirical studies,
it can be assumed that the probability of participating in volunteer activity is higher
for the healthy group than for the group with poor health in China. The subjective
health status (poor, fair, good, very good, excellent) dummy variables were used as
the indices of health status.
Other factors
Gender, marital status, environmental changes (i.e., earthquakes, natural disasters),
and community factors, have also been shown to possibly affect participation in
volunteer activity (Schram and Dunsing 1981; Menchik and Weisbrod 1987; Vail-
lancourt 1994; Atoda et al. 1999; Atoda and Fukushige 2000; Yamauchi 2001; Ono
2006; Moriyama 2007; Ma and Ono 2013). Therefore, the other factors such as
gender,marital status, and regional disparity variables are also constructed as follows.
(1) A female dummy variable is used to investigate the gender gap in volunteer
activity participation. (2) According to the labor market segmentation hypothesis
(Piore 1970), the behaviors of workers are shaped by the characteristics of the labor
market. As is well known, the Chinese labor market is segmented by the population
registration (Hukou) system. In 1958, the Hukou system was implemented by the
government. Under the planned economy period from 1949 to 1977, migration from
rural regions to urban regions was prohibited. Since the 1980s, the Hukou system
has been deregulated, great differences in the labor market remain between rural and
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urban areas. For example, the social security systems (i.e., public pension, medical
insurance schemes) differ under theHukou system. Therefore, a urbanHukou dummy
variable is used to control the influence of segmentation, which is equal to 1 when
a woman has urban Hukou and equal to 0 when the individual has rural Hukou. (3)
A spouse dummy variable is conducted, which is equal to 1 when a woman has a
husband and equal to 0 when she is single. (4) The culture and the economic devel-
opment level may change for different periods; therefore, the year dummy variables
(2011, 2013, 2015) are included in the control variables. Although previous studies
(Wu et al. 2018; Lin 2019) reported that social capital may affect volunteer activity
in China, because we cannot obtain the information from the CHARLS, this must
be a future research issue. The gender gap of volunteer activity is discussed in the
following section.
Table 6.1 presents descriptive statistics for (a) the total sample, (b) participation
in a volunteer activity group (PVA), and (c) non-participation in a volunteer activity
group (non-PVA) of individuals aged 45–69. It is observed that (1) in China, the
proportion of participation in volunteer activity for individuals aged 45–69 is 15.8%.
(2) To compare the employment rate between PVA group and non-PVA group, it is
7.6%points higher for the PVAgroup than for the non-PVAgroup. (3) The proportion
of middle-and high-level education groups is higher for the PVA group than for the
non-PVA group. (4) The income level is higher for the PVA group than for the non-
PVA group. In addition, the proportion of income transferred to children is higher
for the PVA group than for the non-PVA group, while the proportion of pension
recipients is lower for the PVA group than for the non-PVA group. (5) The number
of children is less for the PVA group than for the non-PVA group, but the proportions
of both caring for grandchildren and for parents are higher for the PVA group than
for the non-PVA group. (6) The proportion of women with poor health status is 7.0%
points lower for the PVA group than for the non-PVA group, while the proportion
of healthy women is higher for the PVA group. The results show that individual
attributes, family structure, and income factors differ between the PVA group and
the non-PVA group. These factors should be controlled in estimations.
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Gender Gap in Volunteer Activity Participation
Table 6.2 displays the results for determinants of volunteer activity participation. Five
models are used.To compare the appropriateness of thesemodels, first, the likelihood-
ratio test of rho= 0 indicated that the random effects model is more appropriate than
the probit regression model (Model 1). Second, the Cragg-Donald Wald test results
are more than 10 for Model 2, Model 3, andModel 5 (121.41 for Model 2, 190.06 for
Model 3, and 122.63 forModel 5), suggesting that the instrumental variables in these
models are not weak IVs. The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test suggest that
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Table 6.1 Descriptive statistics of variables
Total (a) PVA (b) Non-PVA (c) D b-c




Female 0.483 0.500 0.439 0.496 0.492 0.500 −0.053
Work 0.765 0.424 0.829 0.377 0.753 0.431 0.076
Education
Low-education 0.860 0.347 0.796 0.403 0.872 0.335 −0.076
Middle-education 0.118 0.323 0.160 0.367 0.110 0.313 0.050
High-education 0.022 0.147 0.044 0.205 0.018 0.133 0.026
Consumption 8.907 0.911 9.139 0.925 8.864 0.902 0.275
Pensioner 0.285 0.452 0.267 0.443 0.289 0.453 −0.022
Transfer to
children
0.379 0.485 0.507 0.500 0.355 0.479 0.152
Number of
children
2.361 1.191 2.186 1.119 2.394 1.201 −0.208
Grandchildren care 0.402 0.490 0.412 0.492 0.401 0.490 0.011
Parent care 0.093 0.291 0.125 0.331 0.087 0.282 0.038
Age 56.186 6.852 54.689 6.667 56.467 6.850 −1.778
Health status
Poor 0.206 0.404 0.147 0.355 0.217 0.412 −0.070
Fair 0.523 0.500 0.532 0.499 0.521 0.500 0.011
Good 0.148 0.355 0.162 0.369 0.145 0.352 0.017
Very good 0.111 0.314 0.138 0.345 0.106 0.307 0.032
Excellent 0.013 0.113 0.020 0.139 0.012 0.107 0.008
Urban 0.211 0.408 0.261 0.439 0.201 0.401 0.060
Having spouse 0.924 0.265 0.931 0.253 0.923 0.267 0.008
Survey year
y2011 0.305 0.460 0.161 0.368 0.332 0.471 −0.171
y2013 0.340 0.474 0.364 0.481 0.335 0.472 0.029
y2015 0.355 0.479 0.475 0.499 0.333 0.471 0.142
Observations 28,463 4,491 23,972
Source Calculated based on CHARLS2011-2015
Note PVA: participation in volunteer activity; Non-PVA: Non-participation in volunteer activity
the instrumental variables in both Model 2 and Model 5 are endogenous variables
that should be addressed by instrumental variables methods. Based on these results,
it can be considered that Model 5 is more appropriate than the other models. Based
on the results from Model 5, the new findings are summarized as follows.
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First, based on the results of Model 1, it is shown that the probability of partici-
pating in volunteer activity is smaller for women than for men; however, when the
heterogeneity problem and the other endogeneity problem are addressed simultane-
ously (Model 5), the coefficient of the female dummy variable is not statistically
significant. This suggests that the influence of unobservable factors—such as indi-
viduals’ preferences and social participation ability—is greater; when these factors
are not considered, the results may reflect an estimation bias.
Second, for the other determinants of volunteer activity,
(1) The probability of participating in volunteer activity is 20.8% points lower for
the working group than for the non-working group. A trade-off relationship
between market work and social activity is indicated. The results are consis-
tent with those of Atoda et al. (1999), Atoda and Fukushige (2000), Yamauchi
(2001), Carlin (2001), Ono (2006), and Moriyama (2007).
(2) The probability of participating in volunteer activity is 42.2% points higher
for the highly educated group than for the low-educational level group. These
results are consistent with those of Vaillancourt (1994), Freeman (1997), and
Ma and Ono (2013).
(3) The probabilities of participating in volunteer activity are higher for the high-
income group, for the pensioner group, and for the group transferring their
pension income to their children. This suggests that the higher the level of
incomeorwealth, the higher the probability of participating in volunteer activity.
It is confirmed that the probability of participating in volunteer activity is higher
for the group with high unearned income than for the group with low unearned
income. These results are consistent with those of Menchik and Weisbrod
(1987), Vaillancourt (1994), and Ma and Ono (2013). The consumption model
is supported for individuals aged 45–69 in China.
(4) The coefficient of the number of children is a negative value, both caring for
grandchildren and parents are positive values, and they are all statistically signif-
icant. This indicates that a higher number of children decreases the probability
of participating in volunteer activity, but the availability of family care increases
the probability of participating in volunteer activity. The results for the number of
children are consistent with those of Atoda et al. (1999), Atoda and Fukushige
(2000), Yamauchi (2001), Ono (2006), Moriyama (2007), and Ma and Ono
(2013). However, the results for family care (grandchildren care, parent care)
are not consistent with those of Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), Morgan et al.
(1977), and Vaillancourt (1994). The reason may be as follows. The analyzed
objects in previous studies included younger generations with younger children
who need more parental (particularly mothers’) care, but the analyzed objects
in this study are individuals aged 45–69. The time constraints of work and
family care differ by generation—younger, middle-aged, or older—therefore,
the influence of family care on volunteer activity participation may differ for
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each age group. In addition, it may be that family caregivers have more altru-
istic values and motivation to provide more volunteer support to others than
non-family caregivers do. Ma and Ono (2013) found that, in Japan, the prob-
ability of participating in the volunteer labor supply is higher for those with
strong altruistic values.
(5) The probability of participating in volunteer activity for those aged 45–49 is
16.5% points, which is 41.0% points lower than for those aged 50–59 and 60–
69. This suggests that age negatively affects the probability of participating in
volunteer activity, indicating that the probability of participating in volunteer
activity decreases with age.
(6) The probability of participating in volunteer activity is higher for those who
are healthy than for those with poor health (16.8%, 21.9%, 25.7% and 38.3%
points higher for fair, good, very good and excellent health groups). These results
indicate that the probability of participating in volunteer activity is higher for
the healthy group than for the group in poor health. These results are consistent
with those of Atoda et al. (1999) and Ma and Ono (2013).
6.4.2 Gender Gap of Determinants of Volunteer Activity
Participation
To compare differences in the mechanism of participation in volunteer activity by
gender, we employ the estimations for groups of women and men. Estimations using
the random effects (RE) model or random effects and IVmethod (RE_IV) by age and
region are performed to address the heterogeneities of different groups. The results
of the tests for weak instrumental variables and endogeneity, indicate that the RE
model is appropriate for the female group, and the RE_IV model is appropriate for
the male. The results by using these models are summarized in Table 6.3.
The results indicate that all six factors influence the probability of participating in
volunteer activity for both women and men, but the influences of these factors differ
by gender. Notably,
(1) Market work negatively affects the probability of participating in volunteer
activity for women (−0.422), while work is not statistically significant for men.
This suggests that the negative effect of work is greater for women than for men.
The results can be explained as follows. Family responsibilities are greater for
women than for men. For example, in general, housework hours are longer
for women than for men, and the problem of work–family conflict may be
more severe for women than for men; therefore, the negative effect of work on
participation in social activity is greater for women than for men.
(2) Education positively affects volunteer activity participation for both women and
men; the effect of education is greater for women than for men.
(3) Both income level and transfer of income to children positively affect partici-
pation in volunteer activity for both women and men.
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Table 6.3 Determinants of volunteer activity participation by female and male groups
(1) Female (2) Male
RE RE
dy/dx z-value dy/dx z-value
Work −0.422** −2.19 0.118 0.69
Education (Low-education)
Middle-education 0.161*** 2.80 0.149*** 3.35
High-education 0.554*** 4.72 0.350*** 3.93
Income 0.038* 1.93 0.102*** 5.52
Pension 0.079* 1.63 0.062 1.24
Transfer to children 0.224*** 6.63 0.269*** 8.55
Number of children −0.013 −0.86 −0.038** −2.54
Grandchildren care −0.011 −0.32 0.124*** 3.84
Parent care 0.404*** 7.49 0.329*** 6.62
Age (age45–49)
Age50–59 −0.136*** −3.08 −0.204*** −5.14
Age60–69 −0.421*** −6.39 −0.376*** −6.12
Health status (Poor)
Fair 0.194*** 4.13 0.149*** 3.13
Good 0.163*** 2.62 0.254*** 4.47
Vey good 0.323*** 4.95 0.210*** 3.48
Excellent 0.396*** 2.87 0.358*** 3.01
Control variables Yes Yes
Number of obs 13,761 14,702
Number of groups 8,221 8,287
Likelihood-ratio test of
rho = 0
chibar2(01) = 43.15 chibar2(01) = 104.14




(P = 0.000) (P = 0.000)
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 0.385 0.106
(P = 0.535) (P = 0.774)
Source Calculated based on CHARLS2011–2015
Note (1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) The random effects probit regression model (RE) is used for female group, and the random
effects probit regression and instrument variable methods (RE_IV) is used for male group
(3) Control variables include urban, having spouse and survey year dummy variables. The results
of control variables are not expressed in this table
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(4) Although the coefficient of the number of children is a negative value for
men, it is not statistically significant for women. Parental caregiving posi-
tively affects participation in volunteer activity for both women and men. In
addition, receiving a pension may increase the probability of participating in
volunteer activity for men. This suggests that the influence of family factors on
volunteering is greater for men than for women.
(5) The probability of participating in volunteer activity decreases with age for both
women and men.
(6) Better health status positively affects volunteer activity participation for both
women and men.
6.5 Conclusions
This study investigates the determinants of participation in volunteer activity of
individuals aged 45–69 in China. It uses the longitudinal data of the China Health
and Retirement Longitudinal Survey (CHARLS) from 2011 to 2015. The random
effects (RE) model and instrumental variables (IV) methods are used to address the
unobserved heterogeneity and other endogeneity problems. The main findings are as
follows.
First, the probability of participating in volunteer activity is smaller for women
than for men. However, when the endogeneity problem are addressed, the coefficient
of the female dummy variable is not statistically significant. This suggests that the
influenceof unobservable factors—such as individuals’ preferences and abilities—on
the gender gap of participation in volunteer activity is greater.
Second, for the determinants of participating in volunteer activity, the results indi-
cate that, in general, (1) market work may decrease the probability of participating in
volunteer activity. (2) The probability of participating in volunteer activity is higher
for the well-educated group than for the less-educated group. (3) The probability
of volunteer activity participation is higher for the high-income group than for the
low-income group. (4) A greater number of children decreases the probability of
participating in volunteer activity, but family care increases the probability of partic-
ipating in volunteer activity. (5) The probability of participating in volunteer activity
decreases as age increases. (6) The probability of participating in volunteer activity
is higher for the healthy group than for the group in poor health.
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Third, the results indicate that the influence of determinant factors on participating
in volunteer activity is different by gender. For example, the negative influence of
work on participation in volunteer activity is greater for women than for men.
Two significant policy implications are indicated by these results. First, participa-
tion in labor market work negatively affects participation in volunteer activity. There
is a trade-off relationship between working hours and leisure (volunteer activity),
particularly for women. This may be because the responsibility of work at home
(e.g., child care, parent care) is greater for women than for men.10 Therefore, accom-
modating both work and leisure is more difficult for women; in other words, work–
family conflicts may be greater for women than for men. The probability of partici-
pating in social activity decreases as working hours are lengthened, particularly for
female workers. Work–life balance policies, including the policy to promote men’s
participation in housework and family, and the mandatory family care leave system
may increase women’s participation in social activity. Nevertheless, the introduction
of flexible systems of managing working hours (e.g., part-time work, job sharing,
flexible working hours systems, or revising excessive overtime work) is imperative.
Second, the results suggest that the higher the unearned income, the higher the
probability of participating in volunteer activity. Income inequalitymay contribute to
the gap in volunteer activity participation. A low income may decrease participation
in social activity, which may decrease social capital and increase the risk of social
alienation. How to support the low-income group’s participation in social activity,
thereby increasing their well-being, is an important issue for the government.
Finally, the limitations of this study should be clarified. This study uses panel data
(CHARLS from 2011 to 2015) to provide an empirical analysis of the gender gap in
volunteer activity participation for individuals aged 45–69. The survey target objects
of the CHARLS are individual aged 45 and older; therefore, samples in this study do
not include younger generations. Further research to compare younger generations
with middle-aged and older generations should be considered in the future. Even
more detailed analysis of factors on the volunteer demand side is needed for China.
Notes
1. According to Snyder and Omoto (2008), volunteer activity is defined as “freely
chosen and deliberate helping activities that extend over time, are engaged in
without expectation of reward or other compensation and often through formal
organizations, and that are performed on behalf of causes or individuals who
desire assistance.”
2. For detailed descriptions of the theories of volunteering, please refer to Haski-
Leventhal (2009), Hustinx et al. (2010), and Snyder and Omoto (2008).
3. For literature review of empirical studies of volunteering, please refer to Smith
(1994), Bekkers and Wiepking (2010), and Wilson (2012).
6.5 Conclusions 139
4. Please refer toMa andOno (2013) for a more detailed overview of the empirical
research on volunteer activity.
5. Menchik andWeisbrod (1987) conducted aTobit analysis of determining factors
of volunteer activity hours, using data from a survey conducted byMorgan et al.
(1977). Vaillancourt (1994) employed a probit regression analysis of deter-
mining factors of the probability of participating in volunteer activity, using
survey data from Canada’s 1987 Labor Force Survey (LFS).
6. In an analysis focusing onmarriedwomen,Carlin (2001) used data froma1975–
1976 US survey on non-work time to conduct a probit regression analysis of the
probability of participating in volunteer activity. Carlin estimated the volunteer
activity time function, considering the selection bias based on the choice of
whether to participate in volunteer activity.
7. The 2SRI model was advocated first by Hausman (1978), and then it was used
by Blundell and Smith (1989). Newey (1987), Rivers and Vuong (1988), Newey
and McFadden (1994), and Terza et al. (2005, 2008) pointed out that the SRI
model can be used in binary variable analyses and can be considered to be an
expansion of the 2SLS model for binary variable analyses.
8. To check for robustness, the only information used to define volunteer activity
is the individual’s responses to “Done voluntary or charity work”; results using
this narrow definition of volunteer activity are similar to those using the broad
definition in this study.
9. The low-education category includes those with no formal education, those
who did not finish primary school, those who were homeschooled, and those
completing elementary school; the middle-education category includes those
who completed junior high school, senior high school, and vocational school;
the highly educated category includes those who attended college, university,
or graduate school.
10. For the gender gap in home responsibilities, such as child care and parent care,
please refer to Chaps. 2 and 3 of this book.
Appendix
See Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4 Probability of work (first-stage estimation in the IV methods)
(1) Probit (2) Random effects probit
dy/dx z-value dy/dx z-value
Formal retirement −0.293*** −26.37 −1.351*** −22.55
Female −0.148*** −28.53 −0.880*** −23.17
Education (Low-education)
Middle-education 0.003 0.33 −0.004 −0.08
High-education 0.058*** 3.57 0.330*** 2.77
Age (age45–49)
Age50–59 −0.076*** −9.98 −0.433*** −9.56
Age60–69 −0.187*** −19.38 −0.993*** −17.57
Having spouse 0.090*** 9.34 0.477*** 8.37
Health status (Poor)
Poor 0.122*** 19.71 0.618*** 16.75
Fair 0.119*** 16.47 0.769*** 14.97
Good 0.119*** 15.20 0.780*** 13.63
Excellent 0.121*** 6.48 0.846*** 6.06
Urban −0.187*** −22.36 −0.947*** −19.08
Grandchildren care −0.032*** −6.12 −0.151*** −4.86
Parent care 0.044*** 4.80 0.223*** 4.08
Number of children −0.001 −0.54 −0.009 −0.6
Transfer to children 0.058*** 10.81 0.274*** 8.83
Income −0.027*** −8.96 −0.121*** −6.92
Pensioner −0.021*** −2.88 −0.152*** −3.84
Survey year (y2011)
y2013 0.020*** 3.11 0.110*** 3.23
y2015 0.013* 1.93 0.027 0.74
Number of obs 28,463 28,463
Number of groups 16,508
Likelihood-ratio test of rho = 0 chibar2(01) = 1512.84
Pseudo R2 0.200
Prob > = chi2 0.000 0.000
Source Calculated based on CHARLS2011-2015.
Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
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Part III
Impact of Policy on Women’s Labour
Market Outcomes in China
Chapter 7
The Impact of Higher Education
Expansion Policy on the Wages of Female
and Male College Graduates
Abstract Based on the quasi-natural experiment methods (DID method and DDD
method), using six waves longitudinal survey data of the China Health and Nutrition
Survey, this study investigates the influence of the Higher Education Expansion
Policy (HEEP) on the wage levels of young college graduates and compare the
different policy influences by gender. The results indicate that the HEEP does not
affect the wage levels of young college graduates significantly; the HEEP decreased
the wage level of new college graduates in the short term, whereas the negative effect
disappears in the long term for both female and male younger workers; the gender
differences in the impacts of the policy on the wage levels of new college graduates
are smaller.
Keywords Higher education expansion policy · College graduates · Gender ·
Wage · China
7.1 Introduction
China’s planned economic system was reformed after 1978. A set of new poli-
cies were implemented by the Chinese government, and China experienced great
economic growth which achieved an average GDP growth rate of around 10% during
the 1990s and 2000s. In 1999, the Higher Education Expansion Policy (HEEP) was
implemented by the government. Along with the policy implementation, the number
of college graduates increased from 1.08 million in 1998 to 6.381 million in 2013
(NBS 2016).1 According to the general market equilibrium mechanism, when labor
demand is consistent, an increase of the college graduate labor supply in the short
term may decrease the graduate wage level (negative effect); whereas the increase
of college graduate workers may promote technological innovation and increase
economic growth. When the labor demand for college graduates increases greatly
with economic growth or technological progress, the college graduate wage level
This chapter is a revised and developed version of Ma, X. (2019). The impact of higher education
expansion policy on the wage of college graduates in China. International Journal of Economics
and Finance, 11(5), 68–84. Copyright © reprinted by permission of the Journal of International
Journal of Economics and Finance.
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may increase even after the implementation of the HEEP (positive effect). Thus, the
influence of the policy is not clear and it deserves empirical investigation.
This study employs a quasi-experiment method based on the DIDmethod (Differ-
ence in difference method) and DDDmethod (triple differences method) to estimate
the impact of the HEEP on college graduates’ wages in China, and compare of the
differences of impacts by female and male groups. It uses data from a longitudinal
survey data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) conducted from
1997 to 2011. These analyses build on the findings of relevant published research.
This chapter is structured as follows: Sect. 7.2 introduces the implementation of
higher education expansion policy, Sect. 7.3 introduces the channels by which the
HEEP y can affect college graduates wage, and introduces previous empirical studies
on the issue. Section 7.4 gives the framework of the empirical analysis, including
models and datasets. Section 7.5 presents estimated results and explains these results.
Section 7.6 summarizes the conclusions.
7.2 Hight Education Expansion Policy in China During
the Economic Transition Period
The Chinese government promoted the enrollment of compulsory education and
higher education since the planned economy period of the 1950s. This study focuses
on the HEEP during the market-oriented economy period (transition period) as
follows.
In 1999, the State Council approved the Plan of Revitalizing Education in the
Twenty-First Century proposed by theMinistry of Education to expand higher educa-
tion enrollment. The plan included various strategies to encourage universities to set
up multiple campuses as well as instituting the private colleges. The plan called for
an increase in public education expenditures, especially in tertiary education. The
proposal aimed at an increase in the gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education, a rise
in the student-teacher ratio, and an increase in state educational funding. A target
was set in the plan for China to reach a tertiary enrollment ratio of 15% by 2010,
defined as “mass higher education” (Trow 1972, 1973). In addition, in 2004, the
Chinese State Council passed A Plan of Education Revitalization 2003–2007. This
plan focused on the improvement of teaching, mainly for universities on the “985”
and “211” lists. It emphasized the reform of the teaching and evaluation system, and
the implementation of the Improvement of New Graduates Employment Program
policy. It required the higher education system to prepare new graduates for the jobs
market. In 2010, theNational Outline for Medium and Long-term Reform and Devel-
opment (2010–2020)was published. This plan sought to improve teaching, scientific
research, and the social relevance of education, and to let the total number of enrolled
college student increase to 33 million by 2020: this indicates that higher education
expansion will continue.
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China’s higher education developed rapidly with the implementation of these
polices (see Fig. 7.1). From 2000 to 2011 the enrollment of regular college2 students
expanded from 5.56 to 26.25 million, and annual college graduate students increased
from 0.95 to 6.81 million. From 2000 to 2015 enrollment of senior high school
students expanded from 12.01 to 23.74 million, and annual college graduate students
increased from 30.15 to 79.77 million. It is observed that with the implementation of
the HEEP, both the students and graduates of college and senior high school increase
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Fig. 7.1 Numbers of students in schools and graduates from 1990 to 2015. Source Based on data
from China Statistics Yearbook 2016
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greatly. It is thought that the increase in the higher education labor supply affects the
employment of young graduates.
7.3 Literature Review
7.3.1 The Channels of the Impact of Higher Education
Expansion Policy on the Wages of College Graduates
How does the HEEP affect the wage level of new college graduates? Based on
economic theories, both positive and negative effects can be considered as follows.
First, based on the generalmarket equilibriummechanism,when the labor demand
is constant, the increase of new college graduates supply in the short term may
decrease the college graduate wage level (negative effect). Whereas, when economic
growth is strong or technological innovation is progressing, the increase of demand
for higher education and highly-skilled workers is greater than the supply, the wage
level for college graduates may not change or may even increase during policy
implementation (positive effect).
Second, according to human capital theory (Becker 1964;Mincer 1974), when the
increase in productivity of a higher education worker is greater than that for workers
with a low- and middle-education levels, the wage level which is set by the firm may
be more for the worker with a higher education than for low- and middle- education
worker (positive effect).
Third, according to signal theory (Spence 1976), the education level can be used
as a sign by which the firm can identify the ability of an employee. In the absence of a
better way for the firm to identify an employee’s actual ability, the firm may evaluate
and judge the worker’ ability based on the employee’s educational attainment. When
the firm believes the college graduates are the most productive employees than the
counterparts, the wage level may be higher for college graduates (positive effect).
However, when the number of college graduates increases, the signal function may
lead the firm to recruit college graduates to substitute the high school graduates and
recruit graduates with second or postgraduate degrees to fill jobs formerly given
to college graduates: this may cause the wage of the college graduates decreased
(negative effect).
Based on these theories and hypotheses the influence of the higher education
expansion policy on thewage of college graduates is not clear. Therefore, an empirical
study is needed.
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7.3.2 Previous Empirical Studies on the Issue
For the empirical study results on the impact of the HEEP on the labor market, we
summarize its impact on wage as follows.3
He (2009) used Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) data to estimate the
education return from 1991 to 2006 based on the OLS, and shows that the education
effects on wage (education return) decreased from 2004 to 2006. He points out that
the higher education expansion policy may affect the wage level of higher education
graduates. Chang and Xiang (2013) analyzed the change of education return from
1989 to 2009 using CHNS data. Based on a Heckman two step model, they estimate
the education return for the pre-policy period (1989–1993, 1997, 2000) and post-
policy period (2004, 2006, 2009) groups, and the group aged 19–26 and the group
aged27–55.They found that compared to the pre-policy period, thewagegapbetween
college and senior high school graduates increased during the post-policy period. It
seems that the policy positively affects the wage level of college graduates. Using
data from the China Urban Labor Survey (UCLS) in 2001, 2005, and 2010, Gao and
Smyth (2015) estimated the education return based on OLS and instrument variables
methods, they indicate that the education return increased from 2001 to 2005 and
2010.Xia et al. (2016) employedCHNSdata from2000 to 2009 to estimate education
return based on the quantile regression model and Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (FFL)
decomposition method. They find the education return increased from 2000 to 2009
and the education return is higher for the high-wage group than the middle and
low wage groups. It should be noticed that these previous empirical studies did not
consider the unobserved heterogeneity problem among various groups.Wu and Zhao
(2010) addressed this and estimate the impact of the HEEP on wage directly based
on a DID method and DDD method using data from the China Urban Labor Survey
(CULS) for 2002 and Chinese 1% Population Census data. It is found that the policy
decreases the wage level based on the DID method whereas the impact of the policy
on wages are not statistically significant based on DDD method Yao et al. (2014)
also estimated the policy influence based on DID and DDD methods using China
Urban Household Income Survey data from 1998 to 2005. They find that the higher
education expansion policy negatively affects the wage of young college graduates,
but the negative effect decreases in the long term. Wu and Zhao (2010), and Yao
et al. (2014) used the same DID and DDD methods to find a different outcome for
the impact of policy on wage. This suggests that more research is needed on this
topic.
7.3.3 Contributions of This Study
Although the previous empirical studies investigate the impact of higher education
expansion on the wages of college graduates, the empirical studies based on an
experiment analysis method are scarce. There remain further areas to be researched.
The main contributions of this current study can be summarized as follows.
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First, the impact of policy may vary according to period. For example, in a perfect
competition market, in a short-term, the dramatic increase of college graduate labor
supply may affect wage level of new college graduates. Whereas in a long-term, the
influence of the policy may decrease because the labor demand for college graduates
may increase with economic growth or industrial structure upgrading. Yet there is no
empirical study based on DID and DDD methods which scrutinizes the short term
and long-term effects. This study tries to address this need.
Second, because there remains the gender wage gap in China (Gustafsson and Li
2000; Li and Ma 2006, 2015; Ma et al. 2013; Ma 2018a, b), to consider the gender
disparities of the family responsibility, labor participation behavior and work efforts,
this study also compares the policy influence by gender.
Third, as the one of features of Chinese economy, the Chinese labor market is
segmented by various sectors and regions. For example, due to the large regional
disparity in China, the impact of the policy may differ by regions. This study also
analyzes the effect of the policy in the Eastern, Central, and Western Regions. In
additions, there remains the discrimination against migrants by the Hukou system
(Meng and Zhang 2001; Song and Appleton 2006; Ma 2018c), we also investigate
the policy effects by the rural Hukou and urban Hukou resident groups.
Fourth, a set of robustness checks is employed to test the analysis appropriateness.
These results may develop previous studies on the issue.
7.4 Methodology and Data
7.4.1 Model
The DID method is used to investigate the impact of higher education expansion
policy on wages:
Yit = a + β1Yeart + β2Treatit + β3Treatit ∗ Yeart + β4Xit + εi t (7.1)
The object analyzed by the DID method is the college graduates aged 21–40. In
Eq. (7.1), Y is hourly wage logarithms, i stands the individual, t is years, Year is
post-policy period (2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 in this study), Treat is the treatment
group, X includes the individual characteristics variables (e.g. family numbers, health
status, and gender),Hukou, and the regional characteristics variables. a is the constant
term, and ε is the error term. β1–β4 represent the estimated coefficient for each
variable. This study uses the survey years before the implementation of the higher
education expansion policy (1997, and 2000) as the pre-policy period and the years
of 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 as the post-policy period. In this study the treatment
group is defined as college graduates aged 21–25 and the control group is defined as
college graduates aged 31–40.
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The DDDmethod is shown by Eq. (7.2). The object analyzed by the DDDmethod
includes both college and senior high school graduates aged 21–40.
Yit = a + β1Yeart + β2age21−25i t + β3Colleit + β4agei21−25t ∗ Colleit ∗ Yeart + β5X ′i t + βλλi t + εi t
(7.2)
In Eq. (7.2), age21−25 is the group aged 21–25, Colle is the college graduate
group, X ′ includes the individual characteristics variables, the regional characteristics
variables and other variables including the interaction item of age and year dummy
variable, the interaction item of college graduate and year dummy variable, and the
interaction item of college graduate and age dummy variable.
In the Eqs. (7.1) and (7.2), β3 and β4 represents the estimated coefficient of DID
or DDD items.When β3 and β4 is a negative value, and it is statistically significant, it
indicates that the implementation of the higher education expansion policy reduces
the wage level of young college graduate, and vice versa.
A sample selection bias problem may exist therefore a DID method or DDD
method based on the Heckman two-step model is also used to correct the bias
(Heckman 1979). In Eqs. (7.1) and (7.2), the inverseMills’ ratio λ is an adjusted item.
λ is calculated by λ = φ(γt Zit )/(γt Zit ), φ(·), (·) is a normal density function
and distribution function based on the probit regression model, Z is factors which
affect the employment status selection (e.g. to work or not to work), γ represents the
coefficients of these factors.
7.4.2 Data
This study employs six waves (1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011) longitu-
dinal data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) conducted from
1997 to 2011. CHNS is a nationwide longitudinal survey conducted by the Carolina
Population Center at the University of North Carolina and the National Institute
for Nutrition and Health (NINH, former National Institute of Nutrition and Food
Safety) at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The survey took
place over seven days using a multistage, random cluster process to draw a sample
of about 7,200 households with over 30,000 individuals in fifteen provinces and
municipal cities that vary substantially in geography, economic development, public
resources, and health indicators. Although the longitudinal survey began in 1989 this
study uses the survey data from 1997 to 2011 because the higher education expan-
sion policy was implemented in 1999. This study uses samples from 11 provinces
and municipalities: Beijing, Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Shandong,
Hernan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou.
The independent variable is the logarithms value of hourly wage. The wage is
the earning income including the basic wage and the allowance, and not including
the bonuses. The nominal wage is adjusted to the real wage by the 2011 CPI
(Consumption Price Index).
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Figure 7.2 shows both the monthly wage and hourly wage from 1989 to 2011.
Because the higher education expansion policy was implemented in 1999, the effect
of the policy on wage appears in the period after 2002 for college graduates whose
degree takes for three years and 2003 for college graduates whose degree takes for
more than four years. Thus the period from 1989 to 2000 is the pre-policy period and
the survey period from 2004 to 2011 is the post-policy period. Themonthly wage and
hourly wage are calculated for three groups: college graduates aged 21–25; college
graduates aged 31–40, and senior high school graduates aged 21–25. The change
Panel A: Monthly wage
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Fig. 7.2 Wage by age and education groups from 1989 to 2011. Source Calculated based on
CHNS 1989–2011
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tendency of wages from 1989 to 2011 is similar for Panel A (monthly wage) and
Panel B (hourly wage). It is observed that as the wage increased from 1989 to 2011,
the wage gaps between the three groups are different. It indicates that the work hours
may be different between the three groups. To consider the influence of work hours,
the hourly wages are used in the study. The main results of Panel B (hourly wage)
in Fig. 7.2 are as follows.
First, when compare the college graduates aged 21–25 with the college graduates
aged 31–40, it is observed that except in 1993 and 1997, the wage is higher for
the college graduates aged 21–25 than for the college graduates aged 31–40 during
both pre-policy period and post-policy period. However, for college graduates aged
21–25, the wage decrease is greater for 2004 and 2009. It is indicated that the higher
education expansion policy seems likely to reduce the wage gaps in both 2004 and
2009. Excepting the period of world financial crisis in 2007, the higher education
expansion policy seems to affect the wage of young college graduates in a short term.
Second, to compare the college graduates aged 21–25 with the senior high school
graduates aged 21–25, even though the wage gaps between these two groups are
different by periods, the relations between these two groups are not observed clearly.
For example, during the pre-policy period, the wage is higher for senior high school
graduates aged from 21 to 25 than the counterpart, whereas the wage is higher for
college graduates aged 21–25. Moreover, during the post-policy period, the wage is
higher for college graduates aged 21–25 in 2006 and it is lower in 2009 and 2011
than for the counterpart.
7.4.3 Variable Setting
The main dependent variables are constructed as follows (see Appendix Table 7.11).
First, Year is a set of year dummy variables. In the study, 1997, 2000 is the pre-
policy period, and 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 is the post-policy period. DID in the
Eq. (7.1) is the interaction term of the two variables used: the post-policy period
and treatment group dummy variables. The treatment group is defined as the college
graduates aged 21–25.DDD in Eq. (7.2) is the interaction term of the three variables
used: the post-policy period dummy, the group aged 21–25 years old dummy, and
the college graduate dummy variables (Year * Age21-25 * Colle).
Second, for the other factors, (1) the years of experience and health status are
used as human capital. (2) The male dummy is used to control the gender gap in
labor market. (3) To control the influence of occupation on wage, the occupation
dummy variables (manager, technician, clerk, agriculture job, high-level manufac-
turing job, low-level manufacturing job, service job, the other job) are constructed.
(4) To consider the labor market segmentation by various groups and regions, the
private sector dummy, the urban areas, and region blocks (Eastern, Central, Western)
dummy variables are constructed.
Third, the first-step in the Heckman two-step model is a work probability func-
tion (e.g. work or not to work). The factors that affect labor participation behavior
are also constructed. They are the individual variables including age, number of
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family members, gender, health status, urban hukou, and the province level variables
including regional ratio of fixed asset investment to GDP, ratio of tertiary industry to
GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, and GDP per capita.4
It is thought that the results may be sensitive by the treatment group setting. In
this study, the rule to distinguish the treatment group and control group is based on
age categories. To compare the impact of the higher education expansion policy on
wage by various age category groups, an analysis by the following function is used:
Yit = a + β1yeari + β2ageit + β3a
30∑
a=21
ageit ∗ yeart + β4Xit + εi t (7.3.1)
Yit = a + β1yeari + β2ageit + β3Colleit + β3a
30∑
a=21
ageit ∗ yeart ∗ Colleit + β4Xit + εi t
(7.3.2)
In Eqs. (7.3.1) and (7.3.2), i stands for the individual, t for years, year for
policy implementation years (2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 in this study), age for
the age dummy, X for the individual characteristics variables (e.g. family numbers,
health status, gender), the regional characteristics variables and other variables. In
the Eq. (7.3.2), X also includes the interaction item of age and year dummy variable,
the interaction item of college graduate and year dummy variable, and the interaction
item of college graduate and age dummy variable. a is the constant term, and ε is
the error term. β represents the estimated coefficient for each variable. The results
of β3a are summarized in Table 7.1.
The results indicate that although all coefficients are not statistically significant,
the higher education expansion policy negatively influences the wage of college
graduates aged 21–25; whereas it almost positively affects the wage of the university
graduates aged 26–30. It is observed that the influences of the policy are different
between the group aged 21–25 and the group aged 26–30. The results of estimation
2 showed a similar tendency, the influence of the policy is negative for the treatment
group (group aged 21–25), whereas they are almost positive for the other group.
It is confirmed that to define the treatment group as college graduates aged 21–25
is appropriate. However, the impacts of the policy on the college graduate group
aged 26–30 are various, it indicates that the estimated results may differ by the
treatment group setting. The results of a set of robustness checks for age groups will
be discussed in Sect. 7.5.
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Table 7.1 Test results for treatment group setting
Model 1: DID Model 2: DDD
coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Age 21 −0.065 0.265 −0.079 0.399
Age 22 −0.116 0.194 −0.259 0.305
Age 23 −0.110 0.206 −0.237 0.324
Age 24 0.123 0.164 0.272 0.259
Age 25 −0.079 0.106 −0.031 0.233
Age 26 −0.015 0.125 0.610** 0.271
Age 27 0.033 0.098 0.115 0.235
Age 28 0.220** 0.095 0.106 0.238
Age 29 0.033 0.087 0.274 0.227
Age 30 0.058 0.084 0.151 0.220
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) The treatment group, age, year, male, health status, occupation, private sector, regular worker,
urban hukou, province dummy variables are estimated, these results are not expressed in this table.
The DID item and DDD item coefficients are only shown in this table
7.5 Results
7.5.1 The Impact of Higher Education Expansion Policy
on the Wage of College Graduates
The calculated results based on DID method are shown in Table 7.2. The treat-
ment group is college graduates aged 21–25, the control group is college graduates
aged 31–40. 2000 is the pre-period of policy implementation, and 2004, 2006, 2009,
2011 are the post-periods. The values of coefficients of DID items are from−0.109 to
−3.447, it is shown that the HEEP decreased the average wage level of young college
graduate from 2004 to 2011. In addition, to compare with 2004 (−0.114) and 2006
(−0.109), the negative values are greater for 2009 (−3.447) and 2011 (−3.385). It
indicates that the policy influences differ by the short term and the long term after
the policy implementation.
The calculated results based on a DIDmethod shown in Table 7.2 did not consider
the other factors which may affect wage. When the other factors are controlled, does
the higher education expansion policy affect the wage level of college graduates?
Tables 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5 summarizes the econometric analysis results. Panel A is the
results based on DID method, and Panel B is the results based on DDD method. The
main findings are as follow:
First, based on the results shown in Table 7.3, the coefficients of DDD item are not
statistically significant in both Panel A and Panel B. It indicates that, generally, the
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Table 7.2 Calculated result
based on the DID method
Panel A
a:2000 b:2004 D(b-a)
T: Treatment group 8.685 7.584 −1.101
(10.000) (4.640)
C: Control group 8.865 7.878 −0.987
(9.675) (5.648)
D(T-C) −0.180 −0.294 −0.114
Panel B
a:2000 b:2006 D(b-a)
T: Treatment group 8.685 8.360 −0.325
(10.000) (5.256)
C: Control group 8.865 8.649 −0.216
(9.675) (11.857)
D(T-C) −0.180 −0.289 −0.109
Panel C
a:2000 b:2009 D(b-a)
T: Treatment group 8.685 11.258 2.573
(10.000) (7.168)
C: Control group 8.865 14.885 6.020
(9.675) (28.312)
D(T-C) −0.180 −3.627 −3.447
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) Values in parentheses are standard deviation
(2) Treatment group is the college graduates aged 21–25; Control
group is the college graduates aged 31–40
higher education expansion policy does not affect the average wage level of young
college graduates.
The results based on the quantile regression model are shown in Table 7.4. For
both low-wage (10th), middle-wage (30th, 60th) and high-wage (90th) groups, the
coefficients of DID item are not statistically significant. It suggests that the difference
of policy effect between various wage centile groups is small.
Finally, to compare the influence of the HEEP on wage by different periods (e.g. a
short term, or a long termafter the policy implementation), the year dummyvariable is
used and the results are summarized in Table 7.5. The results based on DID method
indicates that the higher education expansion policy negatively affected wages in
2004, whereas the coefficients of DID items are not statistically significant for 2006,
2009 and 2011. It indicates that theHEEPmay decrease thewage level of new college
graduates in the short term, whereas the negative effect disappears in the long term.
The reason for the results can be considered as follows. First, in the short term,
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Table 7.3 Results of the impact of the higher education expansion policy on the wage of college
graduates
Panel A: DID method
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.146 0.455 0.386 0.445 0.096 0.203
Year 0.683*** 0.243 0.757*** 0.219 0.586*** 0.098
DID −0.277 0.480 −0.397 0.462 −0.095 0.209
Exp. −0.113 0.078 −0.109 0.069 −0.043 0.031
Exp-sq. 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.004 0.003
Health −0.006 0.028 −0.007 0.013
Male 0.087 0.163 0.121* 0.070
Occupation (Clerk)
Manager 0.220 0.188 0.302*** 0.080
Technician −0.022 0.255 0.017 0.106
Agriculture −0.119 1.013 −0.044 0.682
Manufacturing job (H) −0.240 0.369 −0.156 0.155
Manufacturing job (L) −0.473 0.616 −0.071 0.285
Service 0.033 0.359 0.076 0.153
Others 0.033 0.277 0.034 0.127
Regular worker 0.022 0.079





Constants 2.205 0.342 2.0124 0.378 1.792*** 0.195
Inverse Mills ratio −2.833 1.177 −2.502 0.981 −1.030** 0.518
Observations 980 980 980
Prob > chi2 0.0321 0.056 0.000
Panel B: DDD method
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.038 0.407 0.140 0.430 −0.006 0.404
Year 0.234 0.215 0.277 0.215 0.005 0.209
College 0.503 0.344 0.338 0.340 0.228 0.302
Year * College 0.079 0.379 0.076 0.370 0.138 0.325
Year * Aged 21–25 0.113 0.489 0.128 0.524 0.234 0.475
(continued)
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Table 7.3 (continued)
Panel B: DDD method
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
College * Aged 21–25 −0.116 0.875 0.063 0.910 −0.011 0.846
DDD −0.146 1.015 −0.345 1.061 −0.200 0.963
Exp. 0.019 0.059 0.010 0.058 0.019 0.052
Exp-sq. −0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.004
Health −0.009 0.029 −0.018 0.026
Male −0.104 0.159 −0.112 0.142
Occupation (Clerk)
Manager 0.207 0.211 0.209 0.179
Technician 0.125 0.284 0.120 0.241
Agriculture 0.0111 0.436 0.037 0.471
Manufacturing job (H) −0.133 0.260 −0.127 0.227
Manufacturing job (L) −0.260 0.275 −0.218 0.249
Service −0.036 0.261 −0.062 0.230
Others −0.007 0.247 0.084 0.248
Regular worker 0.021 0.142





Constants 2.128*** 0.342 2.324*** 0.453 2.746*** 0.455
Inverse Mills ratio −5.347*** 1.526 −5.090*** 1.385 −4.213*** 1.088
Observations 4,064 4,064 4,064
Prob > chi2 0.151 0.547 0.778
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Heckman two step model is used. In the first step estimation, individual level variables including
the age, health status, number of family members, gender, noearned income, urban hukou, region
block (Central, Western Region), and region level variables including ratio of fixed asset investment
to GDP, ratio of tertiary industry to GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, and GDP per capita are estimated,
these results are not presented in this table
(3) In the second step examination, years of experience, health status, male, occupation, private
sector, regular worker, urban, and region dummy variables are also estimated, these results are not
presented in this table
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Table 7.4 Results of the impact of the higher education expansion policy on the wage of college
graduates by wage centiles
10th 30th 60th 90th
Treatment 0.255 0.254 0.102 −0.100
(0.548) (0.207) (0.180) (0.341)
Year 0.948*** 0.720** 0.630*** 0.445***
(0.241) (0.091) (0.079) (0.150)
DID −0.097 −0.028 −0.0226 −0.084
(0.581) (0.220) (0.191) (0.362)
Inverse Mills ratio −3.009* −2.779*** −3.005*** −2.617***
(1.658) (0.627) (0.545) (1.032)
Constants 0.627 1.209*** 1.859*** 2.825***
(0.425) (0.161) (0.140) (0.265)
Observations 980 980 980 980
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.146 0.1407 0.14
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) The coefficients, standard error and statistical significances are summarized in this table
(3) Heckman two step model is used. In the first step estimation, individual level variables including
the age, health status, number of family members, gender, noearned income, urban hukou, region
block (Central, Western Region), and region level variables including ratio of fixed asset investment
to GDP, ratio of tertiary industry to GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, and GDP per capita are estimated,
these results are not presented in this table
(4) In the second step examination, years of experience, health status, male, occupation, private
sector, regular worker, urban, and region dummy variables are also estimated, these results are not
presented in this table
(5) The quantile regression model is used
here 2004, the great increase of college graduates from 0.95 million in 2000 to 2.39
million in 2004 became a great shock of labor supply of higher education workers,
which may reduce the probability of labor participation for young college graduates
and decrease the higher education graduate group’s wage level. Second, in a long
term, with economic growth and technological progress, labor supply and demand
can be adjusted by the general equilibrium mechanism, and the negative effect of the
policy may become smaller or disappear.
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Table 7.5 Results of period effect of the impact of higher education expansion policy on the wage
of college graduates
Panel A: DID method
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.145 0.436 0.376 0.417 0.076 0.180
Year 0.690*** 0.233 0.766*** 0.205 0.607*** 0.085
DIDy2004 −0.585 0.620 −0.777 0.574 −0.550** 0.244
DIDy2006 −0.388 0.586 −0.576 0.559 −0.279 0.235
DIDy2009 −0.287 0.598 −0.318 0.576 0.008 0.240
DIDy2011 −0.085 0.523 −0.180 0.493 0.151 0.209
Constants 2.180*** 0.329 1.985*** 0.357 1.700*** 0.171
Inverse Mills ratio −2.714** 1.139 −2.341** 0.937 −0.760* 0.456
Observations 980 980 980
Prob > chi2 0.082 0.000 0.000
Panel B: DDD method
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.035 0.251 0.0992 0.259 −0.057 0.221
College 0.467 0.212 0.308 0.205 0.184 0.166
y2004 0.209 0.158 0.243 0.154 −0.001 0.129
y2006 0.094 0.160 0.133 0.156 −0.012 0.138
y2009 0.380*** 0.175 0.447*** 0.173 0.252 0.159
y2011 0.656*** 0.187 0.720*** 0.186 0.436** 0.188
Year * College 0.025 0.234 0.015 0.223 0.114 0.178
College * Aged
21–25
−0.033 0.540 0.134 0.548 0.067 0.463
Year * Aged 21–25 0.099 0.302 0.107 0.315 0.233 0.260
DDDy2004 −0.149 0.813 −0.334 0.816 −0.257 0.663
DDDy2006 0.088 0.784 −0.150 0.810 −0.083 0.647
DDDy2009 −0.117 0.799 −0.173 0.831 −0.133 0.659
DDDy2011 −0.220 0.696 −0.360 0.704 −0.227 0.571
Constants 1.769*** 0.240 1.876*** 0.307 2.131*** 0.326
Inverse Mills ratio −3.296*** 1.137 −3.060*** 1.029 −2.302*** 0.872




Panel B: DDD method
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Heckman two step model is used. In the first step estimation, individual level variables including
the age, health status, number of family members, gender, noearned income, urban hukou, region
block (Central, Western Region), and region level variables including ratio of fixed asset investment
to GDP, ratio of tertiary industry to GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, and GDP per capita are estimated,
these results are not presented in this table
(3) In the second step examination, years of experience, health status, male, occupation, private
sector, regular worker, urban, and region dummy variables are also estimated, these results are not
presented in this table
7.5.2 The Results of the Impact of the Higher Education
Expansion Policy on Wage by Gender
Does the impact of the HEEP differ by males and females? The results by gender
are summarized in Table 7.6. It indicates that in both male and female groups, the
impacts of the policy on wage are not statistically significant. It indicates that the
Table 7.6 Results of the impact of higher education expansion policy on wage by gender
Panel A: DID method
Female Male
coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.290 0.323 0.035 0.252
Year 0.622*** 0.138 0.641*** 0.127
DID −0.255 0.344 −0.060 0.264
Constants 1.655*** 0.249 1.829*** 0.236
Inverse Mills ratio −1.011** 0.470 0.247 0.612
Observations 408 572
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Panel B: DDD method
Female Male
coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment −0.144 0.671 0.069 0.428
Year −0.096 0.376 0.085 0.213
College 0.289 0.523 0.162 0.313
(continued)
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Table 7.6 (continued)
Panel B: DDD method
Female Male
coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Year * College 0.086 0.553 0.222 0.340
Year * Aged 21–25 0.077 1.570 −0.045 0.842
College * Aged 21–25 0.298 0.784 0.206 0.507
DDD −0.270 1.748 −0.189 0.973
Constants 2.943 2.301 2.235* 1.200
Inverse Mills ratio −1.446 1.615 −0.394 1.520
Observations 1,722 2,342
Prob > chi2 0.999 0.690
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Heckman two step model is used. In the first step estimation, individual level variables including
the age, health status, number of family members, gender, noearned income, urban hukou, region
block (Central, Western Region), and region level variables including ratio of fixed asset investment
to GDP, ratio of tertiary industry to GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, and GDP per capita are estimated,
these results are not presented in this table
(3) In the second step examination, years of experience, health status, occupation, private sector,
regularworker, urban, and region dummyvariables are also estimated, these results are not presented
in this table
gender disparities of the influence of the HEEP on wage is small. It may be caused
by that the gender gap for the young college group is smaller than for the middle age
or older age groups.
7.5.3 The Results of the Impact of the Higher Education
Expansion Policy on Wage by Region and Hukou
Groups
(1) The results by region
Table 7.7 summarizes the results by EasternRegion and no-EasternRegion (Western-
and Central Region). It is shown that although the policy effect is a negative value for
the Eastern Region and a positive value for the no-Eastern Region, these results are
not statistically significant. The results indicate that the difference of the impact of
the policy on college graduates wage between Eastern, Central and Western Region
groups is small.
Two reasons may be considered for the results. First, during the 2000s, the
Chinese government promoted the economic development in the Western, and
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Table 7.7 Results of the impact of the higher education expansion policy on wage by region
Panel A: DID method
East Central/West
coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.165 0.916 −0.050 0.253
Year 0.397 0.466 0.502*** 0.116
DID −0.060 0.933 0.221 0.295
Constants 2.401*** 0.861 1.361*** 0.260
Inverse Mills ratio −2.740 2.035 −0.172 0.390
Observations 533 447
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Panel B: DDD method
East Central/West
coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.197 0.577 −0.097 0.187
Year 0.045 0.321 0.213** 0.090
College 0.321 0.439 0.169 0.137
Year * College 0.049 0.460 0.175 0.151
Year * Aged 21–25 −0.022 1.113 0.067 0.397
College * Aged 21–25 −0.039 0.662 0.415 0.222
DDD −0.111 1.235 −0.313 0.466
Constants 2.880*** 0.579 1.637*** 0.202
Inverse Mills ratio −3.359*** 1.077 −1.572*** 0.450
Observations 1,712 2,352
Prob > chi2 0.796 0.000
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Heckman two step model is used. In the first step estimation, individual level variables including
the age, health status, number of family members, gender, noearned income, urban hukou, region
block (Central, Western Region), and region level variables including ratio of fixed asset investment
to GDP, ratio of tertiary industry to GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, and GDP per capita are estimated,
these results are not presented in this table
(3) In the second step examination, years of experience, health status, male, occupation, private
sector, regular worker, and urban dummy variables are also estimated, these results are not presented
in this table
Central Regions to reduce the regional disparity, and the GDP growth rate became
greater for theWestern andCentral Regions than for theEasternRegion. For example,
theGDP growth ratewas 7.8% for theWestern Region, 10.5% for the Central Region,
and 7.2% for the Eastern Region in 2009 (NBS 2010). Currently, economic growth
in Western and Central Regions may increase the college graduate labor demand in
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these regions. Second, with the deregulation of the registration system, labor migra-
tions between various regions became easier during the 2000s. Labor migration may
cause the various regional wage levels convergence.
(2) The results by hukou type
It is known that in China there remains the discrimination against migrants by the
Hukou system, and there persists the wage gap between the local urban hukou resi-
dents and the migrants with rural hukou in Chinese urban labor market. The analyses
for the rural hukou group and urban hukou group are summarized in Table 7.8. It
suggests that the policy positively affects thewageof themigrants (PanelA);whereas,
the policy negatively affects the wage of the local urban hukou residents (Panel B).
The reasons can be considered as follows. First, because there remains the discrim-
ination against migrants during both the pre-policy period and the post-policy period,
the wage is lower and the wage rise is smaller for the migrants (Ma 2018c). When
there maintains the discrimination against migrants, even after the HEEP was imple-
mented, for the migrant group, the wage gap of college graduates aged 21–25 and
the group aged 31–40, the wage gap between the college graduates and the senior
high school graduates, and the wage gap between pre-policy and post-policy may be
smaller than those for the urban residents. Therefore, the results in Panel A show that
the policy only negatively influenced thewage of local urban residents. Second, when
the human capital and other factors are constant, because the average wage level is
lower for migrants than local urban hukou residents, the labor demand for migrants
may increase, which causes the migrant college graduates’ wage rise during the post-
policy period. Therefore, as it is shown in Panel B, the policy positively affected the
Table 7.8 Results of the impact of higher education expansion policy on employment by hukou type
Panel A: DID method
Urban Rural
coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.213 0.210 −0.538 0.344
Year 0.633*** 0.108 0.406*** 0.135
DID −0.301 0.221 0.819** 0.374
Constants 1.975*** 0.180 1.514*** 0.291
Inverse Mills ratio −0.792* 0.515 −0.009 0.421
Observations 645 335
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000
Panel B: DDD method
Urban Rural
coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.126 0.130 −0.0133 0.401




Panel B: DDD method
Urban Rural
coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
University 0.490*** 0.106 0.267 0.323
Year * University −0.018 0.163 −0.007 0.346
Year * Aged 21–25 0.309 0.346 −0.555 1.010
University * Aged 21–25 −0.700*** 0.182 0.242 0.449
DDD −0.008* 0.238 0.451 1.123
Constants 1.975*** 0.180 2.819*** 0.883
Inverse Mills ratio −0.792* 0.515 −2.850*** 0.788
Observations 2,342 1,857
Prob > chi2 0.690 0.432
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Heckman two step model is used. In the first step estimation, individual level variables including
the age, health status, number of family members, gender, noearned income, urban hukou, region
block (Central, Western Region), and region level variables including ratio of fixed asset investment
to GDP, ratio of tertiary industry to GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, and GDP per capita are estimated,
these results are not presented in this table
(3) In the second step examination, years of experience, health status, male, occupation, private
sector, regularworker, and region dummyvariables are also estimated, these results are not presented
in this table
wage of migrant groups. It indicates that there may remain the substitutions of labor
demand for the young college graduates between the migrants and local urban hukou
residents. More detailed study is needed on this issue.
7.5.4 Robustness Checks
(1) Using various treatment groups
Two types of treatment groups are used to investigate if the policy effect varies by
treatment group constructions. The results are summarized at Table 7.9. Estimation
1 is the analysis using the college graduates aged 21–27 as the treatment group.
Estimation 2 is the analysis using the college graduate aged 21–30 as the treatment
group. It is found that the results for these two varied treatment groups are similar:
the policy effects are not statistically significant. In comparison with the results of
Panel A in Table 7.3 which uses the same model, it is indicated that the estimated
results are sensitive for the treatment group setting.
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Table 7.9 Results using various treatment groups
Estimation 1
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.010 0.397 0.182 0.389 −0.016 0.156
Year 0.675*** 0.251 0.751*** 0.233 0.594*** 0.096
DID −0.225 0.415 −0.309 0.404 −0.073 0.163
Exp. −0.093 0.077 −0.092 0.071 −0.035 0.029
Exp-sq. 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.003
Health −0.007 0.028 −0.009 0.012
Male 0.078 0.162 0.110* 0.064
Occupation (Clerk)
Manager 0.235 0.186 0.3054*** 0.073
Technician 0.016 0.251 0.042 0.097
Agri. −0.095 1.077 −0.036 0.670
Manufacturing job (H) −0.239 0.379 −0.170 0.147
Manufacturing job (L) −0.256 0.541 0.041 0.228
Service −0.008 0.363 0.013 0.142
Others 0.061 0.277 0.065 0.118
Regular worker 0.002 0.073





Constants 2.167*** 0.346 1.984*** 0.390 1.797*** 0.187
Inverse Mills ratio −2.912** 1.307 −2.662** 1.137 −1.015* 0.580
Observations 1,116 1,116 1,116
Prob > chi2 0.057 0.066 0.000
Estimation 2
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment 0.010 0.397 0.223 0.463 0.046 0.286
Year 0.675*** 0.251 0.710** 0.329 0.554 0.207
DID −0.225 0.415 −0.213 0.480 −0.027 0.297
Exp. −0.093 0.077 −0.055 0.095 −0.024 0.058
Exp-sq. 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.009 0.003 0.006





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Male 0.039 0.205 0.055 0.125
Occupation (Clerk)
Manager 0.251 0.235 0.295** 0.141
Technician 0.056 0.320 0.070 0.189
Agri. 0.239 1.262 0.066 1.120
Manufacturing job (H) −0.182 0.462 −0.142 0.276
Manufacturing job (L) −0.317 0.664 −0.072 0.435
Service −0.073 0.461 −0.074 0.274
Others 0.090 0.360 0.080 0.233
Regular worker 0.015 0.138





Constants 2.167*** 0.346 2.040*** 0.509 1.975*** 0.362
Inverse Mills ratio −2.912** 1.307 −3.766*** 1.741 −2.201 1.413
Observations 1,454 1,454 1,454
Prob > chi2 0.531 0.872 0.872
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Heckman two step model is used. In the first step estimation, individual level variables including
the age, health status, number of family members, gender, noearned income, urban hukou, region
block (Central, Western Region), and region level variables including ratio of fixed asset investment
to GDP, ratio of tertiary industry to GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, and GDP per capita are estimated,
these results are not presented in this table
(3) In the second step examination, years of experience, health status, male, occupation, private
sector, regular worker, urban, and region dummy variables are also estimated, these results are not
presented in this table
Why is the policy effect different for the college graduate group aged 21–25, and
the group aged 21–27 or the group aged 21–30? It can be thought that a new college
graduate aged from 21–25 searches for his (her) work in the first career period.When
the labor demand is consistent, the increase of new college graduates labor supply
may reduce the wage level of this group easily and quickly. Thus the results for the
policy impact is more sensitive for the young college graduates who are aged 21–25
than for the group aged 21–27 or aged 21–30 years old.
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(2) The Placebo test
A placebo test is used to test the propriety of the DID/DDD methods used in the
study. It is thought that the higher education expansion policy greatly affects the
college graduate labor supply, whereas the influence of the policy on senior high
school graduates is smaller. Therefore, when the senior high school graduate sample
is used to take a similar analysis based on the DID method, the results should be
different to that shown in Panel A of Table 7.3. In the placebo test, the treatment
group is defined as the senior high school graduates aged 21–25, and the treatment
group is defined as the senior high school graduates aged 31–40. The results are
summarized in Table 7.10. It is found that the whole coefficients of DID items are
not statistically significant. It is clearly that these results are different from those
shown in Table 7.3.
Table 7.10 Results of the placebo test
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Treatment −0.539 0.416 −0.318 0.413 −0.342 0.394
Year 0.174 0.171 0.250 0.166 0.048 0.175
DID 0.237 0.306 0.206 0.313 0.223 0.304
Exp. −0.073 0.087 −0.061 0.086 −0.039 0.081
Exp-sq. 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.005
Health −0.008 0.027 −0.023 0.027
Male −0.115 0.143 −0.146 0.140
Occupation (Clerk)
Manager 0.096 0.206 0.106 0.190
Technician 0.240 0.269 0.177 0.247
Agriculture −0.013 0.313 0.106 0.368
Manufacturing job (H) −0.129 0.213 −0.125 0.201
Manufacturing job (L) −0.232 0.218 −0.238 0.209
Service 0.004 0.213 −0.048 0.206
Others −0.042 0.212 0.057 0.232
Regular worker −0.008 0.131









Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef. S.E. coef. S.E. coef. S.E.
Inverse Mills ratio −3.375*** 0.990 −3.113*** 0.926 −2.757*** 0.775
Observations 1,892 1,892 1,892
Prob > chi2 0.0276 0.094 0.807
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note
(1) Note ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10
(2) Treatment group: senior high school graduates aged from 21 to 30 years old; Control group:
senior high school graduates aged from 31 to 40 years old
(3) Heckman two step model is used. In the first step estimation, individual level variables including
the age, health status, number of family members, gender, noearned income, urban hukou, region
block (Central, Western Region), and region level variables including ratio of fixed asset investment
to GDP, ratio of tertiary industry to GDP, ratio of trade to GDP, and GDP per capita are estimated,
these results are not presented in this table
(4) In the second step examination, years of experience, health status, male, occupation, private
sector, regular worker, urban, and region dummy variables are also estimated, these results are not
presented in this table
7.6 Conclusions
In 1999, the Chinese government implemented aHigher Education Expansion Policy
(HEEP). With the implementation of the policy, new college graduates increased
yearly from 0.8 million to 6.1 million from 1999 to 2011 (NBS 2016). It is thought
this dramatic increase in the college graduate labor supply may affect the wage level
of young college graduates. Based on the quasi-natural experiment methods (DID
method andDDDmethod, using six waves (1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011)
longitudinal survey data from the Chinese Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), this
study employs an empirical study to provide new evidences on the issue.
Five major conclusions emerge. First, in general, the HEEP does not affect the
wage level of young college graduates; the difference of policy impact on wage by
various wage centiles is small; the HEEP decreased the wage level of new college
graduates in the short term (in 2004); whereas the negative effect disappears in the
long term (in 2006, 2009, and 2011). Second, the gender disparity of the impact of
the HEEP on wage levels of young college graduates is small. Third, the regional
disparity of the influence of the policy on wage between Eastern Region and Non-
Eastern Region (Central Region, Western Region) is small. But there maintains a
larger difference of the policy effect between urban hukou group and rural hukou
group. Concretely, the policy positively affects the wage of the migrants most of
whom are with the rural Hukou, whereas the policy negatively affects the wage of
the local urbanHukou residents. Fourth, the robustness checks confirms these results.
Based on these empirical study results, it suggests that although the gender differ-
ences of the impact of the policy on the wage level of new college graduates is
smaller, for both female and male workers, in a short term, the policy may affect the
172 7 The Impact of Higher Education Expansion Policy on the Wages …
wage level of new college graduates, but in a long-term, the negative effect of the
policy on wages may disappear. Wolf (2002), De Meulemeester and Rochat (1995)
argued that higher education can contribute to economic growth by training intellec-
tuals and facilitating scientific and technological innovation, or if the content of the
courses is directed towards a productive objective. It indicates that from a long-term
perspective, with economic growth and technological innovation, the labor demand
for highly-educated labor should increase, and as a result the increase of college grad-
uates supply can be absorbed.An important issue for the government is to promote the
economic growth through the implementation of the HEEP and to upgrade industry
structure based on the technological innovation.
Notes
1. In China there are two types of colleges: collegeswith three years of study course,
and universities with four or five years of study course. In the study, the two types
are referred to simply as “college”.
2. In China, college includes regular college and irregular college (such as colleges
which provide education courses at night, or collegeswhich provide the education
courses by television communication).
3. For the impact of higher education expansion policy on employment, please refer
to Wu and Zhao (2010), Xing and Li (2011), Li et al. (2014), Yao et al. (2013),
Knight et al. (2017) and Ma (2018a).











Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
log.hourly wage 2.282 0.754 2.337 0.929 1.730 0.799
Exp 8 1 19 3 11 1
Number of family members 4 1 4 1 4 1
Health status 6.842 2.662 5.905 2.935 6.434 2.591
Male 0.596 0.492 0.586 0.493 0.549 0.498










Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Occupation
Manager 0.247 0.433 0.459 0.499 0.103 0.304
Technician 0.075 0.265 0.139 0.347 0.029 0.169
Clerk 0.411 0.494 0.228 0.420 0.190 0.393
Agri. 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.051 0.026 0.158
Manufacturing job (H) 0.055 0.228 0.045 0.207 0.205 0.405
Manufacturing job (L) 0.021 0.142 0.011 0.102 0.136 0.343
Service 0.082 0.276 0.045 0.207 0.223 0.417
Others 0.110 0.313 0.071 0.257 0.088 0.284
Regular worker 0.568 0.497 0.793 0.405 0.458 0.499
Private sector 0.123 0.330 0.038 0.192 0.040 0.197
Urban hukou 0.699 0.460 0.657 0.475 0.520 0.501
Region
East 0.664 0.474 0.613 0.487 0.505 0.501
Central 0.288 0.454 0.284 0.451 0.333 0.472
West 0.048 0.214 0.103 0.304 0.161 0.368
Regional level variables
Ratio of fixed asset investment to GDP 0.417 0.147 0.426 0.162 0.447 0.164
Ratio of trade to GDP 0.422 0.155 0.454 0.178 0.340 0.079
Ratio of tertiary industry to GDP 0.513 0.524 0.453 0.452 0.257 0.286
GDP per capita 39,424 30,197 43,018 30,097 23,130 20,092
Survey year
y1997 0.096 0.295 0.061 0.239 0.198 0.399
y2000 0.068 0.253 0.107 0.309 0.172 0.378
y2004 0.137 0.345 0.093 0.291 0.139 0.347
y2006 0.158 0.366 0.113 0.317 0.099 0.299
y2009 0.151 0.359 0.112 0.315 0.147 0.354
y2011 0.390 0.490 0.514 0.500 0.245 0.431
Source Calculated based on CHNS 1989–2011
Note Calculated based on total samples including females and males
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